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This thesis examines the logical possibility of manned, 
or information-carrying temporal movement into the causal 
past of the object being relocated. This is achieved through 
the application of carefully controlled thought experiments 
to specific problems associated with such activity, namely: 
contradictory claims and alternative time frames -- where 
the object is said to travel 100 years in 5 minutes; 
identity relations -- where a traveller communicates with 
himself at an earlier moment in time; freewill and 
determinism -- particularly the problem of preserving the 
traveller's freewill when full knowledge of future events is 
available (this chapter includes a brief analysis of 
possible worlds); causal relations -- including backward 
causation and time travel, and closed causal chains (this 
chapter includes a fuller examination of time travel and 
possible worlds). I conclude that whereas time travel cannot 
be proved logically impossible without certain physical 
assumptions, the required concatenation of circumstance is 
so highly improbable as to make organised, human-determined 
time travel a practical impossibility. 
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I 
When I began this thesis it was with the intention of 
determining whether or not the popularly conceived image of 
time travel (primarily into the past) could ever become a 
reality. This was to be done by analysing the logical 
structure of that concept. But what seemed, with little 
thought, to be so manageable a task proved impossibly 
complex and, towards the end, I was constantly faced with 
the image of myself trying to nail a cloud to the floor. 
For one thing, the `popular' image is hardly clear-cut, 
and I soon fell into the trap, to which other philosophers 
have also succumbed, of failing to define in advance 
precisely the system of time travel to which I referred. In 
fact the concept was always there subconsciously, otherwise 
the intensely interconnected nature of this thesis could 
never have been realised, but trying to formulate the 
concept in words that would allow no interpretation but the 
one intended by the author proved to be an exhausting task. 
The interconnectedness itself has also posed enormous 
problems. In one obvious sense it is very gratifying as it 
ensures, I believe, that the whole is very tightly knit and 
that, once one point has been conceded, the rest must 
follow. But, as with any long term process, the pattern of 
argument presented here bears little resemblance to its 
earlier incarnations. As theories were shown to be flawed by 
later additions, and alternatives were prepared, so the 
entire work was to be constantly re-evaluated, and 
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appropriate alterations made. The image changed from the 
cloud to dominoes and back again. 
The amorphous nature of the study, being centred on 
something as yet unrealised and which -- if these 
conclusions are correct -- will never be realised, has 
raised other problems. Spatial analogies for time are 
notoriously deceptive, but how else can one clearly 
represent temporal movement on a page? The graphs included 
were all necessary, because the temporally dominated nature 
of the English language, quite apart from any other 
consideration, makes discussion of the incredibly complex 
subject of time a necessarily verbose exercise if clarity is 
to be preserved. Verbosity also hampers clarity, though; 
hence one problem was compounded by another, and then by a 
third when graphical imagery was used in an effort to 
express in an easily understood form the concepts expressed 
in writing. Warning is hereby given that certain sections 
(most notably those in Chapter 4 concerning the freedom of a 
traveller in the spatio-temporal relocation of a book, and 
in Chapter 5 concerning anti-matter time travel) must be 
read with extreme care due to the excessive complexity of 
trying to hold four dimensions in mind at the same time (see 
the problem? ) instead of the more usual three. It is hoped 
that the graphs, which are correct, will help. 
Two other images have remained constant companions 
throughout this study. Escher's Ascending and Descending is 
an elegant graphical representation of the closed causal 
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chain, which is the linchpin of time travel according to the 
popular conception as I have defined it (see the 
Introduction). It is also equally frustrating and impossible 
to conceptualise in real terms: frustrating, because it 
looks so straightforward at first glance and proves so 
complex when studied more carefully; impossible, for the 
reasons outlined in this thesis. The second image is that of 
the Möbius band. As a representation of the confusion 
between occasion and experience (see Chapter 4) it is ideal, 
although I refrained from making appeal to it in that 
Chapter (an omission that I hope has been rectified by its 
inclusion here), and as an aid to thinking about dimension 
in an unusual manner it proved invaluable. 
This thesis has also been the attempted realisation of 
a long held dream, and as such has been a dismal failure. I 
began with the intention of proving time travel possible, 
and ended by having to admit that all my efforts had failed. 
But this also adds to the strength of the study. My 
definition was intentionally wide ranging in order that 
anything that might be considered acceptable as an instance 
of time travel to `the man in the street' would be covered, 
together with several alternatives with which popular 
opinion would not necessarily agree. Any method that might 
be used to resolve a particular problem was considered, 
although not all those considered have appeared in this 
final submission -- in most cases because when analysed they 
all reduced to something which had been included already, 
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but occasionally because the alternatives instantly raised 
more problems than they solved (ghosts, reincarnation, and 
spiritual relocation may be counted amongst the latter). My 
determination to prove time travel possible has, I believe, 
made my study thorough, with every effort made to disprove 
my eventual conclusion. Even now I still seek a way out of 
it. 
If a preface is the place where one thanks all those 
who have helped, then that duty must now be performed. First 
I must thank all those -- whether friends, relatives, 
seminar audiences, tutors, or total strangers who engaged me 
in conversation -- who tolerated my frustrations, posed 
problems, and made me re-think my theories a thousand times. 
Specifically I include my supervisor, Jonathan Lowe, who 
gave me free rein in the early stages, and then imposed the 
required discipline on my writing without making me dejected 
at the enormity of the task which lay ahead. Barry Gower 
gave me the strength to believe in myself when, quite 
frankly, I didn't, and Paddy Fitzpatrick restored my good 
humour with his own, as well as giving me, by his own 
academic example, a lesson in scholastic honesty that I have 
tried to take to heart. 
Finally, a note addressed to any who consider my use of 
a male character for all my thought experiments an 
indication of sexual repression. I here point out that while 
it is true that Chronos features throughout these studies, 
in the course of the examples provided for analysis he is 
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revealed as a paranoid, homicidal schizophrenic! The real 
reason for using Chronos is that `he' has one less letter to 
type than 'she' and s/he is a distraction which becomes 
unmanageable and clumsy when reflexives are needed. 
1 
Section 1 
Definition 
How does one define time travel? Typically, the response 
of the man in the street differs from that of the physicist or 
mathematician: while the latter speak in terms of quantum or 
relativistic effects, the former imagines a machine with a 
`time switch' carrying a human being or, at the very least, a 
note written by one; where physicists speak in terms of parts 
of a second, the layman imagines the passage of millenia; and 
where scientists are concerned with mathematics, the man in 
the street thinks of freewill and attempts made to change the 
past. Both are concerned with causality, but once again the 
non-scientific approach is generally on a grander scale. This 
is not to claim that science never considers these aspects, 
only that a more rigorous system, concerned primarily with the 
mathematics of the subject, is less prone to misinterpretation 
due to the accidental use of unacknowledged variables than the 
purely image-based reasoning, concerned with more human 
issues, which is the realm of the non-scientist. As a result, 
whilst images are provided to aid the understanding in many 
scientific studies, the real work is often done by formulae. 
However, the intention of this study is to determine the 
logical possibility of time travel as conceived in the 
'popular' imagination, and from the above examples there is 
revealed a dichotomy between the scientific and popular 
9 
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understanding which indicates that the purely scientific 
approach is inadequate to the task. Methods by which the 
disadvantages of the non-scientific approach may be overcome 
will be examined in due course, but first a clear definition 
of the system of time travel to be examined must be provided, 
since it will have a profound effect on both the structure of 
this thesis and the validity of the conclusions drawn. 
It is interesting to note that although many articles 
have been written about time travel, few concern themselves 
with defining in advance precisely what is meant by the term. 
The `closed time-like loops' and 'movement into the backward 
light cone' of the physicist's definition do not fully capture 
the essence of the popular interpretation, and the most common 
definition provided outside the scientist's arena -- most 
famously described by H. G. Wells when he compared movement 
through time with movement through space -- is notoriously 
defective due to the subconscious inclusion of other spatial 
assumptions, the problematic `Myth of Passage' being a direct 
descendant of this form of temporal analysis (see Chapter 5). 
Among those studies which have been conducted within the 
sphere of philosophy, a rare example of an attempt at 
definition is provided by Paul Horwich in Asymmetries in Time, 
where he writes that 
To travel in time is to traverse some temporal 
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interval in a time that differs from the duration of that 
interval. 
Horwich, 1987, p. 114. 
But even here the intent is not to classify the method of time 
travel to be analysed, but merely to supply a working 
description that may be used to determine whether or not the 
term `time travel' is inherently contradictory. Murray 
MacBeath's Who Was Dr Who's Father, and Jonathan Harrison's 
Time Travel for Beginners and Jocasta's Crime, provide story- 
lines -- as opposed to specific definitions -- which are then 
analysed. This is a method common to the majority of 
philosophical discussions on the subject, and indeed, once a 
clear definition has been provided here, the remainder of this 
study will depend upon a similar system of thought-experiment 
followed by analysis. 
Of all the articles written on time travel, the sections 
devoted to the subject in Chapter 10 of D. H. Mellor's book 
Real Time represent the fullest definition that I have 
encountered. It is typically comprehensive in its analysis 
1 
but his definition of forward time travel raises an 
interesting problem. He describes it as 
not restricted as the flow of time is to a 
tautological rate of seven days a week. An example of it 
would be someone taking only ten minutes to reach the end 
1. Although some, such as P. J. Riggs (1991), would not consider the argument either 
convincing or sufficiently thorough to fully explore the problems raised. 
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of the next century; and that is an objectively possible 
achievement... All we really need is a sufficient slowing 
down of processes of change and decay so that they take a 
century to reach the point they would otherwise have 
reached in ten minutes... 
Mellor, 1981, p. 171. 
He goes on to argue that both the results of Special 
Relativity and, for living organisms, freezing or other 
methods of slowing biological processes achieve the same end, 
and consequently 
Rip Van Winkle was a time traveller... and so in 
its humble way is every hibernating animal. 
Ibid., p. 172. 
While few would feel satisfied with the claim that time 
travel into the future is employed by the hedgehog on an 
annual basis, it is difficult to define future-directed 
temporal relocation in such a way as to exclude such examples. 
The hedgehog's experience of the passage of time, both 
psychologically and with regard to its own bodily processes, 
is slowed down, as are the experiences of the time traveller 
relative to those not travelling with him. In the case of 
cryogenics, physical decay is halted, and ä person 
successfully awakened from his or her deep freeze will 
experience a sense of temporal relocation as real as that of 
the time traveller in Wells' description. True, Wells' 
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traveller could experience events within the machine (the 
movement of the hands on his own wrist-watch, for example) 
that the sleeping or frozen traveller could not, but no one 
would claim that Wells' creation would be any less a time 
traveller if he were frozen before being put into his machine. 
The difference, and a possible distinction, is best revealed 
if one examines the `twins paradox' and its resolution. 
Einstein was concerned that, according to the claims of 
Special Relativity, one twin (call him Peter) leaving earth at 
high velocity and then returning would age considerably less 
than his brother (call him Paul) left behind on Earth. The 
problem is that if Peter's behaviour is relative, it would be 
just as correct to claim that Paul was moving away from him as 
vice versa, and consequently there should be no age 
difference. The missing factor was acceleration. One twin, but 
not the other, is accelerating relative to an inertial frame. 
Peter is, in effect, the active partner, accelerating away 
from, and then back towards, the planet, and so reaping the 
benefits. It can be imagined that, as Peter begins his 
journey, Paul is frozen, to be awakened by his brother upon 
the latter's return. In this way neither would have aged as 
much as the passage of time on the planet warranted (indeed, 
Paul will not have aged at all relative to any time frame), 
but whereas Paul preserved his youth by passively succumbing 
to the effects of drugs and low temperatures, Peter actively 
went about the task of speeding up the passage of time on 
Earth relative to him, whilst preserving the normal rate of 
6 
temporal passage within the time machine. His physical and 
psychological experience of temporal passage in his immediate 
vicinity is unaffected, and an atomic clock could measure the 
passage of that time even if the traveller were also frozen. 
Thus an active/passive distinction is indicated, the passive 
distinction verging on a `Cambridge change'. It is not that 
the sleeper has time travelled, it is that the rest of the 
world has not slept with him. Time, in the frame of reference 
relative to which he is said to have travelled, has continued 
all around him, and he has been carried along with it, 
failing, because of his slowed state, to experience that 
passage. Conversely, even were the entire planet to be 
propelled into the future via some spectacular space-time 
anomaly, it would still be possible to state that time travel 
into the future had occurred, and even to determine how far 
relative to the moment of departure. Time, in the frame of 
reference relative to which the planet is said to have 
travelled, has continued, but not in the immediate vicinity of 
those travelling. Consequently they could age and experience 
events for a few years, only to return and find that millenia 
have passed in their original time frame2. Yet the 
categorisation of `sleepers' (such as the Seven Sleepers of 
Ephesus and Rip Van Winkle), cryogenically frozen biological 
beings, and hibernating animals as passive time travellers -- 
beings whose physical and psychological experience of the 
2. Backward time travel is, by definition, active, due to the asymmetrical linear ordering of 
the time frame at rest with respect to the history of the planet. 
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passage of time in their immediate vicinity differs from that 
of others in the same area (a clock frozen with them would 
accurately represent the physical or psychological passage of 
time relative to anv time frame for such travellers, i. e. 
zero) -- still retains a slightly unsatisfactory aspect. 
Furthermore, borderline examples may be imagined, such as the 
case where all behaviour, be it animal, vegetable, or mineral, 
in our solar system slowed to half speed simultaneously. 
Relative to our immediate surroundings time would appear to be 
passing normally, but relative to the universe outside our 
system we would appear to be moving very slowly, or the rest 
of the universe very fast. Is this an example of passive or of 
active time travel? The intuitive rejection of certain 
scenarios as examples of time travel is a psychological rather 
than philosophical or scientific problem, since the experience 
of those employing such systems, and their physical state 
after the 'journey', fulfil every requirement of time travel 
into the future; consequently further analysis is outside the 
purview of this study. To quote Mellor 
Forward time travel is neither a problematic 
nor an especially remarkable phenomenon. It is really 
only an overly grand description of processes slowing 
down or stopping. Describing a stopped watch as having 
turned literally into a time machine does rather doll up 
the situation; and a repairer advertising cures for cases 
of forward time travel in watches and clocks would be 
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more derided than enriched -- as I shall be if I waste 
more ink on so trifling a topic. 
Ibid., p. 172. 
Henceforth all such systems will be regarded as time travel 
into the future, the imprecise (and, when analysed, totally 
unsatisfactory) application of an active/passive distinction 
providing a temporary salve to those who remain unconvinced. 
Time travel into the future, however it is achieved, is not a 
cause for philosophical investigation. 
In contrast, Mellor's definition of backward time travel 
is far less derisory and considerably more complex. He begins 
with the suggestion that it would involve the reversal of 
processes -- an achievable task -- but this in itself is 
insufficient, since there are processes that can be reversed 
without time travel taking place. To show the differences 
between such processes and genuine time travel, Mellor gives 
the example of three clocks: (1) which runs normally; (2) 
which is time travelling into the past; (3) which has been 
fixed so that its-'hands always run in the reverse direction. 
The difference between the three, labelled C, C', and C'' 
respectively, is given by the following: 
[1, Cl e1 precedes e2, affects it and is 
unaffected by it, 
[2, C'] e'1 succeeds e'2, affects it and is 
unaffected by it, and 
[3, C''] e''1 succeeds e''2, is affected by it 
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and does not affect it. 
Ibid., p. 173. 
C' represents the genuine backward time traveller's appearance 
to those not accompanying him (per impossibile, see Chapter 1) 
because, from the traveller's own point of view, events inside 
the time machine are not reversed but behave in the normal 
manner, with the cause -- such as water from a recently boiled 
kettle being poured onto leaves in a pot -- preceding the 
effect -- the manufacture of a hot pot of tea. Furthermore, 
with examples of genuine time travel it is not merely events 
within the time machine that appear reversed to an outside 
observer, but the ordering of events before he begins and 
after he finishes his journey. Hence, the switching on of the 
machine in 2000 AD precedes and is the cause of the arrival of 
that same machine in 1800 from the traveller's point of view, 
whilst the events in 1800 precede those of 2000 AD relative to 
an observer who is not time travelling. 
Yet despite the force of his argument, Mellor's 
description is nevertheless unsuitable for this thesis, for 
from it he derives two logical consequences. One is that all 
time travel into the past necessitates the existence of closed 
loops (an hypothesis with which this thesis concurs; an 
argument in support of this claim will be presented in Chapter 
5), and the other is that time travel into the past 
necessitates backward causation. This is not a contention to 
be supported in the following pages and, again, full analysis 
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may be found in Chapter 5. What, then, is the definition of 
time travel with which this thesis will be concerned? 
In simple terms the following pages will be dedicated to 
proving whether or not it is logically possible for something 
to carry (or transmit) information into the past relative to 
the moment of departure; or, to put it another way, whether we 
can or will ever receive a message of any kind from the future 
(time travel into the future having been shown to be 
considerably less problematic and, in a very real sense, 
possible). But if time travel into the past is defined as the 
temporal relocation of information to a period lying in the 
causal past relative to the moment of departure, there remains 
the problem of the ambiguous use of the term `information'. 
The Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus defines information 
as 
1. Knowledge acquired through experience or 
study. 2. knowledge of specific and timely events or 
situations; news. 3. the act of informing or the 
condition of being informed. 
Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1986. 
The combination of definitions 1 and 2 in particular seems to 
sum up neatly the commonest examples of a time traveller's 
characteristics, but this also introduces the concept of 
knowledge -- a concept that is hardly devoid of problems 
within the boundaries of philosophical debate. As such, it is 
of limited value at this stage. It is the nature of the 
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information that is to be carried which can provide a greater 
insight into the system of time travel to be investigated. 
If this examination is to be concerned with whether or 
not information may be transmitted or carried into the causal 
past, then the prime concern must be to determine whether the 
system employed enables the communication of the temporal 
origin of the transmission or journey, for it is a fact that 
only time travelling objects which come from the future 
relative to the moment of arrival generate problems. In order 
to communicate futuristic temporal origins, the system must 
exhibit two features: (1) it must be capable of causal 
interaction; (2) anything possessed by the system at point C- 
-C being posterior to A, relative to a time frame at rest 
with respect to the history of the planet (see Chapter 2) -- 
is preserved during its travels backwards to point A (see 
above). Hence, if a time machine is scratched at point B, that 
being a position between A and C, that scratch is still 
exhibited upon the machine's arrival at A. But marks or 
physical organisation are not the only methods by which the 
results of events in the future may be carried into the past 
relative to the moment of departure. The existence of an 
object may be sufficient if, in advance, it is determined that 
matter is to be sent from the future to a particular spatio- 
temporal location. The detection of energy or matter at the 
specified space-time under regulated experimental conditions 
could generate a bilking experiment, and so must be included 
as a method of communicating information about the future and 
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hence the temporal origins of the message. This does, however, 
require that a positive temporal and causal direction be 
preserved for the information, even when it is travelling 
backwards in time. The applications and implications of this 
caveat are more fully explored in Chapter 2. 
From the above, the definition of time travel to be 
examined in this thesis is revealed; for if the person or 
object is not capable of causal interaction, he/it is 
incapable of communicating with or affecting objects or 
persons within the time in which he/it exists. Consequently 
he/it would not breathe, or be seen, or displace molecules in 
the past relative to the moment of his/its departure, and so 
there would be no proof of his/its physical existence at that 
time. An example may clarify the issue still further. A person 
with a powerful telescope situated upon a far distant planet 
might point it at the Earth and see dinosaurs walking the 
surface ---and this is not problematic, as shown by our 
freedom to admire the night sky -- but such an action is not 
considered time travel according to the above criteria, since 
the observer on a distant planet is not interacting with the 
Earth in the Cretaceous period but merely observing reflected 
light given off at that time. Only if a response from that 
observer precipitates causal interaction prior to the emission 
of those photons could bilking experiments be generated, and 
under such circumstances time travel would be said to have 
taken place. 
Mention has been made of interaction within the causal 
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past, and a physicist might well re-interpret this as meaning 
interaction within the light cone that lies in the past 
relative to the moment of departure. But this is simply 
because the light cone presently defines the fastest system by 
which messages may be dispatched and received. However, were 
another method discovered by which the speed of causal 
interaction might exceed that of light, then the cone which 
represents the optimum reaches of causal interaction under 
that description would define the boundaries of backward time 
travel for this study. Thus interaction within the causal cone 
lying in the negative direction relative to the point of 
departure would represent backward time travel, since any 
action performed within those boundaries would be in a 
position to propagate consequences that could affect events at 
the point of departure and so at the point of origin of the 
event. Were a time traveller to journey to a spatio-temporal 
location that did not permit the arrival of any causal 
consequences of his actions until after the moment of his 
departure, this would not be considered an example of time 
travel into the past as popularly conceived, even though it 
could be an instance of time travel into the relative past as 
designated by Einstein's Special Relativity Theory. This is 
because the popular system includes the implicit assumption 
that the traveller into the past is in a position to affect 
his own existence or that of others around him before the 
moment of his departure. 
What of the second criterion raised above? What is the 
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importance of preserving what may be termed the causal history 
of the information being transmitted into the past? Causal 
history includes memories, marks, physical location, and 
organisation. In order that the temporal origins of an object 
may be determined it is necessary that, at the very least, one 
of these elements is preserved as it journeys into the past. 
For if the causal history is in some manner negated as travel 
into the past occurs, there remains no indicator of temporal 
origins, and so no proof that time travel from the future 
relative to the moment of arrival has taken place (see 
Chapters 2,3 and 5). 
Time travel into the past as defined for this thesis is 
therefore the temporal relocation of information, by any 
method, into the causal past relative to the moment of 
departure; and information is defined as consisting of, at the 
barest minimum, a means of verifying the future temporal 
origins of that information. These may, in turn, be 
communicated by its organisational structure or spatio- 
temporal location. The method of conveyance is limited only by 
its capacity to preserve the causal history that provides a 
means of determining the temporal origins of the object said 
to be time travelling, and its ability to convey an object or 
person in such a manner that the power to interact in the past 
-- a feature required if time travel is to be detectable -- is 
also preserved. 
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Section 2 
Why? 
As time travel is typically associated with scientific, 
rather than philosophical, research, and more often than not 
considered suitable only for science fiction, I will now 
provide an explanation for my choice of subject. 
1, Human Freedom. Despite man's astonishing technological 
advances over the past one hundred years or so, there is one 
shackle of which he cannot divest himself: he is incapable of 
escaping the passage of years. He cannot correct the mistakes 
of the past upon the realisation of present unpleasantness, 
nor can he go into the past to verify events or decide issues. 
Regardless of his academic or financial standing, no man can 
ever affect what has been, and yet his future life will, to a 
lesser or greater extent, be affected by it. A man paralysed 
in a driving accident will never live again as he once did; a 
student who fails an important exam finds a door slammed shut 
which may never open again; a mere slip of the tongue may be a 
cause of constant regret throughout a lifetime. In each case 
the individual concerned may wish it were possible to correct 
the error, but at present both scientists and philosophers -- 
while still keeping their options open -- are at best 
sceptical and at worst derisory regarding the potential for 
backward time travel, particularly if that potential includes 
the freedom to change or in some way affect the past. 
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Consequently those who would be time travellers concede the 
arguments propounded and `make the best of a bad job'. Yet 
many of the arguments so far suggested do not, in themselves, 
completely dismiss the possibility of time travel. Were it 
possible to describe a logically coherent system that showed 
this activity to be more than a science fiction writer's 
dream, perhaps some (I do not say all, as many are inherently 
contradictory -- as this thesis will show) of the 
aforementioned limitations upon man's freedom would be 
removed. 
2,,,. Popular Science Fiction. Since the publication in 1895 of 
H. G. Wells' The Time Machine, an enormous number of books and 
-- in more recent years -- films have appeared that consider 
the possibility and implications of backward time travel. This 
is not to claim that no one had ever considered the subject 
before. The image of time as 'the ever flowing stream' upon 
which we float, helpless to correct past errors, has been 
explored since at least the time of the pre-Socratics (witness 
Heraclitus: `Panta rei kai ouden menai' -- 'Everything flows, 
nothing remains', a rueful comment on the inexorable passage 
of time). However, in the last century the combination of 
space travel and (I suspect) cinematic effects has made time 
travel, if not actually physically possible in the manner 
popularly conceived, then at least a less fantastic prospect 
and more accessible to the imagination. Thus books, articles, 
and films employing time travel include (among many others too 
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numerous to mention) Robert A. Heinlein's All You Zombies and 
By His Bootstraps, Ray Bradbury's A Sound of Thunder, Anne 
McCaffrey's Pern series, Douglas Adam's Dirk Gently's Holistic 
Detective Agency, Jack Finney's Time and Again, and an amusing 
article in Larry Niven's All the Myriad Ways; also Steven 
Spielberg's Back to the Future I, II and III, Disney's Flight 
of the Navigator, The Terminator (I and II), Star Trek, BBC 
T. V. 's Dr Who (although despite the basic plot device this 
programme rarely deals with the problems of time travel as 
defined) and the American series Quantum Leap. As can be seen 
from this list, the film industry has recently turned to time 
travel as a new and lucrative subject for exploitation. 
Unfortunately, very little thought has been put into many of 
these works, and few withstand more than a cursory glance 
before even the least well informed espies contradictions. 
L. Science Pact. The mention of time travel to a physicist is 
not guaranteed to evoke a derisory response. Richard Gott at 
Princeton University has recently suggested cosmic strings as 
a possible means to backward time travel, leading Stephen 
Hawking at Cambridge to add fuel to the debate with his 
`Chronology Protection Conjecture'. David Deutsch at Oxford 
has defended the possibility of time travel, with certain 
caveats, and the whole re-awakening of interest in the subject 
has led to the appearance of a number of television and 
newspaper articles which, whilst often imprecise due to the 
intensely erudite nature of the scientific articles with which 
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the reporters are grappling3, do reflect the sudden increase 
in interest within the scientific community. In addition to 
the macroscopic concepts of worm-holes and infinitely long 
cosmic strings that warp space-time, interpretations of 
particle behaviour that refer to travel at speeds faster than 
light, and hence time travel, do exist and there is, at 
present, no clear indication that these interpretations are 
incorrect. However, the implications were time travel possible 
have already caused consternation (see Benford, Book and 
Newcomb's The Tachyonic Anti-Telephone), and such studies 
should come under philosophy's wing. 
A, Philosophical Interest. This, sadly, has not been great. 
There are some notable articles that have been written on the 
subject, and many of them will be referred to during the 
course of this thesis. However, some are more notable for 
their marked pre-judgement of the issue than for fair 
philosophical argument. For example, Anthony Flew, in his 
article Time Travel and the Paranormal, says that we should 
recognise 
the at least prima facie incoherence of all 
talk about time travel. 
Flew, 1988, p. 267. 
and adds later that 
3. One reporter from a national newspaper, whom I contacted with regard to an article on time 
travel that he had written, admitted that he had not actually read the papers to which he had 
referred but was merely reciting commentaries written by others. 
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quite apart from all the contradictions 
involved in such experiences as those of being a witness 
in 1987 to a battle which occurred in 1066 or of being 
directly affected by the happening of things which have 
not yet happened, the time traveller would have to be not 
a flesh and blood person but a disembodied soul. And it 
is not to be taken for granted that that suggestion is 
any more coherent than the others. 
Ibid., p. 268. 
Unfortunately, such surface skimming is typical, and has given 
the subject a worse reputation than it already possessed. To 
add insult to injury, many philosophers seem to consider time 
travel only when they desire a 'mental holiday' from the 
rigours of so called `serious' intellectual thought. Jonathan 
Harrison's Dr Who and the Philosophers or Time Travel for 
Beginners and Jocasta's Crime both appear to fit this 
category, as does Murray MacBeath's Who Was Dr Who's Father?. 
I am sure both would claim that there was, in point of fact, a 
serious intent behind these articles, which raises the problem 
that time travel simply is not taken seriously. Part of the 
reason lies in the necessary use of colourful thought 
experiments, and part in the association with commercial 
successes (poorly thought out from a philosophical 
perspective) such as Dr Who which is not only hard to shake 
off, but is positively encouraged (witness the titles 
mentioned above). A justification of the methods employed 
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throughout this thesis will appear later in this introduction; 
here I will only state my belief that philosophy need not be 
boring in order to be relevant, and when a subject is as 
difficult as time travel any method that makes it available to 
a wider audience is to be encouraged, provided it does not 
detract from the power of the argument or cause the reader to 
ignore the reasoning in favour of the story-teller. 
Personal Interest. As this is vital to the successful 
completion of any thesis, I chose a subject whose 
ramifications have long been of interest to me. Curiously 
enough I did not like science fiction books on the whole, 
although some of those I encountered in the course of writing 
this thesis did cause me to reconsider my opinions on the 
quality of the genre in general. I have, however, decided to 
concentrate my energies upon philosophy and science for 
background, and philosophy alone for argument, in an effort to 
minimise any antagonistic response resulting purely from the 
commercial as opposed to academic origins of the examples. My 
use of science fiction or fantasy as an aid to understanding 
during the course of what follows, therefore, must now be 
explained. 
Section 3 
Justification of Method 
Throughout this thesis considerable use will be made of 
thought experiments. These have a long and distinguished 
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heritage ranging from Zeno's Achilles and the tortoise and 
Plato's Cave, to Boethius' cartwheel, Hume's billiard table, 
and finally, in the 20th century, myriad thought experiments 
which, while not so famous at the moment, will in some cases 
doubtless become so in due course. Some philosophers are more 
renowned than others for employing this method. Dummett, 
Lewis, Putnam, and Einstein have all applied thought 
experiments regularly and to great effect, and will be 
considered, together with many others, in due course. However, 
the use of thought experiments is not always viewed so 
benignly. K. Wilkes, in her book Real People, Personal 
Identity Without Thought Experiments, gives over a long and 
interesting first chapter to their uses and dangers. Her 
arguments must be considered, as the value of my conclusions 
must necessarily rest upon the validity of the method of their 
extraction. 
Philosophers are not the only members of the academic 
community who employ thought experiments. Scientists too have 
been known to use the words `Suppose the following were the 
case. What would happen then? '. Einstein, who more than any 
other earned the title philosopher-scientist, considered what 
one would see if one were to travel upon a beam of light, and 
the consequences of his Gedänken-experiment are the basis of 
the presently accepted scientific view of the universe as a 
relative, rather than absolute, system. Naturally, the world 
of science did not simply accept Einstein's claims without 
empirical evidence: experiments were designed to test his 
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theories, and after they were found to be correct they were 
built upon and further hypotheses extrapolated from them. 
However, the thought experiment itself was justified, despite 
the fact that it could never occur. This was because the 
inability of the human frame to withstand the pressures 
exerted upon it when it is accelerated to the speed of light 
is irrelevant to the experiment, which was concerned with the 
behaviour of light itself. Thus Wilkes concedes the validity 
and necessity of this sort of thought experiment. What then of 
the philosopher's fantasy life? 
According to Wilkes 
philosophical thought experiments are, in 
theory at least, intended to tell us what we would say 
if..., precisely in the world as we know it from our 
scientific theories -- so that we can explore the 
ramifications of the concept in question. 
Wilkes, 1988, p. 46. 
Personal identity and time travel both share an enormous 
burden of thought experiments. Suppose one were to awake with 
all the memories of Socrates or Charles I; suppose one were to 
step into a machine, flick a lever, and find oneself facing 
the Ironsides at Marston Moor, and were informed by the 
combatants that the date was July 1644, what then? According 
to Wilkes the answer depends all too much on the information 
you may have left out. If one cites actual examples, all 
necessary information is contained within them simply because 
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they occurred. Thus 
basing our arguments on actual cases allows us 
to check our imagination against the facts, and our 
intuitions get strengthened and rendered more 
trustworthy. 
Ibid., p. 48. 
However, when one creates a thought experiment, one is 
necessarily forced to specify, rather than assume, the 
required details, and it is all too easy to omit those which 
are either too obvious or too obtuse. How can one guarantee 
that one does not make errors that could affect or negate the 
conclusions drawn from the example? Wilkes argues that this 
guarantee is required, since without it all one can say is 
that in our ignorance 
we do not know whether the state of affairs is 
theoretically possible or not; and that is a long way 
from saying that it is possible. 
Ibid., p. 31. 
Secondly, many thought experiments assume situations 
which, according to Wilkes, could never obtain in this world; 
hence their validity is once again tainted. For example, she 
queries the value of asking what would follow were a human 
being to fuse with another or split into two like an amoeba, 
when the event simply cannot occur? Where is the dividing line 
between these suggestions and pure fiction? Wilkes comments 
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that 
[T]hought experiments are, like all 
experiments, undertaken for a specific purpose. [In the 
amoeba case] everything else is going to be so 
unimaginably different that we do not know what concepts 
would remain `fixed', part of the background; we have not 
filled out the relevant details of this 'possible world', 
except that we know that it cannot be much like ours. But 
if we cannot know that, then we cannot assess, or derive 
conclusions from, the thought experiment. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
From the above it would appear that thought experiments are a 
minefield whose potential for self-destruction seems to make 
their avoidance the primary concern of cautious researchers. 
The arguments raised by Wilkes are indeed powerful, and I 
have by no means covered every attack she makes, merely the 
more salient points. However, whereas personal identity and 
time travel share the superfluity of thought experiments, they 
are very different in one important respect: whereas one can 
take examples from life to discuss identity, the same does not 
hold true of time travel into the past. Indeed, the aim of 
this thesis is to determine whether or not time travel of the 
form described above is possible. To refuse to use thought 
experiments under these circumstances is to refuse to discuss 
the subject altogether, and that is a recipe for stagnation. 
One might ask why I do not concentrate upon scientific 
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experiments; after all, to quote Sklar: 
[t]o try and carry out a philosophical 
discussion about such a problem as the nature of space 
and time without relying upon the results of physical 
theorizing is to walk blindfold when one is equipped with 
extraordinarily useful eyes. 
Sklar, 1974, p. 417 
My reasons for not doing so are: (1) As a philosopher and not 
a scientist I lack the scientific background to perform the 
task adequately; (2) as revealed in the definition of time 
travel provided at the beginning of this chapter, the 
characteristics of the popular concept are not always catered 
for within the scientific arena, and it is the logical 
possibility of the popular understanding of time travel that I 
wish to investigate; (3) the most promising area of study at 
present appears to lie in the region of quantum physics, which 
in turn is proving incredibly alien to our understanding of 
the macroscopic world that we inhabit, and until a means is 
discovered of uniting quantum theory with gravitational 
theory, this situation will doubtless continue. Since human 
beings and other macroscopic objects do not behave in the same 
way as photons, and since our existence in any particular 
state is not generally understood to be dependent upon the 
observations of others, there is little value in my utilising 
studies which are not (at present) applicable to the 
definition of time travel under consideration. Consequently, 
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while mention will be made of appropriate scientific 
references, their use is limited by the nature of the area to 
be explored, and I am therefore forced, if I am to discuss the 
subject at all, to make some appeal to thought experiments of 
my own devising. 
The value of thought experimentation lies not only in 
their use when discussing what has yet to be achieved, but 
also in their power to push any given theory to its extreme. I 
cannot design a time machine, but I can subject carefully 
chosen hypotheses to tests of coherence. Should I find that 
time travel, as defined earlier in this chapter, necessarily 
involves contradictions then, provided the validity of my 
method is accepted, I will have shown it to be logically 
impossible and therefore physically impossible. 
What would be a valid test of my methods? According to 
Wilkes 
we should look rather to the 'theoretical', or 
`in principle' possibility of the relevant background 
conditions -- the conditions we need to specify before we 
can be sure that both the imagined scenario is adequately 
described, and that the inference from the imagined state 
of affairs to the conclusion can be made. 
Wilkes, 1988, p. 18. 
These background conditions have already been stated in the 
definition. In addition, no consideration is to be given to 
the study of time travel by disembodied spirits as suggested 
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by Flew (above). This is due to the considerable difficulties 
that arise whenever any attempt is made to explain the nature 
of a disembodied existence. Problems typically raised include 
queries as to the site of memory storage, how it could see, 
hear, touch, smell or taste without the necessary organs or a 
brain in which to analyse the information, and how it can be 
said to have a position when there is no physical substance 
with which any other given object can hold a spatial relation. 
A further issue worthy of consideration concerns the logical 
argument being invoked: why should a time traveller need to be 
disembodied? In fact an appropriate answer to this, although 
not specifically addressed to the problem of disembodied 
spirits, appears in Chapter 5. In this thesis I am not 
concerned with one particular method, but with time travel (as 
defined) per se, however it may be achieved, although as the 
argument proceeds certain methods may present themselves as 
more logically coherent than others. An argument could be 
presented for querying the validity of a study of the logical 
problems associated with a physically impossible phenomenon, 
but it has yet to be proved conclusively that time travel lies 
in this category, as indicated by the aforementioned 
resurgence in scientific interest. 
Some consideration should now be given to the nature of 
the time machine itself. For those who have seen the film 
version of The Time Machine a particular image will probably 
spring to mind: that of a machine with a large rotating wheel 
upon the back, plush red velvet upholstery, a lever with a 
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crystal base, and brass fittings. Whilst perhaps aesthetically 
pleasing, such a description is hardly practicable since a 
time machine must be capable of propelling itself through 
space as well as time. This is due to the fact that our planet 
circles the Sun; these two, together with the remainder of our 
solar system, orbit the galactic centre, and the galaxy itself 
is moving through space. Should the machine only be capable of 
movement through time, a traveller into the past could not 
alter his temporal location and maintain his spatial position 
relative to the planet. Consequently the machine must be 
capable of self-propulsion, and since high velocities will be 
required to cover the intervening spatial difference between 
the planet's present and earlier positions there must also be 
a means for the protection of the traveller. Present space- 
ship technology indicates the possibility in principle of a 
machine capable of high velocity movement through the vacuum, 
and so the utilisation of such a machine may be assumed as a 
working hypothesis. Since the aim of this thesis is to 
determine whether a machine capable of travelling backwards 
through time is logically viable, this physical description 
lies within the parameters laid down above for thought 
experiments. Should the results in any way hinge upon the 
physical structure or behaviour of the time machine -- rather 
than that of its occupants, or the fact that it is travelling 
backwards through time and not just in a linear fashion 
through space -- this description will be replaced with one 
more appropriate to the conditions (as in Chapter 3, Section 
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3, and Chapter 5). Since the aim of this thesis is to 
determine whether time travel as defined above is possible, 
and that definition does not cite any particular method of 
temporal relocation, it is important that the method used at 
any given point in the discussion does not restrict the 
conclusions drawn. 
How will the time machine achieve its design aim? Whilst 
this question is understandable, it is not actually relevant 
to the discussion in hand. As suggested earlier, it might 
prove possible to make use of worm holes in space or other 
gravitational anomalies, and by the end of the next century we 
may have discovered alternative methods. However, if the 
conclusion of this thesis should be that backward time travel 
is logically impossible due to fundamental contradictions, 
inherent in the process, that cannot be resolved, rather than 
as a result of the methods employed or the persons/objects 
involved, then whatever discoveries are made they will not 
enable its existence, for logical possibility is a necessary 
precursor of physical viability. 
This introduction has highlighted the inappropriate 
nature of Wilkes' test to this thesis. This is due to the 
necessity of a suspension of disbelief for the purposes of 
initiating investigation into the subject. But under such 
circumstances how can one avoid falling into the trap of 
proving that from the impossible anything follows? First by 
remembering the fact that time travel, as has already been 
stated, has not been proved impossible -- to establish whether 
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or not that is the case is the purpose of this thesis. Second, 
by subjecting every argument to tests of logical consistency 
and coherence -- not just internally, but within the entire 
universe in which this activity is to be pursued. Whilst I 
cannot guarantee to cover every detail -- that is the 
limitation of thought experiments -- it is possible to subject 
any hypothesis to considerable logical pressure, attacking 
every premise with equal force until one gives way -- and in 
this lies their advantage. 
So far I have defined the subject area, outlined my 
intentions, and justified the use of thought experiments, but 
what of my use of science fiction and fantasy? How can this be 
justified? It should be remembered that the first notable 
fiction work on the subject was by H. G. Wells in 1895. There 
was another previous to that, by F. Anstey in 1891, called The 
Time Bargain or Tourmalin's Time Cheques, which pondered the 
possibility of causality violation -- a subject that the 
scientifically trained Wells neglected to consider -- but this 
book was overshadowed by its contemporary's success and few 
have heard of it. Since then, many writers have given 
intelligent consideration to the subject, and it would 
therefore seem short-sighted and unnecessarily insular not 
even to pay lip service to what has been written, even though 
reasons of copyright as well as the need to include only those 
aspects of the story that are relevant will result in a total 
dependence upon self-created thought experiments for analysis. 
All references to well known science fiction made in this 
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thesis will therefore be expansions, provided either as a 
supplement to the descriptions already given, as an aid to 
visualisation, or as additions to point the way to how others 
have dealt with the problem. I cannot claim originality in the 
ideas to be tested, or even in the means of testing them, but 
in the conclusions reached and the unification under one title 
of a great many opinions upon the subject of time travel, 
originality does, ultimately, reside. 
The next chapter will mark the beginning of my 
investigation within the parameters outlined above. It will 
contain an initial description of an incident of time travel 
as presently defined, followed by an analysis in which the 
various elements will be highlighted. Where feasible, these 
elements will be subjected to immediate investigation; 
otherwise, direction will be provided to those specific 
chapters in which an in-depth study of the problem, and its 
possible solutions, may be found. 
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Section 1 
A General View 
This chapter is intended as a general introduction to the 
particular problems, generated by time travel into the past as 
defined, which will be encountered throughout the course of 
this thesis. It is hoped that any remaining confusion 
regarding the nature of the system under investigation will be 
resolved through consideration of the following thought 
experiment and its subsequent analysis. In order that all the 
aspects to be analysed in the following pages be raised, a 
human time traveller using a time machine has been used as a 
blueprint for discussion. In this way problems concerned with 
human freewill and the physical nature of the time machine may 
be raised along with those of interaction, temporal anomalies, 
and causality violation that apply to all methods of time 
travel. 
Imagine, therefore, the time traveller preparing for his 
first journey into the past. Certain precautions can be 
assumed to have been taken in advance for the purposes of 
survival, such as the administering of inoculations against 
diseases which, though long since eradicated, were prevalent 
in the years to be visited, but there are other precautions 
that must also be taken into consideration, whose nature and 
purpose are best summed up in the following quotation from 
Monte Cook. 
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The real reason for time travellers to take 
certain kinds of precautions is not for them to avoid 
changing the past; [it]... is for them to play the odds. 
If you want to visit Socrates' trial, don't 
dress in twentieth-century clothes -- the odds against 
someone's having been present at Socrates' trial dressed 
in twentieth-century clothes are astronomical. If you 
want to visit Socrates' trial, dress appropriately, speak 
the language, know the customs and so forth. In this way 
you'll be playing the best odds for your having been 
present at the trial. 
Of course, if the records of the time you want 
to visit tell of a bizarrely dressed, strange-tongued, 
odd acting visitor, you need to take that into account. 
(If your visit to the past can explain something hitherto 
inexplicable, so much the better. ) 
Cook, 1982, p. 54. 
Consequently our time traveller (who will henceforth be termed 
Chronos for the sake of brevity) must be both informed and 
protected to ensure the maximum chances of survival and 
success. 
Assuming all appropriate precautions have been taken into 
consideration, it would be reasonable to suppose that the 
would-be time traveller would incorporate a test into his 
first venture by which he might determine whether or not he is 
successful. To this end it may be imagined that Chronos takes 
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with him an object which can be left behind in the past. It 
should be of a substance that will not degenerate and that can 
be easily hidden, in order to maximise its chances of 
survival. Here one might ask why Chronos does not simply leave 
a mark, whilst in the past, that can be easily detected at an 
appropriate future date. The reason is, as above, because he 
must 'play the odds'. No scientifically verifiable evidence 
has ever been found to indicate the previous existence of a 
time traveller, therefore any sign left by such a person must 
be both well hidden and easily and unquestionably recognisable 
for what it is. A rock that has been painted or otherwise 
marked by what appears to be an intelligent hand is not 
acceptable, even if it contains a signature, matching that of 
the time traveller, that can be tested by means of carbon 
dating, for this could still be coincidental (albeit in the 
face of overwhelming odds). However, the discovery of a 
plastic sheet containing both an autographed hologram of 
Chronos and information on 20th-century technological advances 
would, I believe, be considered more than acceptable evidence 
if it were, for instance, located in the very fabric of an 
ancient monument. Thus, if such an object -- recently known to 
have been involved in time travelling experimentation -- were 
uncovered during repair work on the pyramid of Cheops, in a 
position that could only be accounted for if it had been 
inserted during the original construction of the tomb, and if 
scientific examination revealed no more recent damage or 
alteration to the tomb's structure, and there was no other 
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explanation for its existence in that position, then this 
could be considered proof of the activities of a time 
traveller at a much earlier moment in the history of the 
monument. 
Imagine Chronos inoculated, appropriately garbed and 
informed, and armed with the potential proof of his 
activities, stepping into his machine, pressing the relevant 
buttons to programme the intended date of arrival, and 
stepping out again in Egypt, on the plateau of Giza, in the 
inundation of the year 2588 BC. If his journey is successful 
he will then be in a position to watch the construction of the 
pyramid of Cheops, and having established beyond question his 
temporal and spatial position (perhaps by means of the stars), 
he could conceal the hologram in the base of the pyramid, 
including with it some beacon by means of which it could be 
detected by modern techniques so as to enable its future 
discovery. 
Still further aspects may now be added to the thought 
experiment without excessive complication. Imagine that 
Chronos pauses in that space-time position until it is no 
longer physically possible to remove the hologram without the 
reconstruction of a vast section of the pyramid, and thereby 
he ensures his proof remains in position. During this 
interval, Chronos is approached by someone who establishes 
himself as Chronos' older self. This person (Chronos-old) 
discusses events that will occur after Chronos-young's return 
from his trip, after which the latter bids his older self 
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goodbye and steps back into the machine. Chronos-young moves 
slowly forwards through time in order to follow the building 
of the pyramid through the windows of his machine, and, when 
he is finally satisfied that the hologram is safely embedded, 
returns to his own time (i. e., the year of his initial 
departure). 
Having re-established his temporal position, Chronos pin- 
points the location of the hologram inside the pyramid with 
the sensing equipment. It is removed (with some difficulty) 
and found to be exactly the piece of modern design described 
above, positioned in such a way as to defy attempts to place 
it today without very severe and easily detectable damage to 
the pyramid'. 
Section 2 
An Analysis of the Problems Highlighted by the Experiment 
With the completion of the initial description comes the 
need to distinguish those problems contained within it that 
will constitute the substance of the following chapters, as 
well as those which, while problematic enough to warrant 
explanation, are of insufficient magnitude to be granted 
chapters of their own. The latter will be analysed within this 
section. 
(I) The first problem encountered -- termed `playing the 
odds' by Monte Cook -- will be discussed in the chapter 
1. The fact that its removal would also cause irrevocable damage to the pyramid is a matter 
for aesthetic, not logical, concern. 
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entitled Freewill and Determinism. It is concerned in part 
with the consequences should a person attempt an act in the 
past of sufficient worth to guarantee a report, but for which 
no such report exists: for example, a traveller visiting the 
Battle of Waterloo with a large number of modern machine guns 
and tanks, despite the fact that no record exists of such 
weaponry at that event. It is also concerned with the 
implications for the individual's freedom not to act when an 
event occurs involving a future stage of the traveller to the 
stage presently occupying that space-time in the normal 
manner: for example, the traveller watches his future self 
commit a crime and, having witnessed the consequences of that 
act, decides not to perform it under any circumstances. He 
then proceeds to do everything in his power to ensure he is 
not present at that particular time and place when the crime 
is committed, even to the extent of attempting self- 
destruction in order to forestall the event. 
In each case the immediate conclusion would be that he 
will not succeed. In the first case, this is because 
activities of such magnitude do not go unrecorded, and 
consequently there ought to be some register of it in history 
books or accounts preserved from that time period. As there is 
not, the simplest explanation is that he will not succeed 
because he did not. Similarly, in the second, there is 
evidence -- in the shape of past experience -- to indicate 
that the act will be performed at a later moment in the 
traveller's personal history. Hence from the fact that this is 
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what he did do there follow apparently inescapable conclusions 
regarding what he will do. 
(II) In the above paragraph I highlighted certain 
temporal phrases -- `did do', `will do' -- and this leads 
directly into the next aspect to be considered, which I will 
term the problem of 'alternative temporal references'. In the 
initial description I spoke of the time traveller stepping 
into his machine, and a few moments later stepping out again 
to find himself in Ancient Egypt. The impression was thereby 
given that he had travelled more than four thousand, five 
hundred years in a few minutes. This, surely, is a 
contradiction, and some philosophers have dismissed time 
travel as incoherent upon this stumbling block alone (see 
Flew, 1988; Williams, 1968; Holt, 1981). Since this is an oft- 
cited paradox of time travel the chapter immediately following 
this one, entitled Personal and External Time, will be devoted 
to its dissolution by means of the introduction of carefully 
defined temporal reference points. 
(III) So far the problems highlighted have all been 
contained exclusively within the bounds of logic and 
metaphysics. Yet some of the difficulties encountered in a 
thought experiment concerning time travel straddle the 
boundary between physics and philosophy, and in so far as they 
fall within the parameters of a philosophical analysis should 
be examined. Thus, I described Chronos as stepping into the 
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machine, pressing some buttons, and going backwards in time. 
In these circumstances is there not a danger of collision 
between the time machine moving forwards through time under 
normal conditions, and that same machine moving backwards 
relative to the temporal axis whilst occupying the same 
spatial coordinates as its earlier self? 
The potential for clashes arising from an attempt to 
travel backwards through time is considered by Michael Dummett 
in his article Causal Loops (1986). There he examines and 
expands the descriptions at the beginning of Wells' The Time 
Machine. The reader is asked to imagine a time traveller who 
arrives from the year 2085 AD, this being a moment in the 
future relative to the temporal siting of the thought 
experiment. Dummett argues that two versions (he calls them 
`exemplars') of the machine must appear side by side: one 
travelling backwards in time from our point of view, 
containing within it a time traveller whose bodily processes 
seem to us to be reversed, the other machine, from which the 
traveller steps, behaving perfectly normally provided no one 
tampers with it. This latter version is moved to a museum in 
order that it may be preserved. Dummett makes the hypothesis 
that the time traveller is born in 2045, but dies in 2020, and 
that consequently, after a pause between the years 2020 and 
2045, there are two travellers existent on the planet. 
Furthermore, there will be at first two time machines, and 
later three. The explanation is as follows: one traveller will 
be in the time machine travelling backwards in time; the other 
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will be that same traveller earlier in his history, growing 
up, building the time machine, and finally stepping into it. 
Of the time machines themselves, one will be travelling 
backwards in time with the traveller; one will be the same 
machine later in its history after the traveller stepped out 
of it and left it in the museum; and the third will be the 
same machine at the beginning of its existence, as the 
traveller first builds it and prepares to use it. It is at 
this point that Dummett raises the matter at issue. 
Note that he [the time traveller] cannot leave 
it [the time machine] standing for any length of time and 
then climb in and switch it on, since it would then have 
been in the way of itself. He has, rather, to set its 
controls, have it hoisted above the correct position -- 
which is occupied by that one of its other two exemplars 
that is not in the museum, but contains himself living 
backwards -- climb in, give the signal for it to be 
dropped and simultaneously press the 'On' button: he and 
it will then coalesce with their other exemplars and 
vanish, leaving only the surviving machine in the museum. 
Dummett, 1986, p. 139. 
A visualisation of Dummett's thought experiment, together 
with a clearer explanation of its implications, can be 
provided by means of graphic illustrations. Fig. 1.1 
illustrates the time machine's life history as described 
above. Figs. 1.2 and 1.3 depict the problem Dummett is trying 
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to prevent. In the former, the time machine has been left in 
one position for some time before being activated. In the 
latter, there is only a brief but nevertheless sufficient 
period of time during which the machine occupies the same 
position travelling forwards in time that it will occupy when 
travelling backwards. Both would seem to be recipes for 
disaster, since in each case it appears that two objects are 
being asked to occupy the same physical space during the same 
temporal period. However, there are some fundamental errors in 
Dummett's reasoning. 
First, as mentioned earlier (see Introduction, Section 
3), were one to travel backwards in time it would also be 
necessary to travel in space. Without some form of propulsion 
capable of equalling the speed of the Earth's movement through 
space (measured at just under 19 miles per second), how can a 
guarantee be given regarding the time machine's capacity to 
remain static relative to the surface of the planet when only 
the time machine is travelling backwards? The image of the 
machine remaining in the same physical space whilst the rest 
of the world appears to be moving backwards relative to it is 
persistent, but is not supported by common sense. This argues 
that the machine would, upon initiating a backward journey 
without physical propulsion, be left floating in space since 
it would be occupying a position which the Earth, at that 
moment in time, has yet to attain. Consequently it would 
appear that in order to travel backwards in time, arriving at 
the intended temporal and spatial position, it is also 
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necessary to travel through space. However, the need for 
physical travel is not merely a matter of convenience: the 
logic of relativistic theory would seem to demand it, and it 
has proved impossible to separate space and time whilst 
preserving any true understanding of either in isolation. But 
if the time machine must necessarily be capable of physical 
movement by means of its own engines, there would appear to be 
no reason, at this stage, to demand that it only occupy those 
positions it occupied on Earth before its backward journey 
began, and so the collision envisaged by Dummett between a 
time machine travelling forwards and then travelling backwards 
in the same space can never be realised in that form. Chronos 
can choose wherever he will be spatially whilst travelling 
temporally, and the only demand is that he be in the correct 
region of space for the moment of his arrival upon Earth. 
However, whilst Dummett's image of disaster is not strictly 
accurate, some consideration must be given to the fact that, 
whereas the planet does move, its speed relative to any point 
is not such that it could remove the possibility of any 
collision between travelling and non-travelling time machines. 
Since even the slightest connection between one part of the 
time machine moving backwards through time and another 
existing in the normal manner would be sufficient to cause a 
crash at least, some method must be determined which can 
prevent this ignominious end to the traveller's intentions. 
Both instantaneous spatial movement at the moment backward 
time travel is initiated and movement through space-time such 
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that direct reversal of the local temporal direction is never 
experienced (as in the Gödelian model or worm-holes) resolve 
the problem, and since any method is acceptable provided it 
coheres with the definition above, and both these suggestions 
do, either may be used as a working alternative to the 
possibility of crashing machines. 
There are other problems with Dummett's system. He asks 
the reader to imagine the time traveller coalescing with his 
other self who is travelling backwards in time, and he cites 
elaborate procedures to ensure that the time machine is 
correctly positioned (such as the crane and the moment at 
which the time circuits must be engaged) in order to forestall 
an explosive union between the two at an inappropriate moment. 
The impression is thereby given that this can in some way 
influence the efficacy of the machine, yet once again the 
problems envisaged are illusory. 
The argument necessitates a re-interpretation of the 
causal order. For in placing the machine according to the 
position of its later self travelling backwards through time, 
Dummett makes the effect -- the already existent, backward- 
travelling machine -- into the cause -- the positioning of 
that machine before it begins its backward temporal movement. 
Yet it must be recalled that the physical location of the 
machine travelling backwards, at time t_1, is a result of the 
behaviour of the time traveller at a moment in the future 
(t+1) before (in the traveller's own experience) he began his 
journey (to). Furthermore, to position the machine according 
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to where it will be is not only to reverse the normal 
direction of cause and effect -- an attack regularly levelled 
against time travel, and which will be considered in due 
course (see Chapter 5) -- but also to deny the occupant of the 
machine any freedom of will (see Chapter 4). 
On a final note, Dummett's use of the word `coalesce' is 
potentially misleading. It suggests two or more distinct 
entities combining into one. In fact it is not that the 
machine at space-time position t will merge with another 
machine at position t_1, but that the machine at t, at a later 
moment in its personal history, ja the machine at point t_1. 
Thus it is not so much a coalescence as an ordered passage of 
causally connected stages in the life history of one object. A 
distinction must be drawn between the temporal direction 
experienced by observers who are not time travelling and the 
way the machine appears to behave, and its temporal direction 
and the way it does behave. The associated problems of 
freewill, identity, and personal and external time references 
will be dealt with in more detail in the appropriate chapters. 
(IV) The next difficulty encountered is one strongly 
linked with the problem of freewill, and has already been 
mentioned: it concerns the direction of cause and effect. 
There are three inter-connected difficulties that arise under 
this heading -- backward causation, closed causal 
chains/loops, and causal contradiction. Some clarification of 
their position in discussions of time travel will now be 
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provided by means of examples. By placing the hologram created 
in the 20th century in the time machine and thence into the 
pyramid, Chronos is causing there to have been a hologram in 
the Pyramid from the moment of the latter's construction -- 
this would be an example of backward causation. On the other 
hand, were Chronos to travel back in time, marry a woman by 
whom he had children, and one of the children proved to be 
Chronos' own great-grandfather, this would be an example of a 
closed causal loop/chain, since Chronos' particular state of 
physical existence -- not just the mere fact of it, but the 
details which go to distinguish it from other human beings and 
mark it as a descendant of particular individuals -- is 
dependent upon the consequences of his backward temporal 
journey culminating in the procreation of his great- 
grandfather. (This also entails considerations of identity, 
and emphasises further the highly interconnected nature of the 
problems under discussion. ) Finally, there is the problem of 
causal contradiction. This manifests itself when the 
performance of act n in the past actually negates the 
occurrence -- by direct causal influence or by causally 
connected intermediary stages -- of the event in the future 
that was the immediate causal antecedent of n. Thus n, by the 
fact of its existence, negates that existence. For example, 
Chronos might decide to test his machine by burying an article 
in a particular place in his garden, at a moment in the past, 
by means of his time machine. If his journey is successful, 
the article will be buried in the ground in the appropriate 
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position before he leaves, since it was put there before the 
date of his departure via the time machine. But if that were 
the case, Chronos could dig it up before he left, and with the 
proof of his machine's abilities in his hand, refuse to travel 
backwards in time to place the article in the ground. Thus the 
article would not have been buried in the past and so could 
not be excavated, thereby necessitating Chronos' time 
travelling in. order to bury it, and so on. If it exists, he 
does not travel in time; whereas if it does not, he does. But 
if he does not travel in time the buried object cannot exist 
in the past, and if he, does, it will exist (assuming no 
interference2). The structure may be more clearly illustrated 
by way of its logical form: 
(x > Y) & (Y > ~X) & (~X > ~Y) & (~Y > X) 
(where > indicates implication). 
(V) Next arose the problem of identity, as Chronos met 
and communicated with his later self. It is a necessary 
requirement of any successful claim to time travel into the 
past that one is capable of identifying the person claiming to 
be a time traveller at time tfn with the person who purports 
to be an older stage of that traveller at time t_n. Without 
such a relation it is impossible to prove that time travel has 
occurred, as opposed to remarkable coincidence or form- 
creation. Thus Chapter 3 (unoriginally entitled Identity) will 
2. Certain qualifications are required concerning this situation, and these will be given, 
together with examples and a more detailed explanation, in the appropriate chapter. 
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be devoted to a consideration of this topic. In it I will 
attempt to find criteria of identity that can fulfil the 
exacting demands of a time traveller as well as those of 
normal existence. 
(VI) Finally, I described Chronos as moving `forwards 
through time slowly, in order to follow the building of the 
pyramid through the windows of his machine'. I will now 
analyse this in more detail and argue that although this may 
be feasible when travelling in a positive temporal direction, 
as in this instance, it is not possible when travelling 
backwards relative to the object(s) to be observed. 
The image of time travel recalled by so many who consider 
the subject is often that of a person inside a machine 
witnessing the passage of events outside the machine's 
perimeter, whether in a forward or backward direction, at very 
high speeds. Flowers grow, bloom and die; snails streak across 
the floor; the sun rises and sets in seconds and -- more often 
than not, as backward time travel is of more interest -- in 
the reverse direction. The reason may be a consequence of the 
inaccurate film version of Wells' The Time Machine and the 
wonders provided by The Oxford Scientific Film Unit, neither 
of which can be considered examples of time travel. But these 
images are persistent, and have not remained confined within 
the boundaries of popular fiction and media special effects. 
Jonathan Harrison, in his article Dr. Who and the 
Philosophers, or Time Travel for Beginners also speaks of the 
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view out of the porthole of the time machine. He writes 
If there are windows in their machine, what 
sort of scenery may we suppose them to see? So far as 
their instrumental readings go of course, things 
happening outside the machine will seem to them to be 
happening in the reverse order from the order in which 
they would be happening if we date them by the sun.... If 
they actually see, through the windows of their machine, 
then what they see would be the leaves turning from brown 
to green, and the sun rising in the West and setting in 
the East. 
Harrison, 1971, pp. 11-12. 
The problems inherent in this particular aspect of Harrison's 
thought experiment were brought out by one W. Godfrey-Smith 
when replying to Analysis Problem 18: 
Let us ponder what happens during the journey. 
For the backwards traveller no sun would be visible 
rising in the West...; radiant energy would diffuse 
upward from the earth to the sun. The surroundings of the 
machine would be invisible. 
Harrison, 1980, pp. 72-73. 
Harrison's reply highlights both the potential for confusion 
during discussions of time travel, and the ease with which one 
assimilates popular imagery to the exclusion of rational 
debate. 
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Why... should the fact that, on the surface of 
the earth, there is a container holding a clock which is 
moving backwards and a body of a human being which is 
getting biologically older rather than younger mean that 
the container is invisible? 
Harrison, 1980, p. 67. 
The simple error expressed in this response surprised me 
not a little since the problem is rooted in the backward 
temporal direction of the time machine, not in the clock or 
the biological details which are both irrelevant to this 
matter. It should be recalled that whenever film companies 
employ special effects to give the impression of time travel, 
they merely run the film through the camera in the reverse 
direction thereby giving the appearance of time running 
backwards. However, the fascinating and often highly amusing 
nature of these images belies the ease with which they were 
presented to us. Once the film has been made in the normal 
manner (or using stop motion photography in the case of plants 
or slow moving objects), there only remains the simple matter 
of threading the film through the projector in the opposite 
direction or, in these days of video recorders, pressing the 
reverse button, for the effect to be created. However, the 
success of this imagery is dependent upon the fact that 
genuine time travel is not taking place. The time traveller is 
not watching a film, but attempting to observe photons that 
are moving away from the machine because of the latter's 
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temporal direction. This is not to suggest that the existence 
of an object moving in the opposite temporal direction causes 
photons to reverse their course, but simply to recall that, 
relative to that object, their direction is reversed, just as, 
relative to an outsider attempting to peer into the machine, 
the light rays emanating from it would also be reversed. The 
time traveller and the external observer could no more see the 
outside world or the interior of the time machine 
respectively, than a normal observer could see the light being 
dragged away from them by a black hole. Thus the view from 
inside the machine when travelling backwards would be non- 
existent, and a similar condition would apply to any person 
outside the machine trying to see in. At this point the 
association with backward causation becomes clear. For in 
order to claim that Chronos could examine the surroundings of 
his ship during backward temporal movement, it is necessary to 
assume that he would see the effects before the cause, i. e., 
the light from the sun before it is given off. Here it should 
be recalled that regardless of the machine's temporal course, 
the behaviour of the person inside it will always appear 
normal to him. This is because both he and the machine are 
travelling in the same direction. To use a spatial analogy, we 
do not notice the incredible speed at which the planet Earth 
travels through the universe because we are travelling with it 
at the same speed. Difficulties can only arise when Chronos 
attempts to examine something that is travelling in the 
opposite direction to himself -- in this instance, anything 
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outside the boundaries of the time machine. 
Thus within the machine the causal direction is from 
cause to effect, but when travelling backwards the causal 
direction outside the machine, from the perspective of the 
person inside it, would be from effect to cause. What would 
happen if a case of backward causation and one of ordinary 
causation met? This is a factor which must be taken into 
consideration as it appears an inevitable consequence of 
Chronos' activities, most clearly witnessed at the windows of 
the machine. A possible answer to this was provided by an 
article in Scientific American (No. 77, Jan. 1967) called 'Can 
Time Go Backward? ' where the author (Martin Gardner) 
considered the potential experiences resulting from an attempt 
to examine a time reversed universe. He writes that 
... a time-reversed galaxy would be invisible 
to 
us because light would flow into it instead of out. 
Gardner, 1967, p. 98 
Later he explains the physical reasoning behind this claim, 
arguing that 
it is easy to observe a reversed world -- one 
has only to look into a mirror. But how could an observer 
in one galaxy 'see' another galaxy that was time 
reversed? Light, instead of radiating from-the other 
galaxy, would seem to be going toward it. Each galaxy 
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would be totally invisible to the other3. Moreover, the 
memories of observers in the two galaxies would be 
operating in opposite directions. If you somehow 
succeeded in communicating something to someone in a 
time-reversed world, he would promptly forget it because 
the event would instantly become part of his future 
rather than of his past.... Norbert Wiener, speculating 
along such lines in his book Cybernetics, concluded that 
no communication would be possible between intelligent 
beings in regions with opposite time directions. 
Ibid., p. 102. 
But in the thought experiment I outlined at the beginning 
of this chapter, Chronos was moving forwards through time, and 
so it would appear that the above arguments do not apply. 
Would he, therefore, be capable of witnessing events outside 
the machine and, of equal interest, would those outside the 
machine be in a position to watch him? If time travel into the 
future is achieved via cryogenics or a form of hibernation 
then clearly there would be no problem for those outside the 
machine who wish to see in. The machine would continue to 
exist upon the surface of the planet in the normal manner; 
hence views would be possible, unless the means employed to 
prevent damage (either as a result of natural or man-made 
activity) occurring to the machine, before the intended moment 
3. There may be means by which we can determine the location of the entrance to a time 
reversed universe by effects on the boundary between the two universes, but normal views 
would be out of the question. 
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of arrival was reached, inhibited the view. Under this 
description, though, Chronos himself would not be capable of 
watching the passage of events outside, which was an important 
aspect of the description above; consequently the method 
employed must preserve Chronos in a conscious state in order 
that he may experience the passage of events in his immediate 
vicinity (i. e. within the confines of the machine) in the 
normal manner. However, I believe that once this qualifier has 
been added, the method utilised for time travel into the 
future will prevent both viewpoints from being realised. In 
order to explain this, it is necessary that some consideration 
be given'to modern scientific theory, although I will try to 
keep this analysis as brief as possible. 
One of the stranger consequences of Relativistic Theory 
concerns `time dilation'. At speeds on or above 60% of that of 
light, or near exceptionally high gravitational fields (a 
black hole, for instance), time slows down perceptibly for the 
object concerned relative to observers not experiencing the 
effect. An example of this form of time dilation (or 
dilatation) regularly appears in the shape of certain 
particles whose very existence on the surface of the planet 
Earth would not be possible, were it not for the fact that the 
particles (mu mesons or muons) had not experienced the time 
required for them to travel through our atmosphere. Even at 
the speed of light the journey time is such that they should 
have decayed before reaching the planet itself. The fact that 
they have not is indicative of the actual passage of time for 
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the particles -- a period of sufficient brevity to enable 
their existence to be registered by instruments on the 
surface. Similarly, for an object approaching a black hole the 
theory predicts that the massive gravitational field will slow 
all clocks (including biological ones) until, as the subject 
fades from view (having never crossed the event horizon from 
the observer's point of view), they almost, but not quite, 
stop relative to an observer not caught in the gravitational 
field. Of course, in neither example does the subject of the 
experiment notice any difference in time as it affects 
himself. 
From these examples it appears that a conscious time 
traveller into the future must either achieve near light 
speed, or he must position himself near an intense 
gravitational field. In neither eventuality can he remain upon 
the surface of the planet, and the only external observers who 
would be in a position to examine his behaviour inside the 
machine would either have to be travelling with him or be 
alongside him as he neared a black hole or similar 
gravitational field. In each case the observer is experiencing 
the same conditions as the traveller, and so cannot be said to 
be in an equivalent position to that of the imaginary 
observer, on the surface of the planet, attempting to peer 
inside the machine from the perspective of his different 
physical state. As for the traveller's view, it would appear 
that his experiences would match those predicted by the 
relevant theory, and would depend upon the relative velocity 
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of the objects to be observed. 
One more possibility remains. This would involve the 
slowing of Chronos' biological clock in such a manner that he 
ages more slowly but nevertheless remains conscious and so is 
free to witness the (apparently) high-speed passage of events 
outside. In contrast, those outside the ship would be able to 
peer in and see the (apparently) immensely slowed behaviour of 
the traveller within. Whilst this successfully fulfils both 
requirements it is at an unnecessary cost since there is no 
known means whereby this could be achieved. On the other hand, 
two methods for travel into the future have been presented 
which are, in principle if not yet in practice, possible, 
although neither permits a symmetrical view. Hence there are 
good reasons for supposing that neither when travelling 
backwards nor when travelling forwards through time would the 
traveller be in a position to watch reversed or high-speed 
temporal passage around him. 
The above arguments further undermine Dummett's claims 
regarding the necessary apparatus required for time travel 
into the past, since not only will the physical method 
employed necessitate the movement of the machine through 
space, but, even were it to remain on the surface of the 
planet, a backward-moving machine would not be visible and so 
the positioning of its earlier self could not be determined by 
means of observation. However, Dummett's point regarding the 
positioning of the machine is not altogether redundant, as 
will now be shown. 
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Imagine Chronos inside his machine, travelling through 
space in a linear manner, preparing to press the lever which 
will send him backwards through time. If he does not move 
instantaneously in space at the precise moment when he begins 
backward temporal movement, an overlap will occur as the back 
of the machine occupies the same space-time as the front of 
the machine the instant before. This situation would also have 
arisen had Dummett employed his crane method, except that in 
his case the top and bottom of the machine, rather than the 
front and back, would have been affected. From this it may be 
deduced that either the time traveller must utilise a method 
which ensures that at no point during his journey does the 
machine move locally in a backward temporal direction, or the 
entire machine must be physically relocated at the instant it 
begins its journey into the past. Both of these alternatives 
will be considered in greater detail in the last chapter of 
this thesis. 
Having highlighted the component parts of the thought 
experiment and distinguished those that require further 
examination, I will next provide an explanation of the 
ordering of the chapters in this thesis. 
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Section 3 
Method of Analysis 
The study will begin with an analysis of Personal and 
External Time, to be followed by the chapters on Identity, 
Freewill and Determinism, and Causality, in that order. Each 
chapter will deal specifically with the subject of its title, 
although the interconnected nature of the philosophical 
problems associated with time travel (an aspect which has 
already come to light in this first chapter) will force an 
occasional repetition in order to provide greater clarity. But 
if the problems are so interconnected, their arrangement 
should make no material difference. Some explanation would 
therefore seem to be in order. 
The first draft of this thesis began with problems of 
freewill and determinism. This was because I had been 
preoccupied for many years with the implications of time 
travel upon the freedom of rational beings. Having studied the 
subject further, I have come to realise that although problems 
of freewill may seem more pressing, it is problems of 
causality that will prove fatal to the project. For whilst the 
former are psychologically disconcerting, they generate 
neither incoherence nor logical contradiction, in stark 
contrast to the results of my investigations into the problems 
of causality. 
The association between causality and time is such as to 
have led some to suggest that the two are almost synonymous; 
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the argument is appealing, as this analysis will show. For the 
present, it is only necessary to recognise that any 
consideration of causality as it pertains to time travelling 
activities will necessarily contain considerable complexity 
within its boundaries. It is therefore left until last, at 
which stage other strands defended in this thesis will have 
been explained and so can be drawn upon to simplify the 
analysis. In addition, the chapter will become both a study in 
its own right and a resume of all that has gone before. 
As to the ordering of the remaining chapters, the 
consideration of alternative temporal reference points will be 
examined first because of the fundamental nature of the attack 
and the ease with which it is levelled. Once an acceptable 
solution to this problem has been found, the study will move 
on to consider the problem of identity before that of 
freewill. This is due to the fact that it is necessary to 
prove an identity relation between the person entering the 
time machine at one moment, and the person who, centuries 
earlier, claims an identity relation with that individual, if 
problems of freewill are to arise at all. Freewill and 
causality will follow in that order, followed by a summary of 
the arguments and conclusions of each chapter. From this study 
I hope to provide a greater understanding of what is, at best, 
a highly complicated subject, touching as it does upon one of 
the most used and yet least understood aspects of human 
existence: time. 
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He may even now -- if I may use the phrase -- 
be wandering on some plesiosaurus-haunted Oolitic coral 
reef, or beside the lonely saline lakes of the Triassic 
Age... 
Wells, 1982, p. 283. 
To travel in time is to traverse some 
temporal interval in a time that differs from the 
duration of that interval. Thus we have a 
straightforward contradiction. 
Norwich, 1987, p. 114. 
This chapter will be concerned with the resolution of 
the above contradictions, by means of the introduction of 
relative frames of temporal reference. I will demonstrate 
that a more rigorous linguistic style, which clearly 
distinguishes the temporal frame of each of the objects 
under consideration, can dissolve those attacks upon the 
logical possibility of time travel that the above exemplify. 
I further hope to show that, without these reference frames, 
many of the most commonly uttered descriptions of time 
travelling activity become meaningless, and so inadmissible 
as evidence of the subject's `prima facie incoherence' 
(Flew, 1988, p. 267). 
The assumption that time travel is `obviously' 
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contradictory, as a result of the temporal disagreements 
that arise during discussion of the subject, has become so 
widespread that it is sometimes mentioned as an aside or 
prelude to another argument. Thus Flew writes 
... quite apart from all the contradictions 
involved in such experiences as those of being witness 
in 1987 to a battle which occurred in 1066, or of being 
directly affected by the happening of things which have 
not yet happened, the time traveller would have to be 
not a flesh and blood human person but a disembodied 
soul. And it is not to be taken for granted that that 
suggestion is any more coherent than the others. 
Flew, 1988, p. 268. 
The resolution of this problem is vital to any future 
analysis of time travel. If it should prove impossible to 
re-interpret all allusions to this activity, by means of an 
appeal to alternative temporal reference points, without 
serious detrimental consequences for the writer's initial 
intent in making the comment, then it will follow -- should 
no other alternative present itself -- that such 
descriptions of time travel are indeed inherently 
contradictory and therefore nonsense. 
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Section 1 
The Problem 
Dennis Charles Holt, writing on what he terms The Time 
Discrepancy Paradox, gives the following clear example of 
the problem under consideration. 
[I]f he [the time-traveller] travels from the 
last day of 1981 to the last day of 1982 in fifteen 
minutes, he will arrive at his destination both fifteen 
minutes and one year after he departs; if his journey 
is instantaneous, his arrival will take place 
immediately after but also one year after he departs; 
if he journeys into the past, he will depart before, 
but also after, he arrives. This is an essential, 
indeed a definitive, feature of time travel as it is 
popularly conceived. 
... But now that it is made clear what the 
time discrepancy unique to time travel is, it seems 
necessary to conclude that time travel is not possible. 
Holt, 1981, pp. 1-2. 
The key to the resolution of this problem manifests itself 
if Holt's argument is rewritten to bring out the logical 
structure. 
Premise 1. In a description of time travelling activity, X 
uses a time machine to travel one hundred years in the 
positive temporal direction. 
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Premise 2. A period of five minutes elapses inside the 
machine, whilst outside the period is of one hundred years. 
Premise 3. Five minutes have elapsed between the start and 
the end of the journey and also one hundred years have 
elapsed between the beginning and the finish. This is a 
contradiction. 
Conclusion. Time travel necessarily entails the 
contradiction stated in premise 3, therefore to time travel 
is to attempt to perform an act that is self contradictory. 
There are three points of note here. The first is that 
Holt makes the assumption that his depiction of time travel 
is the only one that accurately describes the method of 
temporal relocation intended by authors on the subject. 
Second, although Holt makes occasional references to time 
travel into the past, his argument is primarily built around 
examples of future-directed temporal movement. In 
concentrating on such examples, however, he avoids a direct 
confrontation with a key element of time travel, and it is 
this element that undermines his claim to be the only person 
who is discussing genuine time travel when he is challenged 
by the arguments of philosophers such as Horwich and Lewis. 
Third, in the above it was clearly specified that a period 
of five minutes had elapsed inside the machine, whilst a 
period of one hundred years had elapsed outside it. 
Consequently, it is necessary to make a distinction between 
the time outside the boundaries of the time machine, with 
respect to which the traveller is moving -- this will be 
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termed the external temporal reference -- and the time 
period experienced by Chronos within the machine, that is 
the period taken to complete the journey -- this will be 
termed the personal temporal reference. No such distinctions 
are made by Holt and, indeed, his entire argument is built 
on the claim that there is only one frame of temporal 
reference. 
It is in an analysis of this last point that a 
unification and resolution of all three points will be 
found. There are indications that the descriptions based on 
the external and the personal time frames are not merely 
different phrases for the same experience -- except in the 
trivial sense that both refer to the passage of time -- but 
refer to distinct and definable spheres of temporal 
reference. However, the most obvious indicator is the 
disagreement between the two in cases such as that under 
discussion, and this appears to lead into a circular 
argument. The onus is therefore upon me, as the proponent of 
this solution, to prove both that the distinction drawn is 
not an arbitrary one and that there is justification for its 
application. 
The pragmatic need for two temporal frames of reference 
becomes apparent when it is recalled that neither the time 
traveller nor his machine can lose or age the relevant 
number of years in the negative or positive direction when 
travelling backwards or forwards in time'. This is because, 
1. No time travel story to my knowledge raises this issue unless it is as a result of 
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were such temporal losses or gains to occur, time travel 
into the past that encompassed periods greater than the age 
of the oldest then living human would be impossible, and 
even that person's observations would be useless if they 
were too young by the time they arrived to remember them. 
Similarly, time travel to any period earlier than the date 
of the completion of a fully functional time machine would 
also be impossible because it would cease to work, being at 
that moment incomplete, rendering its invention useless to 
those first potential time travellers. This would also 
generate difficulties for the (otherwise relatively 
unproblematic) concept of time travel into the future on 
those occasions when the aim is achieved without the 
appliance of cryogenics or any other method that utilises 
similar temporal relationships between the 'traveller' and 
his surroundings; here, the age and fitness of the traveller 
will determine the length of the journey, it being curtailed 
by death through natural causes or through the hastening of 
latent disease. 
It would be reasonable to enquire at this stage whether 
only two frames of reference are sufficient. J. W. Dunne, in 
his book An Experiment with Time, is of the opinion that 
they are not, and to justify this belief he subjects one of 
his own paragraphs to closer examination. There he notices 
the tendency in his speech to refer to what appears to be 
another time. 
machine error, which -- by definition -- is not the system of time travel being examined. 
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That this 'present' field of observation 
moved in some queer fashion along the Time length; so 
that events which were at first in the future became 
present and then past. The past was thus constantly 
growing. 
Dunne, 1958, p. 110 (his emphases). 
He argues that such references, which seem to indicate a 
time within a time, are 
the legitimate consequence of having started 
with the hypothesis of a movement through Time's 
length. For motion in Time must be timeable. If the 
moving element is everywhere along the Time length at 
once, it is not moving. But the Time which times that 
movement is another Time. And the 'passage' of that 
Time must be timeable by a third Time. And so on ad 
infinitum. 
Ibid. 
Since I only make appeal to two temporal references, I must 
disagree with the claim that one must inevitably succumb to 
an infinite regress. This disagreement derives its substance 
from the fact that the necessity of two temporal reference 
points originates in the discrepancies experienced by the 
traveller on those occasions when he moves through time in 
any manner other than that experienced by all objects that 
are not time travelling. Additional reference points will 
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only be required if further discrepancies arise between the 
personal and external time frames and some previously 
unknown temporal measure that cannot be satisfactorily 
explained in terms of those two time frames. If such 
discrepancies should not arise, once the measurements of 
temporal passage agree with one or other of these 
references, any repetitions may be ignored as surplus to 
requirements. Now, according to Dunne's analysis above, 
repetitions will only occur in the measurement of personal 
time, because it is to this reference that we make appeal 
when measuring the duration of the traveller's personal 
experience of his 'motion in [external] time' -- in this 
instance, into the past. It is a tautologous fact, however, 
that an individual's particular experience of the passage of 
time cannot differ from that experienced by the individual, 
and therefore, since the criterion for multiple frames of 
temporal reference -- that the temporal measurement 
concerned does not agree with that of either the external or 
the personal time frame -- has not been fulfilled, no 
further temporal references are required. 
On a more fundamental level, the error in Dunne's 
argument arises because he has allowed his language to shate 
his ideas, rather than using it to express them. In effect, 
he has succumbed to an aspect of the misconception of time 
that is commonly referred to as the Myth of Passage. This 
appears to have developed from a complication in day-to-day 
parlance in which people refer to time as though it were a 
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medium through which one travels, like a river. The problem 
arises because the imagery dominates the argument, 
encouraging otherwise meaningless questions such as `how 
long does it take the river of time to flow past a certain 
point? '. Although undeniably tempting, it is a misleading 
image; in this instance, this can be illustrated by the fact 
that it is possible to express, in a logically coherent 
manner, the movement of a person through time by using a 
simple graph that does not appeal to more than two temporal 
references. In Fig. 2.1 (loosely, though not entirely, based 
on Lewis's description: see below) the direction of the 
passage of external time is indicated by the arrow along the 
Y axis, while the direction of the passage of personal time 
is indicated by the arrows on the line representing the 
traveller2. On those occasions when the arrows on the 
traveller's line go in the opposite direction to that 
indicated by the Y axis, he is travelling backwards relative 
to the external temporal reference, while still experiencing 
the normal passage of personal time. He would not, 
therefore, appear to someone inside the machine with him to 
be behaving in an unusual manner -- for example, removing 
dry tea bags from a pot in which clear boiling water 
remains. In contrast, if, per impossible (see Chapter 1), 
someone could watch his activities from a temporal 
2. I have not included calibrations on either the personal or external time frame 
indicators because of the difficulty involved in accurately applying then later in this 
thesis. Key events in the traveller's life with which the discussion is concerned will be 
marked directly on the graphs, but the passage of time between the events will not be 
accurately represented -- merely the relative temporal positions. 
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perspective running in the opposite direction (i. e. from the 
external viewpoint), that is precisely what would appear to 
occur. The problems inherent in the Myth of Passage will be 
reconsidered in Chapter 5; at this stage, however, the words 
of David Lewis may aid the understanding of the time 
traveller's graphical representation under the present 
description. 
A time traveler, like anyone else, is a 
streak through the manifold of space-time, a whole 
composed of stages located at various times and places. 
But he is not a streak like other streaks. If he 
travels towards the past he is a zigzag streak, 
doubling back on himself. If he travels towards the 
future, he is a stretched-out streak. And if he travels 
either way instantaneously, so that there are no 
intermediate stages between the stage that departs and 
the stage that arrives and his journey has zero 
duration, then he is a broken streak3. 
Lewis, 1986, p. 69. 
3. It should be noted that, although Lewis makes no specification, the gap would only 
appear in a graph representing the external time frame alone. The reasoning behind this 
claim is explained in Chapter 3. 
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Section 2 
Analysis 
Having established the hypothesis that the application 
of two, and only two, independent temporal references should 
be recognised as a convenient explanatory requirement for 
logically coherent descriptions of successful temporal 
movement into the past or future, it would now be 
appropriate to test whether or not it is also a necessary 
condition of such activity. We are already aware that travel 
into the future is, in theory at least, possible using 
Einstein's theorems (see the Introduction and Chapter 1), 
and that the measured period of time experienced by that 
which is travelling differs from measurements made by non- 
travelling instruments. It is clear, therefore, that there 
is some genuine and existent difference between the temporal 
reference with respect to which the time traveller is said 
to have moved, and the time experienced personally by him 
inside the machine as his external temporal relocation is 
taking place. However, a re-examination of Holt's thesis 
reveals that he-does not accept such appeals to Relativity 
Theory as an argument. He mentions the effect of speed upon 
the decay rate of mu mesons, but then adds that 
[t]his result is not relevant to the problem 
of time discrepancy... unless one should allow that 
high speed mu mesons succeed in traveling through time 
in the originally conceived sense, and it would be 
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ridiculous to suggest that that is what the mu mesons 
do in this instance. Nowhere in the passage is it 
suggested, nor is any basis to be found for thinking, 
that in virtue of their high velocity the mu mesons 
temporarily outdistance the observers measuring the 
rate of decay. Wellsian speculations about the 
whenabouts of the time traveller are thoroughly out of 
place here, and so the time discrepancies associated 
with special relativity are simply irrelevant to the 
problem of time discrepancy associated with the idea of 
time travel. 
Holt, 1981, p. 5. 
Holt's dismissal is rooted in his interpretation of the so- 
called `twins paradox' which he does not consider to be a 
genuine instance of time travel. While I will shortly be 
taking issue with his definition of time travel, his 
argument does not directly affect my claims at this stage. 
Whether or not the behaviour of atomic clocks or mu mesons 
can be termed genuine instances of time travel is irrelevant 
to the fact that they do indicate the existence of equally 
legitimate and independent temporal measurements, whose 
discrepancies need not entail logical contradiction. For an 
independent human observer on the surface of the planet, 
using highly accurate clocks, more than three micro-seconds 
elapse between the initial entry of the mu mesons into our 
atmosphere and the registration of their existence upon the 
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surface of the planet. Had the same amount of time passed 
for the meson, however, it would have decayed. It has not, 
and therefore the meson must have experienced an interval 
which is less than that critical period. Similarly, atomic 
clocks at high speeds, or at greater distances from the 
centre of gravity, also register slightly different results 
from those left upon the surface of the planet, and both 
these measurements are equally valid from a scientific point 
of view. 
If it is clear that these two frames of temporal 
reference are different, then what grounds remain for the 
claim that there exists a contradiction when the two 
disagree? The incorrect reasoning behind this assertion 
appears to stem from a failure in verbal distinction. 
Because both references are simply termed `time', without 
any further qualification, the way is made easy for an 
equivalent failure in logical distinction. Once again, it is 
Lewis who outlines the difference. 
With respect to the correct assignment, 
properties change continuously as you go along, for the 
most part, and in familiar ways. First come infantile 
stages. Last come senile ones. Memories accumulate. 
Food digests. Hair grows. Wrist-watch hands move. The 
assignment of co-ordinates that yields this match is 
the time traveller's personal time. It isn't really 
time but it plays the role in his life that time plays 
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in the life of a common person. It's enough like time 
so that we can -- with due caution -- transplant our 
temporal vocabulary to it in discussing his affairs. We 
can say without contradiction, as the time traveller 
prepares to set out, "Soon he will be in the past. " We 
mean that a stage of him is slightly later in his 
personal time, but much earlier in external time, than 
the stage of him that is present as we say the 
sentence. 
Lewis, 1986, p. 70. 
Lewis emphasises the personal time frame's dependency on the 
existence of the external time frame, deriving from that his 
claim that personal time 'isn't really time'. Whether or not 
the personal time frame can be called `time'4, however, does 
not affect the fact that, in the above words, Lewis lends 
support to the resolution of the problem of time travel's 
contradictory nature through the use of a binary system of 
temporal references. As Horwich writes: 
Giving up the notion of absolute time and 
relativizing time to frames of reference allows us to 
view the 500 years of earth time [in his example] and 
the 15 minutes of the proper time of the time machine 
as equally good and correct measures of the temporal 
difference between the year 2500 and the departure of 
4. Since it plays the same part in the traveller's life the difference is purely academic. 
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the time machine. 
Norwich, 1987, p. 114. 
But what of Holt's claim that such an argument is faulty 
because it does not recreate the state that must necessarily 
exist in order that time travel can be said to have 
occurred? 
The `Twins Paradox' is a conundrum arising from the 
time dilation associated with travel at speeds nearing that 
of light. Thus one twin, Peter, accelerates away from the 
Earth at sub-luminal velocities far in excess of those 
presently achieved by mankind, and then turns around and 
powers back to the planet. Meanwhile the other twin, Paul, 
remains on the planet awaiting his brother's return. Holt 
claims that 
[f]rom the perspective of Paul, the stay-at- 
home, the narrative of Peter's journey, if it is an 
authentic journey into the future, will proceed roughly 
as follows: Paul says goodbye to Peter as Peter boards 
his rocket ship; Peter accelerates away from earth; six 
months later Paul writes in his journal, "If all has 
gone well, Peter has now returned to earth 19 years and 
6 months from now. " Likewise, Peter's perspective, as 
he arrives on earth, will be conveyed in words such as 
these: "Paul must now be wondering 19 years and 6 
months ago whether I have safely arrived. " 
Holt, 1981, p. 5 (his emphasis). 
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Holt rightly argues that such claims are not sanctioned by 
relativistic theory, since the passage of time, according to 
that theory, can only be measured relative to the 
individuals speaking: Paul physically experiences the six 
months that have passed for him in the rocket ship, while 
remaining intellectually aware that twenty years have passed 
for his twin, Peter, on Earth. However, Holt then goes on to 
argue that time travel must necessarily not use such frames 
of reference, since then it would not, in his opinion, be 
time travel. In response to the arguments, propounded by 
Horwich and Lewis, for the application of relative frames of 
temporal reference, he writes 
Suppose I say that one can travel ahead in 
time by taking the plane from San Francisco to New 
York. (Six o/clock comes fewer hours after the time of 
departure, say eight o/clock, as measured by my wrist- 
watch, than it would if I had stayed in San Francisco. ) 
And suppose someone issues the complaint: "But you are 
not talking about authentic time travel"? What have I 
won by responding "But of course I'm not talking about 
your silly naive notion. I am talking about a 
sophisticated notion of time travel"? If there is 
sophistication here, it is only in my willingness to 
play loose with language, a certain cleverness with 
words. It seems to me that Horwich and Lewis, and 
others of like inclination, do something exactly 
75 
parallel to this -- though it is somewhat obfuscated by 
all the talk about alternate models of time. 
Ibid., p. 15. 
The system of time travel that Holt demands necessarily 
invokes contradiction, and he refuses to acknowledge the 
solution of Lewis and Horwich on the grounds that he alone 
is discussing genuine time travel, and they are merely 
'playing loose with language'. If that were genuinely the 
case it would be futile to make further appeals to 
alternative temporal references because, in so doing, one 
would no longer be discussing time travel and, consequently, 
any subsequent argument would be irrelevant, except inasmuch 
as the phrase `time travel' would be employed by all the 
protagonists. With what justification, therefore, does Holt 
maintain that his definition is the only correct one? Is it 
his specification -- one that is never clearly stated, but 
must instead be derived from an analysis of his argument -- 
or that of his attackers that is favoured by authors in the 
subject? 
The quotation from Wells at the head of this chapter 
appears to be a clear example of Holt's definition of time 
travel, but since this is the earliest science fiction tale 
on the subject to have achieved world-wide recognition, the 
logical lapse might legitimately be put down to a lack of 
thought on Wells' part in a subject which, until that 
moment, had received almost no attention. It should, 
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however, be borne in mind that even Wells qualified his 
statement with the words `if I may use the phrase', so there 
is some justification for the inference that he, too, felt 
uncomfortable with his expression. Wells' short story may be 
reconsidered in due course, but since then a number of books 
and films have considered the subject. If these also fail to 
avoid the paradox that Holt deems a necessary feature of 
true tales of time travel, then it is up to his antagonists, 
rather than Holt himself, to prove that their description of 
time travel is the more accurate. Clearly it would be an 
impossible task for me to read every known science fiction 
work upon the subject, but a random selection may be 
sufficient. 
Robert Heinlein's short story All You Zombies makes 
every effort to avoid Holt's paradox. The time travelling 
event itself appears to be instantaneous (no mention is made 
of time spent during the journey), thereby avoiding that 
aspect of the problem, and at the head of every section that 
occupies a different moment in time to that of its 
predecessor there is given a clear temporal reference: the 
first is `2217 Time Zone V (EST) 7 Nov 1970 NYC'; the last 
is `2200-VII-12 Jan 1993-Sub Rockies Annex-HQ Temporal DOL' 
(Heinlein, 1980, pp. 126-138). Consequently, in each case 
the word `now' has been given a clear temporal reference, 
and no instant has temporal priority. The lack of temporal 
priority, is due to the entirely self-supporting and self- 
generating nature of the main character, whose personal 
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world line is closed, and this provides a clue to Heinlein's 
preferred number of time frames. 
In order that a closed causal loop, or closed world 
line, can exist, it is necessary that information -- in this 
example in the form of memories and DNA -- be preserved 
during a journey into the past. This would not be possible 
with only one time frame, because information would be lost 
as the traveller, having only one time frame relative to 
which he can age and with respect to which he is also 
travelling in the reverse direction, would grow younger as 
he travelled backwards through time. Furthermore, the 
instantaneous nature of the system used by Heinlein's 
traveller would not be possible, because a journey of thirty 
years into the past or the future would have to take thirty 
years to complete -- there being no reference frame relative 
to which the journey could be instantaneous. Consequently, 
time travel into the future, using any method other than 
those that slow biological processes, would not be possible. 
Time travel into the past would also be impossible because, 
for every year the traveller attempted to move into the 
past, a year would advance: as he attempted to move into the 
past all memories and marks inappropriate to his temporal 
location would be lost, and as he was carried into the 
future they would be regained. The cumulative effect would 
be the absence of time travel, as every reverse movement 
would be counteracted simultaneously by a positive temporal 
advance. Nothing would happen, or be recalled, that could 
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indicate any temporal movement at all. Under such 
conditions, Heinlein's story would never have been written. 
In By His Bootstraps, also by R. A. Heinlein, there 
appears the following quotation. 
He was standing at the top of a broad steep 
ramp which spread fanlike down to the base of the 
building... It was the same placid, lush, and familiar 
scene he had looked over when he breakfasted with 
Diktor -- a few hours ago and ten years in the future. 
Heinlein, 1959, p. 76 (my emphasis). 
The highlighted section appears to be a blatant 
contradiction that is in keeping with Holt's argument. Yet, 
once the preceding script is read, it becomes plain that the 
writer is appealing to two frames of temporal reference: a 
few hours ago relative to the personal time frame; ten years 
in the future relative to the external time frame. The 
traveller's memories, and the contents of his stomach, bear 
witness to his having breakfasted in the last few hours, but 
since enjoying that meal he has used a time machine to 
transport himself ten years into the past. It is because an 
event that is going to occur in the future, relative to his 
immediate temporal location, is already a part of his causal 
history, that the apparent contradiction emerges. Yet both 
his satisfied appetite and his memories can only be 
preserved if the temporal arrow and causal history of the 
traveller are always positively directed relative to him, 
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otherwise he would have neither his memories nor his full 
stomach because the events would not have occurred in his 
past. It follows, therefore, that in this story also two 
relativised frames of temporal reference are a necessary 
feature of the system of time travel to which Heinlein 
subscribes. In these examples, therefore, Holt's arguments 
do not apply because these are not instances of time travel 
as he defines it. 
Robert Silverberg, in his short story Sailing to 
Byzantium (Dozois, 1989, pp. 85-154), gives temporal 
references for his statements in the shape of the indigenous 
people of the future (for the purpose of the present 
discussion this may be understood as the external temporal 
reference), and the `visitors' (here understood as the 
personal temporal reference since in this case the visitors 
are the time travellers). The visitors have been 
(apparently5) removed from their own historical periods in 
order to become entertaining anomalies in a future where all 
time periods can co-exist in the form of recreated ancient 
cities. Within this framework there appear the following 
phrases: `And then there were all the cities like New 
Chicago, out of time that was time yet unborn to him but 
S. Later the hero discovers that he and all the other 'visitors' are also creations of the 
future, each based on information gleaned about people from earlier times -- in his case, 
about a man of the 20th century living in New York. This does not, however, affect the 
argument, since the visitors believe themselves to be from the appropriate positions in 
the past and base their phraseology on that belief. Were they aware of their actual 
temporal origins, it would be fair to assume that they would apply the appropriate 
temporal references in the same manner that those from the 50th century do throughout the 
tale. 
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ancient history to them' -- `him' being the visitor from the 
20th century and `them' being the occupants of the 50th 
century; or again, in reference to Queen Elizabeth II to a 
visitor from the 16th century, `A second one, and not much 
like the first. Long after your Virgin Queen, this one. She 
will reign in what you think of as days to come'. But on the 
same subject Silverberg also writes `There will be another 
of her name in England, in due time. Has already been in 
fact' and this appears to invoke Holt's paradox. However, 
when the context is examined it becomes clear that the first 
reference is to be understood as being from the perspective 
of the 16th-century visitor, while the second is in 
reference to the perceptions of the 50th-century 
inhabitants. 
Andrew Weiner's short story, Klein's Machine (Dozois, 
1989, pp. 189-205), has a psychiatrist trying to jolt the 
memory of an alleged time traveller by means of a drug- 
induced hypnosis. Under these conditions the subject is 
encouraged to re-live the moments of his time journey into 
the future. Weiner writes 
`Philip... I want you to think back to the 
night of July 5th. Do you remember that night? ' 
`Of course, ' Philip said. `Tonight's the 
night. The night I test my machine. '... 
'What's happening, Philip? ' 
`I don't know, I don't remember... ' 
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`Go with it, Philip... You remember the 
future. You're there now. In the future now... ' 
Dozois, 1989, p. 199. 
The last phrase in particular (being the closest the story 
comes to generating the paradox demanded) appears to fulfil 
Holt's criterion, but the individual in question is, in 
fact, neither travelling through time, nor physically 
occupying, at the same person-stage (see Chapter 3), both 
the present and the future at the moment the phrase is 
uttered. The psychiatrist is attempting to make his subject 
recall an incident which lies in the latter's memory, and so 
he takes Philip through his memories until those that 
include future events are reached. He then encourages Philip 
to recall those memories verbally by making him experience 
them again mentally while in the psychiatrist's office. 
Hence the apparently illogical claim that he is 'in the 
future now' means that the memories he is presently 
recalling are those of events that lie in the external 
future. This type of language is one often heard in cases of 
hypnotic regression techniques, but in this case, due to the 
utilisation of a time travelling method, the memory happens 
to be of events in the future rather than in the past. Once 
again, the need for a relativised frame of personal temporal 
reference ensures that Holt's claims do not apply. 
The personal time frame must preserve the memories of 
events that have already been experienced by the time 
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traveller, but that lie in the external future. 
Consequently, the ordering of local cause and effect must 
always be positive for the traveller, regardless of his 
temporal destination. How does this explain the need for two 
frames of temporal reference? If time travel into the past 
is intended, it may be argued that this positive causal 
order could be preserved by simply reversing the causal 
order for the time traveller as he travels into the past. 
However, the mere reversal of the ordering of cause and 
effect does not create time travel (see: Mellor, 1981, pp. 
172-177; this thesis, Chapters 3 and 5), and, therefore, the 
temporal aspect is still required. As backward causation 
does not counteract the need for two time frames, its 
introduction would be an unnecessary complication. If the 
ordering of cause and effect is reversed relative to the 
external time frame, then it is positive relative to the 
personal time frame, and is, therefore, equivalent to the 
system of time travel defined in the introduction. On the 
other hand, if the ordering of cause and effect is reversed 
relative to the personal time frame of the machine, it must 
be positive relative to the external time frame. This, in 
turn, would mean that the machine would be operating before 
it had been switched on, because the fact that it is 
operating would be the cause of its being switched on at 
some point in the future relative to the external time 
frame. But if it has not yet been switched on, it cannot 
operate. Under standard descriptions of backward causation 
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the operation of a machine would be the cause of its being 
turned on, but the moment at which it was turned on would 
lie in the past: when describing time travel into the past, 
the operation of the machine would physically precede the 
moment at which it is turned on, consequently it would not 
operate. In effect, reversing the temporal direction 
relative to the external time frame, and then reversing the 
ordering of cause and effect relative to the reversed 
personal time frame, results in a double negative, and any 
effort to travel backwards in time would be instantly 
halted, the programme having never begun. In order that 
needless complications may be avoided, and time travel can 
occur, the positive direction of local cause and effect (and 
all those features that, in the words of Lewis, play `the 
role in his [the time traveller's] life that time plays in 
the life of the common person') must be preserved for the 
machine and those within it, but globally the moment of 
arrival must be previous to the moment of departure. Methods 
by which this may be achieved -- such as worm-holes or the 
Gödelian structure of space-time -- have already been 
proposed within the scientific community, and so may lend 
support to the theory. None of the writers cited has made 
any appeal to these methods, of course, but then each is 
primarily concerned with the consequences of time travel, as 
opposed to the method by which it may be achieved. Short- 
cuts that, in the realm of fiction, preserve all the 
necessary requirements, are therefore satisfactory, even 
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though there appears to be no means by which they might be 
physically realised. It is the fact of a system of time 
travel that preserves memories and consequences of future 
events with which these writers are concerned: the specific 
structure and working method of the time machine itself can 
be blurred for the purposes of the narrative. 
In each of the science-fiction examples cited above, 
the authors have simply not been talking about time travel, 
as defined by Holt, at the moment when the apparent paradox 
arose. Even the example cited from Wells at the start of 
this chapter may also be qualified in such a way that the 
paradox is resolved, and the fact that the time traveller, 
upon returning from the future, is in a position to recount 
his experiences to his friends (showing that he has been 
able to preserve his memories while travelling backwards in 
time) indicates Wells' implicit assumption of a relativised 
system for his story. In order to fulfil the aforementioned 
criterion, and so resolve the ambiguity of the speech, Wells 
would have to rewrite the section along the following lines: 
`The traveller left more than five minutes ago by my 
watch. Since he is using a machine that can speed up and/or 
reverse the passage of time around it, from the perspective 
of the person inside it, while preserving the normal passage 
of time and the ageing processes of the traveller within the 
machine, after five minutes had passed according to his 
watch, he could have stepped out of the machine to find that 
any number of years had passed in the time frame with 
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respect to which he was travelling. Hence upon emerging 
after his journey he might find himself wandering on some 
plesiosaurus-haunted Oolitic coral reef, or beside the 
lonely saline lakes of the Triassic Age... '. 
While this resolves the problem of logical coherence, it 
does so at the cost of literary style -- sufficient reason, 
perhaps, for Wells simply to apologise for the terms rather 
than explain them in full. 
Holt might argue that I have selected only those 
stories that support relativised frames of temporal 
reference, or that I have illegitimately re-interpreted the 
words of Wells in order that the paradox may be resolved6, 
but is his case any stronger? He argues that a genuine 
instance of time travel would require that 
[i]f the time traveler departs at to and 
arrives at his destination five minutes later, and if 
the time at which he arrives is forty years after his 
departure, then the time of his arrival as reckoned by 
his own clocks and calendars and by the clocks and 
calendars of the stay-at-home is both to plus five 
minutes and to plus forty years. If, as the stay-at- 
home would say, the time traveler is not7 exploring the 
world forty years in the future, then he is now 
6. In fact I read through 14 short stories on the subject of time travel -- including 
Wells -- and one novel, and could find no other examples of the paradox apart from those 
cited. 
7. Presumably this is a typographical error in the published manuscript and should read 
'now'. 
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exploring the world and at the same time he is forty 
years from now exploring the world. In the first case 
an inconsistency makes its appearance, in the second 
something closer to gibberish. In either case it does 
not seem that one is describing a possible state of 
affairs. But since just these kinds of time 
discrepancies are definitive of authentic time 
travel..., one should, it seems, conclude that time 
travel is not possible. 
Holt, 1981, p. 2 (his emphases). 
Later he claims that, were a time traveller to travel one 
hundred years into the future while only experiencing 
fifteen minutes of those one hundred years, then, as the 
stay-at-home reckons the passing of time by his own clocks, 
the latter will surmise that the time traveller will arrive 
at his destination both fifteen minutes and one hundred 
years after he departed (Ibid., p. 7). Yet this is nonsense, 
since the stay-at-home would not, and cannot, say that the 
time traveller from the stay-at-home's point of view has 
travelled both fifteen minutes and one hundred years into 
the future. All he can say is that the time traveller has 
indeed travelled one hundred years into the future, since 
stay-at-home Paul -- if he continues with his normal 
existence and does not use a time machine -- will not 
encounter the traveller, Peter, again until after the 
passage of those one hundred years. Nevertheless, Peter, or 
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his machine, will only personally experience fifteen minutes 
during the journey of one hundred years, whilst Paul, as a 
representative of the time frame with respect to which Peter 
is said to have relocated, will experience every second. 
The discrepancy in temporal experience is, as Holt 
rightly points out, of paramount importance, because it is 
the comparison between the experience of the person inside 
the machine and that of persons outside it that enables the 
traveller to determine whether or not he has journeyed into 
the future or into the past. However, the time traveller 
cannot personally experience both periods of time but can 
only compare his experience with that of others who do not 
use a time machine8, and it is here wherein the mistake 
lies. Holt assumes that there is only one time or temporal 
reference point, and that therefore any temporal discrepancy 
must, by its very nature, be self-contradictory. While it is 
true that personal and external temporal references normally 
agree, this does not entail identity. To be indiscernible, 
and so fulfil both Leibniz' criterion of identity and Holt's 
claims regarding the inevitability of temporal paradox in 
theories of time travel, the temporal references must always 
agree. As the examples provided above reveal, however, in 
the case of time travel it is clear that they do not. 
8. Note that no information can be drawn from a comparison between the experiences of two 
time travellers operating independent machines, unless they move between near-identical 
space-time locations. An agreed reference frame -- whether it be the personal temporal 
reference of two people inside one machine, or the agreed external temporal passage of two 
separate machines -- is required if further information on the proficiency of the machine 
is to be determined. 
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Therefore, to claim that there is only one temporal 
reference is simply incorrect, and if there are at least 
two, it follows that the paradox does not arise. Since Holt 
has made clear that time travel cannot preserve any logical 
coherence while utilising only one temporal reference, and I 
have argued for a resolution of the paradox -- for which 
there appears to be justification in the science fiction 
literature -- that requires two temporal references, the 
question arises as to whether or not Holt proves, in the 
course of his article, that limiting the temporal reference 
frames available to only one is either logically or 
linguistically-justifiable. 
Section 3 
Justification? 
Although there is no specific declaration of Holt's 
preference for one temporal reference in his article, there 
do appear statements that provide an indication of his 
hypothesis. These include phrases such as: `Paul must now be 
wondering nineteen years and six months ago whether I have 
safely arrived' (my emphasis, p. 5); and, during a 
description of the time traveller in his machine and his 
assistant still in the laboratory, the claim is made that 
the assistant cannot correctly state, after an eight-hour 
wait in the laboratory, that the time traveller `has 
reappeared in the laboratory approximately one month hence' 
(my emphasis, p. 9). The contradictory effect of these 
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phrases is dependent on the assumption of one, and only one, 
temporal reference: but are they linguistically coherent 
phrases in themselves? If not, they cannot be used as 
arguments either for, or assuming, one temporal reference, 
since they do not convey in themselves -- quite apart from 
allusions to time travelling activities -- any genuine 
meaning. 
Upon examination it appears that the inconsistencies 
arising from the above phraseology originate not in the 
vagaries of time travel but in the manner in which the terms 
have been employed. Each is an example of a token reflexive 
statement. That is, the meaning of the words depends solely 
upon the state of affairs that exists for those who utter 
them at the moment of utterance. `Today', if said as I type 
these words, means Thursday, 8 January 1993. The person 
reading this will mean another date by the word `today'. 
Thus to say `Now, nineteen years and six months ago' is to 
utter a phrase that is linguistically self-contradictory, as 
well as logically and physically impossible, and which is so 
regardless of whether time travel is involved or not. The 
sentence construction is as comprehensible as the spatial 
corollary `The body which is here, in its present state, is 
in that room over there', and while it is common practice 
for individuals to employ colloquial expressions such as `I 
was miles away' -- meaning that the speaker was not 
concentrating on the physical and temporal activities around 
him, but was instead thinking of an anticipated future or 
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remembered past event -- this is not to suggest that the 
individual in question, at the time of utterance, is both 
occupying a given spatio-temporal position and not occupying 
that position. The incomprehensible nature of the 
phraseology derives its origins from an incorrect use of 
English, and is not a reasoned consequence of time travel. 
From the above argument it follows that Holt's 
assumptions regarding the existence of a solitary temporal 
reference are not supported either by the literature or by 
linguistic usage. Consequently, his attack against the 
possibility of time travel based in that assumption is 
invalid. Throughout this thesis, therefore, whenever 
allusion is made to a temporal reference, it will henceforth 
be necessary for the particular reference frame to be 
identified. 
Section 4 
Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed three separate points: 
whether or not science fiction authors invoke the time 
discrepancy paradox in their writings; Holt's justification 
for assuming only one temporal reference; and the dangers 
inherent in a careless use of language. Having shown that 
there is not, in Holt's argument, any logical reason for 
limiting oneself to only one temporal reference, and being 
supported in my contention by experimental evidence, 
science-fiction preference, and the proposals of Norwich and 
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Lewis, I have decided to employ. two distinguishable frames 
of temporal reference to resolve the paradox, and by that 
method remove one of the major obstacles to the discussion 
of time travel. In the next chapter I will consider a 
problem closely connected with that of temporal reference: 
that of identity over time. It is necessary that a criterion 
of identity be defined, and be of sufficient rigour to 
enable the identification of one individual, at a given 
instant in external time, with the person claiming that 
identity relation at another moment relative to that same 
time frame. Simultaneously, that system must accommodate for 
the discrepancies that must (as this chapter has maintained) 
exist between the traveller's personal temporal experience, 
and that -- measured by external time -- which should have 
occurred, in order that his claim to time travel may be 
verified. 
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For time travel requires personal identity -- 
he who arrives must be the same person who departed. 
That requires causal continuity, in which causality 
runs from earlier to later stages in the order of 
personal time. 
Lewis, 1986, p. 73. 
Problems of identity are an inevitable consequence of a 
system that entails the possibility of a person being in 
more than one spatial position at the same moment relative 
to the external time frame. They will also arise when claims 
of identity are made, over a time period, between persons 
whose physical and mental state does not match that normally 
, encountered over such an 
interval. An example of the former 
situation would be two people, with identical DNA and early 
memory patterns, standing in a room together, with one 
claiming to be a temporally older stage of the other. The 
latter circumstance might be exemplified by a person 
claiming identity with another who existed several hundred, 
or even thousand, years ago, or someone in their thirties 
claiming identity with a person who, at the moment of the 
claim, is in their teens. Any of these situations might 
arise in the system of time travel presently under 
consideration. 
If time travel is to prove logically possible, it is 
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vital that a criterion of identity be defined which provides 
a simple, but all-embracing, explanation of each scenario 
that might be realised, while simultaneously screening out 
those speculations that are not based in time travelling 
activities. The demand for simplicity and completeness 
arises from the fact that every extra qualification casts 
doubt upon the validity of an argument -- the simplest 
explanations being, in general terms, the most likely. Why, 
then, are some systems of identity unsuitable for the time 
traveller? 
The answer to this question depends on two features of 
paramount importance to time travel as presently defined. 
First, identity criteria that are suitable for persons who 
are not time travellers show a continuity with respect to 
external time (Lewis, 1986, p. 72). But, as was stated in 
the previous chapter, the time traveller shows marked 
discrepancies between his experience of external temporal 
passage and that of others who are not time travelling. 
Consequently, any identity criterion applied to the time 
traveller must accommodate for this necessary consequence of 
his activities. A system of identity that precluded 
relations to alternative temporal references would be of no 
use under these conditions, because it would contain within 
itself a denial of the possibility of time travel. Second, 
the system chosen must expose any instance where a claim to 
time travel has been made erroneously. Identity is, as Lewis 
points out, the ultimate proof of all such claims, and, as 
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such, its importance cannot be over-estimated, and its ease 
of understanding and use, combined with a rigorous testing 
method, must be a matter of primary concern throughout this 
chapter. 
In the following pages I will initially distinguish, by 
means of thought experiments, the specific problems with 
which the test of identity will be concerned. From this 
survey the criterion of identity that can most appropriately 
be applied to time travelling activities will emerge. I will 
then examine some alternative interpretations that have been 
proposed to explain the claims of alleged time travellers, 
in order to determine whether or not the chosen system 
exposes these alternatives as spurious. Finally, an 
examination of the consequences of these studies for a 
general understanding of identity relations will be 
provided. In this way the system will be tested to determine 
its applicability to the wider problems of identity per se. 
Section 1 
Thought Experiments 
The following are all potential scenarios for a time 
traveller under the present description. A deliberate effort 
has been made to refrain from any thought experiments that 
might involve questions of responsibility, in order to 
prevent the obfuscation of metaphysical issues by those of 
morality. The association that emerges between identity and 
responsibility, during a metaphysical analysis of time 
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travel, is not as important as that between responsibility 
and liberty, or identity and liberty. While each of these 
relationships will be mentioned briefly, in order to 
preserve the flow of argument, they will receive greater 
attention in the next chapter. 
Scenario 1. 
Chronos encounters a man who is considerably older than 
himself, and who claims to be Chronos at some time in the 
future. After further investigation, the older man proves to 
have identical memories to the younger up to the moment of 
meeting, and also has memories of events thereafter of which 
the younger Chronos was unaware, or which he was only in the 
process of considering. Medical analyses show that the DNA, 
fingerprints, and other unchanging features of a person 
match both men, but features that can alter or grow over 
time -- such as age, scars, memories, and even character -- 
do not. 
Question. How can there exist two physically separate people 
who share identical DNA, fingerprints, memories (up to a 
point), and so forth? 
Question. How can two people be of differing ages, while 
existing at the same time with the same DNA? 
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Scenario 2. 
Chronos discovers a photograph that is dated, by means 
of chemical analysis and an examination of the subject 
matter, as originating in the late 1880's. It shows a man 
who bears a striking resemblance to Chronos. Further 
research reveals evidence -- such as handwriting, and 
statements made by the man that have been recorded -- that 
proves to Chronos' satisfaction that the person in the 
photograph is, indeed, himself, even though he has not 
experienced the moment the photograph was taken. 
Question. How can Chronos claim identity with a person who 
existed over one hundred years ago, and of whom he has no 
memories whatsoever? 
Scenario 3. 
Chronos prepares an experiment with his time machine, 
with the aim of making several-trips to the same date and 
hour but to different spatial locations within his 
laboratory. He waits in the laboratory until his intended 
arrival time, at which moment the room is suddenly occupied 
by five other time machines and five people, all claiming 
to 
be Chronos, and all appearing physically identical. 
Question. How can six people, all claiming to be the same 
man, be in one locality at the same time? 
Question. Under what circumstances can sense be made of 
the 
claim that one person is also six people? 
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Scenario 4. 
Chronos claims identity with a man who existed 4000 
years ago, of whom he has no memories, and with a man who 
will, he claims, appear in the laboratory the next day. 
Twenty-four hours later a man arrives who bears a strong 
resemblance to Chronos and also a resemblance to the man 
from four thousand years ago -- in that he exhibits the 
appropriate memories -- but who has aged considerably more 
than would be usual in the twenty-four hours that separate 
Chronos' earlier departure and this man's arrival. It 
appears to onlookers that a man from the past has contrived 
to remain in suspended animation until his appearance in the 
laboratory, while Chronos has been destroyed by his own 
machine. Alternatively, the man is an imposter with 
considerable knowledge of the scientist and the past as it 
pertains to the man who lived four thousand years ago, and 
who also bears a physical resemblance to Chronos, but who is 
far too old to be him. In either case identity is denied. 
Question. How can these identity claims be verified? 
Section 2 
Analyses 
Analyses of the above will be based on graphical 
representations, that show the situations initially from the 
perspective of an external observer who is not a time 
traveller, and then from that of Chronos when making the 
journeys. In order to minimise both the number of 
98 
illustrations and the amount of information expressed on 
each one, I have applied overlays. The graph on the page is 
from the external viewpoint (unless otherwise indicated), 
while the overlay represents the personal world line of 
Chronos. The restrictions of two-dimensional graphics, and 
the demands of clarity, make it unfeasible to give the full 
spatio-temporal representation of the traveller when moving 
backwards in time, as described in the introduction. 
Consequently, the most direct route taken during this 
procedure is shown, and it should be borne in mind that the 
traveller would occupy a far wider area of space-time during 
his actual journeys, if only to accommodate for the movement 
of the planet (see Chapter 1, Section 2). 
A cursory examination of the illustrations indicates 
that our inability to apply standard identity criteria in 
each of the examples stems from a lack of continuity in the 
time traveller's world line with respect to the external 
temporal reference. There appear to be two, three, or six 
individuals, depending on which image is examined, and there 
is no immediately apparent method by which any given world- 
line might be correctly connected to any other on the same 
illustration, assuming that such a connection is justified. 
If the overlays are added it becomes clear that connections 
do exist and are revealed through an examination of the 
personal time frame. 
In Fig. 3.1 Chronos -- as a young man -- is indicated 
by line A. The link between this person and the older man 
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standing before him is revealed if we add the personal time 
line from the older man's point of view. Since A has no 
personal knowledge of the intervening (future, from his 
perspective) years, there can be no guaranteed method of 
deriving the required information from him. He may be able 
to guess his future behaviour accurately, but as information 
is demanded regarding more and more distant events in the 
young Chronos' future, the probability of error increases. 
If the information is obtained from the older man the 
possibility of error is, at worst, lessened, and, at best, 
removed altogether (by means of electronic or other 
recording devices that may be examined for signs of 
tampering). This is due to the fact that the events lie in 
the old Chronos' past, and have, therefore, already been 
experienced by him. Consequently, he either has the 
knowledge of hindsight, or had -- and could have previously 
utilised -- the option of recording the events in question. 
This graphic representation also indicates the nature 
of the relationship between the time traveller and his 
future. The personal time line that is shown existing 
between the younger and the older Chronos is a memory for 
the latter after he has made the journeys because it lies in 
his past, but it cannot be personally known by the pre- 
travelling man because it lies in his future, despite the 
fact that the personal time line does exist in a very real 
sense for both stages. The objective status of the personal 
time line for the younger of the two stages is a direct 
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consequence of its relation to the older Chronos. This is 
because the past-directed identity relation is a matter of 
fact for the older Chronos, and it is proof of the existence 
of the future-directed identity relation -- and therefore 
the personal world line -- of the younger stage. This 
argument is prevented from becoming circular by the fact 
that the substantial nature of the personal world line of 
the young Chronos is dependent upon that of the older man. 
The younger man cannot claim knowledge with regard to his 
understanding of the identity relation between himself and 
his future person-stage, except inasmuch as that claim is 
based on the actual knowledge possessed by the older Chronos 
that has been imparted to his younger self. The initial 
verification of the identity relation can only be 
established from the perspective of the older man. 
The above further indicates an association between 
identity and freedom of will or, since the case will hold 
for any time travelling object regardless of whether or not 
it can be said to have a will, between identity and liberty. 
While the question of the traveller's freedom of will in 
general terms will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4, 
this aspect -- pertaining, as it does, specifically to 
identity -- can be examined briefly here. 
Under normal circumstances (i. e. when not time 
travelling into the past) human beings are only prepared to 
acknowledge identity relations with individuals or person- 
stages who were previously existent (in terms of both the 
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personal and the external time frames). I might claim an 
identity relation with the person who was sitting here 
typing a letter this morning, or with the person who 
travelled to Durham University for the first time in 1984 
from Sussex, and studied philosophy there, but it is 
doubtful whether I would make a similar identity claim with 
the person who could be sitting here later tonight, or the 
person who might one day live in another country. Indeed, 
even the words employed help to reinforce that hesitancy -- 
'could be' and `might'. What justification is there for the 
reluctance to commit ourselves that has been expressed 
above? 
The problem appears to originate in questions of future 
personal liberty. A claim to an identity relation with a 
person who experienced an event in the past can be made with 
confidence because either the person making the claim can 
recall being the subject of, or connected with, the event in 
question, or they have been informed by trustworthy sources 
that this is the case, and that testimony conforms to the 
facts as they have been presented from a variety of sources. 
More importantly, however, nothing can happen in the future 
to alter the truth of such a claim (appeals to backward 
causation will be examined in Chapter 5). The past appears 
permanent and binding in a way the future does not (although 
the hypothesis has yet to be verified as anything more than 
an intuitive position in this thesis: see Chapters 4 and 5). 
It is common for human beings to refrain from affirming an 
2ýi 
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identity relation with a person experiencing a future event, 
because the necessary information regarding the experience 
is not available at the moment of the claim, and 
consequently the claimant can guarantee neither the 
occurrence of the event, nor their presence at that 
juncture. 
If an identity claim towards the future could be made 
with the same assurance as that common to such claims to the 
past, it would indicate a lack of freedom on the part of the 
person making the claim. Yet, when a time traveller meets 
his/her future self, that is precisely what happens. If it 
could be proved, beyond doubt, that the person with whom one 
is speaking is a future stage in one's personal world line, 
then, with that proof, would come the apparent denial of 
one's freedom to change the future that led to that later 
stage. This is because, if it were possible to change it, 
the identity relation would not exist. From this it follows 
that, given the immutable nature of the past in one possible 
world relative to any temporal position -- even if the 
position is that of someone (Chronos) who comes from the 
future relative to the individual making the claim (Chronos' 
earlier person stage) -- every positive assertion of 
identity is also an acknowledgement that it is not within 
the power of the person concerned to change the relationship 
because it exists in the past personal world line of the 
traveller's older, and already existing, self. However, the 
extent to which the time traveller's freedom of will is 
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compromised by the identity relationship is further 
complicated by the association with the relationship between 
knowledge and liberty, and as such is part of a much wider 
problem requiring a more detailed analysis than that which 
can be provided in this chapter. Consequently, further study 
will be reserved until Chapter 4. 
At this juncture a distinction between what is, in 
fact, the case (ontological), and the way in which people 
utilise terminology as an expression of understanding 
(epistemological) must be considered. The fact that people 
do not, in general, use terms of identity towards the 
future' does not prove that such relations do not exist, and 
through the analysis of time travel this fact may be 
highlighted. If an individual is, as a matter of fact, going 
to experience some event in the future, then that person can 
make an identity claim in advance with the person who will 
experience that event (present to future), just as much as 
the person at the time of the event will be able to claim 
identity with the person in the past relative to that point 
(present to past). Thus, once an identity relation has been 
established, it runs both ways. However, if an individual 
makes an identity claim towards the future (for example, X 
is identical with the person who will wake up in X's bed 
tomorrow with the looks and memories of X) he is not thereby 
guaranteeing the events that will lead to the particular 
1. Promises such as 'I will meet you here tomorrow' do contain implicit identity 
assumptions, but an analysis of such phrases would reveal the same counterfactual 
requirements as I have listed below. 
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person's state of existence. At best, any such claims will 
be based on an (in theory) unlimited selection of 
counterfactual assumptions. For example, I might claim 
identity with a person who will be working at this computer 
tomorrow in the following manner: 
If my computer is not stolen in the interim, then the person 
sitting at this machine tomorrow will be identical with the 
person writing this now; or 
If no one other than myself enters this room and sits at my 
computer, then the person sitting at this machine tomorrow 
will be identical with the person writing this now; or 
If I am not injured in the interim, or otherwise prevented 
from using my computer, then the person sitting at this 
machine tomorrow will be identical with the person writing 
this now. 
The potentially infinite nature of the list leads to 
its being often reduced, when considered at all, to phrases 
such as `God willing' or `all things being equal'. Thus 
identity claims towards the future show a tentativeness 
rarely seen in claims towards the past. 
When, in due course, there comes the need to verify the 
status of persons or objects which, it is claimed, hold an 
identity relation, if it is then discovered that no such 
appropriate relation exists, it is not that the relation did 
and then did not hold, it is simply that it did not exist at 
the moment of the initial claim. Rather, a prediction was 
being made that subsequently proved incorrect. On the other 
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hand, if such a claim is made and subsequently fulfilled, it 
is not the case that the claimant confidently stated future 
events as present fact. Rather, a claim was made that could 
have been right or wrong and was, in fact, proved correct. 
If information revealed by a time traveller from the future 
is added to the above examples, all that is discovered are 
the details of an incident that has already occurred from 
the perspective of the time traveller with whom the identity 
claim is being made. A preview of the future has been 
provided; yet the only difference between the status of the 
would-be time traveller before and after the meeting is that 
he has been provided with information regarding his 
immediate future rather than having to depend on educated 
guess-work. There has been no effect on the status of the 
individual in terms of his identity relation with the person 
from the future. Thus, although epistemological claims 
regarding identity are invariably in the direction of 
present to past, from an ontological point of view, in a 
world in which time travel into the past is possible -- and 
consequently a world in which the future and its contents 
must, in some sense, exist -- identity relations should be 
regarded as flowing both ways, thereby dissolving the 
problem posed earlier (specifically in scenario 2) of how an 
individual can not only make an identity claim with a person 
of whom he has no memories whatsoever -- amnesiacs are in 
the same position -- but also make an identity claim with a 
person of whom he can have no memories, since a memory, by 
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definition, must be of an event that occurred in the 
personal past of the individual reporting the memory. While, 
in scenario 2, the claimant cannot maintain that he has 
knowledge regarding the identity relation, the high 
probability that such a relation does exist -- which would 
be verifiable from the perspective of the claimant at some 
point in the future relative to the personal temporal 
reference frame -- is sufficient to justify the appropriate 
claims being made in advance. Once again, a full examination 
of this problem involves considerations regarding the 
association between knowledge and freewill, but these will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. 
To return attention to a more detailed analysis of the 
illustrations, it can be seen in Fig 3.1 that there are, at 
first, a minimum of two people. Their world lines overlap 
across an interval of external time, thereby allowing them 
to talk to one another, but they otherwise appear 
unconnected. It should be noted that A's time line extends 
backwards to the moment of his birth, as well as forwards to 
the moment of the meeting, whereas B -- the older of the two 
parties -- has no history prior to his arrival in the year 
of the meeting, and seems to have been spontaneously created 
with the looks and memories of a man of fifty. Herein lies a 
clue to the identity relation that is fully revealed if the 
overlay is added showing the whole of Chronos' personal time 
line. After the meeting, the younger Chronos continues to 
live a normal (i. e. he is not time travelling) daily 
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existence until he reaches a moment at which he uses a time 
machine to travel backwards relative to the external time 
frame (the Y axis). Yet despite this temporal relocation, 
Chronos continues to age in the normal manner relative to 
the personal time frame, in keeping with the requirements of 
the popular interpretation outlined in the Introduction. He 
finishes his journey in the year in which his younger self 
is considering building a time machine at the age of twenty- 
five. From the conversation with his younger self arises the 
situation of two stages -- misleadingly termed `copies' 
of the same man, one aged twenty-five and the other aged 
fifty, existing at the same external time and in close 
physical proximity to one another. 
Fig. 3.2 also represents the appearance of two 
apparently unconnected people, but in this instance there 
has been added the problem that an identity claim has been 
made by A (the younger Chronos) without even the benefit of 
a meeting with the man with whom the claim has been made. 
Chronos has taken the information presented to him and, from 
that information, has concluded that the person in the past 
bears too great a mental and physical similarity for it to 
be merely coincidence. He could be wrong, for he is speaking 
of an event that, if it occurs at all, will occur in his 
personal future -- namely, the event at which he climbs into 
the time machine and operates the switch to travel into the 
past. He cannot claim knowledge regarding his future actions 
as such, but can only maintain that there is strong evidence 
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to support the contention that this is what he will do. But 
if the overlay is now added it becomes apparent that the 
identity relation is a fact of B's past, even if it is only 
a future possibility from A's point of view. Therefore it 
can be concluded that an identity relation exists between 
A 
and B, even though B alone is in a position to prove that 
relation by his memories, recordings, and so forth. 
But if A and B are, in fact, one and the same person, 
with what justification is the term `they' applied, and in 
what way are 'they' different? The problem becomes more 
acute in Fig. 3.3, where there appear to be six world lines 
apparently unconnected to each other in external time. The 
addition of the overlay again shows the relation between 
them, and so resolves the problem of the term `they'. The 
appearance of multiples is a consequence of a temporal 
perspective that is centred solely on the external time 
frame. Once the personal reference frame is also taken into 
consideration the illusion disappears. However, this 
resolution is offset by the appearance of a new problem. In 
each case so far analysed, the two persons claiming identity 
have appeared to be phYSically different -- one is ten, 
twenty, or more years older than the other -- but in Fig. 
3.3 there appear to be six men who are indistinguishable. 
Yet something must distinguish them, for otherwise, through 
the identity of indiscernibles, there would not be six 
materially distinguishable male individuals, but only one. 
What is the feature separating A, B9 C1 t, E, and F that 
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cannot be discovered by the scientific examination of each 
stage of Chronos? 
This problem has been considered by David Lewis in his 
paper, `The Paradoxes of Time Travel'. He suggests that 
whereas it would not be quite accurate to say that the whole 
of the time traveller is existent in two places at the same 
time, what is true is that: 
... he, unlike the rest of us, has two 
different complete stages located at the same time at 
different places. 
Lewis, 1986, p. 722. 
Here Lewis is appealing to an identity criterion that uses a 
system of `person-stages'. According to him, the identity of 
an individual does not reside in some enduring and 
unchanging physical or mental entity but in the causal 
continuity and connectedness, with respect to personal time, 
between individual temporal stages of a person's life. Lewis 
defines continuity as 
the existence of step-by-step paths from here 
to there, with extremely strong local connectedness 
2. Although I name Lewis as the originator, he is responding to Parfit's argument (see 
Parfit, 1971). Lewis adapts Parfit's original thesis in order that the two notions that 
Parfit claims are contradictory -- (1) that 'what matters is mental connectedness and 
continuity between my present mental state and other mental states that will succeed it in 
the future' and (2) that 'what matters is identity between myself, existing now, and 
myself, still existing in the future' (see Lewis, Survival and Identity in Rorty, 1976, p. 
18) -- can complement each other. Otherwise, as Lewis says, it would be the case that 
'what matters in survival according to one answer is present while what matters in 
survival according to the other is lacking. ' Both must be the case in time travel. 
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from each step to the next. 
Lewis, 1976, p. 18. 
He defines connectedness as 
direct relations of similarity and causal 
dependence between my present mental state and each of 
its successors. 
Ibid. 
The time traveller's existence, as shown by his personal 
world line, is divided into individual temporal parts or 
stages that are causally connected in such a way as to 
preserve the same sort of causal continuity that connects 
the person-stages of all beings who are not time 
travellers3. The duration of each person-stage is variable, 
the maximum length being one life-time; otherwise the length 
of a person-stage depends on the circumstances. It may be a 
week, a day, a year, an hour, or twenty years. Deciding 
factors for the moments of division may be appearance, age, 
particular point of view held, end of an experience or the 
beginning of a new one, and changes in behaviour patterns. 
Problems with defining a minimal duration period for a 
person- or object-stage might be correlated with the nature 
of time itself. If time is dense, no specifiable minimal 
stage exists; if time is discrete, the duration of the most 
3. A similar proposal is put forward by Douglas Ehring in 'Personal Identity and Time 
Travel'; he defines a 'P-relation' as at least one causal chain of purely physical events 
between Jones-34 and Jones-4' (Ehring, 1987, p. 430). As shall be seen later, I do not 
endorse the 'purely physical' causal chain alone. 
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minimal stage could be as long as a discrete period of time. 
W. H. Newton-Smith argues that neither of these 
interpretations of the structure of time is entirely 
unproblematic: if time is dense, its continuous nature is 
lost, and yet that is an aspect whose existence is amply 
supported by empirical evidence; if time is discrete, there 
would have to be extensionless periods between the discrete 
particles -- a concept that appears inherently 
contradictory. Lewis overcomes this problem by claiming that 
a given person-stage is defined as being of sufficient 
duration to permit some person-related event. At the very 
least such an event would require a human thought, and that 
cannot take up an infinitely small period of time. This does 
not accommodate for the problem of defining the nature of 
object-stages for inanimate and/or non-sentient beings, but 
that problem will be considered later, and then only in so 
far as it concerns a specific example. An in-depth analysis 
is not necessary because the nature of time's structure does 
not affect the conclusions of this thesis, which apply 
regardless of the temporal interpretation employed (see 
Newton-Smith, 1984, pp. 112-126). It is the system of 
identity uniting the person- or object-stages that is 
important, regardless of the length of duration of those 
stages. 
According to Lewis, between each person-stage 
there is not too much change altogether. 
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Plenty of traits and traces last a lifetime... [T]he 
connectedness and the continuity are not accidental. 
They are explicable; and further, they are explained by 
the fact that the properties of each stage depend 
causally on those of the stages just before in personal 
time, the dependence being such as tends to keep things 
the same. 
Ibid., p. 72. 
This further endorses the personal/external temporal 
reference distinction made in the previous chapter. Whereas 
an examination of the time traveller in external time (the 
sole reference appealed to by those who would accuse time 
travel of inherent temporal contradiction) that shows a 
marked age gap between two externally temporally contiguous 
stages does not fulfil the identity criterion, an 
examination of the time traveller's personal world line 
does, since there are a series of causally connected person- 
stages that link the two occasions in the time traveller's 
life. Lewis further claims that 
[w]hat unites the stages (or segments) of a 
time traveler is the same sort of mental, or mostly 
mental, continuity and connectedness that unites anyone 
else. 
Ibid., p. 72. 
What advantage does this system have for the time 
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traveller over other identity criteria propounded for humans 
or other beings or objects? Quite simply, it permits the 
situation outlined in Fig. 3.3 to obtain without entailing 
contradiction. There are those who argue that personal 
identity does not reside in the causal continuity and 
connectedness of person-stages, but rather in something 
indivisible and unchanging. Such a theory is advanced by 
E. J. Lowe in `Substance and Selfhood' (1991). These criteria 
are, however, logically incompatible with the system of time 
travel presently being considered, because under no 
circumstances could either the traveller or his machine have 
more than one physical manifestation at any given moment 
relative to either reference frame without violating both 
criteria. Arguing from, the opposite direction it follows 
that, if this system of time travel were ever to occur, the 
argument for an indivisible and unchanging basis for the 
time traveller's identity would be undermined. Furthermore - 
- unless it should be discovered that the traveller has a 
unique system of identity that enables his activities but 
prevents anyone or anything else from joining him -- it will 
also follow that identity criteria in general do not consist 
in unchanging psycho-physical entities. In contrast, success 
in any given attempt to relocate an individual temporally in 
either the future or the past relative to the moment of 
departure would not prove the accuracy of Lewis's particular 
identity criterion, but would merely indicate that his was 
closer to the actually existing state of affairs. Failure of 
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all attempts to time travel, however, could not be 
considered proof that identity consisted in a non- 
reductionist, separately existing entity view. It is 
possible that identity resides in a composite object, as in 
Parfit's suggestion (Parfit, 1984. Chapter 10), which 
combines the claim that 
a person's existence just consists in the 
existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a 
series of interrelated physical and mental events 
Parfit, 1984, p. 211. 
with the claim that 
A person is an entity that is distinct from a 
brain and body, and such a series of events. 
Ibid. 
The system of identity proposed in this chapter is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of successful 
time travel as presently defined. 
In order to ensure that no logically possible system of 
time travel is overlooked, and so satisfy the criteria laid 
down for this thesis in the introduction, Lewis's system of 
identity will have to be expanded. To this end the unifying 
factor will be any causal continuity and connectedness with 
respect to personal time -- be it mental, physical, or even 
spiritual. This will enable attacks originating in claims to 
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reincarnation and cyclical universes4, as well as ensure 
that the identity criteria may be applied to inanimate 
objects such as tapes, letters, or even stones, any one of 
which could raise problems for time travel into the past. 
However, because thought experiments allow that it is 
possible for human identity to be preserved without the 
existence of a physical resemblance, or even a causal 
continuity and connectedness of physical parts regardless of 
their similarity, further discussion will concentrate on the 
problem of identity for a human time traveller. 
Parfit terms this the `widest view' definition of 
identity, and it is by no means universally accepted. The 
nature of the time traveller -- as a person who can exist in 
more than one physical location at the same temporal instant 
-- nevertheless demands a system of identity whose general 
structure fulfils the pattern outlined above. By the 
implementation of such an extreme stance I have given the 
time traveller the greatest possible freedom in his 
activities. If it should subsequently be demonstrated that, 
despite this, time travel, as so far defined, by its nature 
engenders logical contradictions that cannot be overcome 
without either a major restructuring of the definition or 
its abandonment, then it will follow that the argument 
provided against this system of time travel is of 
considerable strength. 
By appealing to the causal continuity and connectedness 
4. See S. Weir, 1988, pp. 203-209. 
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of person-stages with respect to the personal time frame, 
the question posed at the beginning of this section, 
regarding the means of differentiation for the six versions 
of Chronos encountered in Fig. 3.3, is resolved. Each is 
shown to be a different person-stage of the same man, 
connected by causal continuity and separated by time itself: 
not time at rest with respect to the external reference 
point, but time at rest with respect to the traveller. This 
would indicate that time is a genuine difference that must 
be taken into consideration, because the only distinguishing 
feature between Chronos as world line A and Chronos as world 
line B is temporal. Even were the temporal interval reduced 
to one nanosecond in order to ensure a physically identical 
state for both A and B -- avoiding the loss of hair or skin, 
or the accumulation of physical marks that is possible over 
a period as short as two seconds -- the difference of one 
nanosecond would still separate them. Without this 
difference of time, and the concomitant increased causal 
history it entails5, there would be no means of 
distinguishing versions A to F, and Chronos' attempt both to 
travel through time and to occupy more than one physical 
space at the same external temporal instant would be 
logically impossible. The status of increasing personal 
temporal and causal experience as both a necessary and a 
5. This association of temporal and causal increase is a fact of the time traveller's 
activities as a being capable of accumulating experiences and acting upon them (or causing 
others to act upon them). It is not to be considered indicative of a reductionist 
position. 
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self-defeating facet of time travel under the present 
description will be considered in Chapter 5. 
Highlighted in Fig. 3.4 is another aspect of time 
travel that is relevant to the problem of identity: the 
correlation of causally connected person-stages with respect 
to external time. The world lines on the first graph have 
been numbered in such a way as to show their temporal 
ordering relative to an external observer. Hence, the person 
watching the building of the pyramids comes first, followed 
by the birth and growth of the scientist until the moment of 
his departure in a time machine from the laboratory, and 
finally the old man who appears twenty-four hours later. 
However, the existence of any individual prior to the moment 
of his birth, as in this case, must be considered reason for 
further investigation, particularly if the first recording 
of the individual's existence made by an external observer 
shows the apparently spontaneous creation of a man with the 
mental and physical structure of a twenty-five year old. 
Minimal analysis based on the previous examples reveals 
this thought experiment as structurally similar, on a 
fundamental level, to the examples already encountered. The 
existence of a time traveller prior to the time of his own 
birth, in external time (and in one possible world), is no 
more problematic than the discrepancy already noted between 
his personal age and that determined by external measurement 
from the moment of his birth to the moment in question. The 
overlay reveals the important fact that Chronos is behaving 
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perfectly naturally with respect to his personal time frame. 
Only if his personal world line were correlated with the 
external time frame under these circumstances would a 
genuinely anomalous situation arise: one in which Chronos 
would come into existence at a moment with respect to his 
personal world line that was before the moment of his birth 
relative to the same reference. In other words if identity 
is assumed, Chronos would exist before his existence began 
with respect to the same time frame. 
This situation, while reminiscent of closed world 
lines, should not be confused with them at this stage6. A 
similar story-line under closed conditions would necessitate 
the traveller being an ancestor of himself, as well as his 
own descendant. Consequently, his existence at each stage in 
the loop could be explained in terms of every other stage, 
although the whole would remain unexplained. In Fig. 3.4, 
however, while there is no previously existing stage, 
relative to the external temporal reference, to explain the 
traveller's existence at that age and at that moment in time 
-- as in a closed world line -- he is neither his own 
ancestor nor his own descendant, having instead a normal 
parentage, as revealed when his world line is examined from 
the perspective of the personal temporal reference. 
If the pattern of the traveller's existence with 
6. In Chapter 5I will argue that all time travelling journeys necessitate the generation 
of such world lines, even when they are to moments in the distant past. However, here the 
distinction between the general rule of time travel as later argued and the structure of 
this particular instance should be clearly delineated. 
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respect to the external reference were considered as though 
it represented the entire personal world line, the 
description would be neither that of a time traveller nor 
that of just one person. Fig. 3.5 illustrates this 
situation, with the personal reference now indicated on the 
main graph. 
In all other respects this graph is identical to that 
of Fig. 3.4, but the absence of two temporal references has 
changed the way in which the information may be interpreted. 
It no longer represents three stages in the life of one 
person, but three different people, causally unconnected, 
whose world lines indicate bizarre histories. 
Pin A is spontaneously created near The Pyramids at the 
age of twenty. He is highly educated in a manner associated 
more with the twenty-first century AD than the twenty-sixth 
century BC. He claims that the object which appeared with 
him is a time machine that he used to travel from 2010 AD, 
and he also claims knowledge of the future. After a forty- 
year stay in Egypt, the man steps into his machine and 
throws the lever. He is instantly vaporised as a result. 
Person B is born under unexceptional circumstances, and 
lives a normal life until the age of twenty, at which point 
he enters something that he claims is a time machine and is 
vaporised. 
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Person 
-Q 
is spontaneously created at the age of sixty, 
claiming memories of Egypt at the time of the Old Kingdom 
and of a young man who had disappeared the day before with 
whom he also claims an identity relation. He leads a 
relatively normal existence, until his death of old age 
thirty years later. 
The above examples indicate that a claim which purports 
to prove the existence of time travelling activities by an 
individual must be supported by a rigorous system of 
identity in order that it may be effectively upheld: a 
system that appeals to causal continuity and connectedness 
between person-stages within a time frame at rest with 
respect to the person or object travelling. Without such an 
identity criterion, all the above examples might be 
relegated to that category of experiences termed examples of 
(fantastic) `coincidence'. 
If this system is to succeed in fulfilling all the 
requirements laid down at the beginning of this chapter, 
however, it is now necessary to examine whether or not it 
can distinguish between time travel as presently defined, 
and alternatives which, while perhaps acceptable within 
their own boundaries, are considered in some manner 
unsatisfactory or `cheating' by proponents of the popular 
system. It is worth noting that although coincidences of the 
type listed above are presently considered highly 
improbable, were this system of time travel to become a 
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reality such situations would become common; this indicates 
a need either to revise our understanding of the physical 
realm, if we do not claim an identity relation, or to 
acknowledge the existence of time travel as defined, if we 
do claim such a relation. 
Section 3 
Weingard and Putnam Into the Future 
In his article entitled "On Travelling Backwards in 
Time", Robert Weingard discusses Hilary Putnam's article "It 
Ain't Necessarily So". There, Putnam argued that time travel 
was a 'conceptual possibility' by providing a description of 
a traveller's activities that included world lines and time 
at rest with respect to frames of temporal reference -- a 
system commensurate with that presently under examination. 
In Putnam's example, the following Minkowski-style space- 
time diagram was employed (see Fig. 3.6) to describe the 
behaviour of a time traveller called Oscar. The line 
numbered 1 is the potential time traveller. At time te at A 
he steps into the time machine which begins its journey into 
the past at time t2; line 2 represents that journey. At t1, 
B the time traveller steps out of his machine to live a 
normal life once more; this last stage is represented by 
line 3. 
Weingard agrees with Putnam's initial description, 
providing definitions of personal ('proper') and external 
('the world line of the observer') time and so indirectly 
122 
helping to define the system of time travel to which he is 
referring. 
[T]he t-axis in [Fig. 3.6] is the world line 
of the observer or his laboratory, say, while the world 
line of Oscar2 and his machine is the time axis of a 
frame of reference which is at rest with respect to the 
time machine. Given this, if we now wish to suppose 
that Oscar has travelled back in time, we can say that 
although events at a occur after those at b, with 
respect to the observer's frame of reference, events at 
a occur before those at b in the time machine's proper 
time. 
Weingard, 1973, p. 117. 
Here, the ordering of events relative to the personal 
(proper) time frame, and the consequent description of 
Oscar's time travelling activities, are in keeping with 
Putnam's description and with that presently under 
examination. The disagreements between Weingard and Putnam 
emerge when an objector's interpretation of Putnam's 
original diagram is provided. 
[T]he correct description of [the activities 
represented in Putnam's diagram] is that Oscarl lives 
normally until t2, when he collides with a strange 
system and both disappear. At t1, this strange system 
somehow was created along with a person who resembles 
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Oscar Smith, very closely. Therefore the arrow on 
segment 2 of the Oscar diagram should also point 
upwards to agree with the arrows on segments 1 and 3. 
If you do not describe the situation in this way you 
will be using language with a change in usage or 
meaning from the ordinary way of speaking, and then 
this would not show that time travel is a conceptual 
possibility because what we want, of course, is a case 
that can be described as `time travel' in terms of our 
present concepts of time, travel, and change. 
Ibid., p. 118 (my emphasis). 
Putnam responds by charging the objector with the latter's 
complaint, saying that the objector's image involves 
... a host of difficulties which make us 
doubt 
whether to speak in this way is to go on using language 
without any change of use or meaning. 
Putnam, 1962, p. 668. 
and it is on this point that Weingard, with some 
justification, disagrees. He interprets the objector's 
picture as the behaviour of a matter transmitter in 
combination with matter/anti-matter creation and 
annihilation. In this manner the whole can be made to read 
in a perfectly logical and scientifically acceptable way. It 
works because anti-matter can be reinterpreted as backward 
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time travelling matter7; however, this interpretation also 
raises a problem. 
The objector wants a system "which can be described as 
`time travel' in terms of our present concepts of time, 
travel, and change". The anti-matter interpretation is a 
method of describing the behaviour of particles that has 
occasionally been used as an example of backward time 
travel; but the response made by those who reject the 
possibility of time travel, as well as by those who support 
the popular image of that activity, is that those who 
support the anti-matter method are `not talking about time 
travel'. This is not strictly true, and painfully echoes the 
unsatisfactory argument of Holt in the last chapter, but if 
an alternative explanation, such as anti-matter behaviour, 
can be interpreted as a scientifically defensible form of 
time travel, why not simply accept it? The reason is because 
although both the popular and the anti-matter systems have 
been termed instances of `time travel', the latter differs 
too much, and in too many significant ways, from the system 
of time travel that the science-fiction writers and, 
ideally, even some scientists would like to see realised. 
Weingard claims that by using a system for the creation and 
annihilation of the Oscars (namely a modified anti-matter 
interpretation) he will 
7. The behaviour of a positron can equally be described as being that of a time travelling 
electron. This is rooted in the so called PCT theory which demands that whenever Parity or 
. 
Charge is reversed, the Temporal indicator must be granted a negative sign also. See The 
Arrow of Time (1990, pp. 139-141). 
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... fill in some details to Putnam's case of 
the three Oscars so that in this new case the 
objector's description is the correct one and Putnam's 
time-travel description is clearly ruled out. 
Weingard, 1973, p. 119 
This suggests that Weingard is using anti-matter as an 
alternative that is not to be understood as a form of time 
travel, but is instead to be regarded as a system that 
appears indistinguishable from what is popularly seen as 
`genuine' time travel but which, in fact, is not. It is this 
claim that will now be challenged. I will show that there 
are significant and detectable differences between the two 
systems that reveal the anti-matter interpretation to be 
inadequate to the task of impersonating Putnam's original. 
The two interpretations will be shown to be different but 
not, thereby, mutually exclusive. Neither system, in itself, 
denies the possibility of the other. 
In his argument Weingard uses the two concepts of anti- 
matter and matter transmitters (the latter are an equally 
popular science fiction device -- witness the `transporters' 
used in the television series Star Trek) to create his 
alternative interpretation. Since the latter are an integral 
part of his anti-matter analysis, these will be analysed 
first. The objective is to examine, within a philosophical 
framework, why the alternative interpretation differs, in 
what way it differs, and why that difference is significant 
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enough to make some reject it as an example of `genuine time 
travel'. Ultimately it is hoped that from this analysis a 
system will be developed that will reveal any subconscious, 
or even covert, use of those aspects peculiar to either the 
matter transmitter or the anti-matter interpretation that 
indicates a position opposed to that of the defined 
structure of the popular system. It is in this last that the 
relevance to the present chapter will be revealed, because 
the omitted elements can be arrived at through an analysis 
of the time traveller's identity relations in comparison to 
those of the transmitted and anti-matter beings when 
attempting to fulfil Putnam's description. 
In order to represent Putnam's written description more 
accurately, an arrow of personal time -- that Putnam omits - 
- has been added to the world line of the time machine. 
Without this, the machine must be interpreted as being at 
rest with respect to the external time frame, a situation 
that would be more in keeping with Weingard's anti-matter 
interpretation than with the time machine of Putnam's 
example. Since Putnam makes no indication that the personal 
time frame of the time machine is any different to that of 
the traveller within it -- and if it should coincide with 
the external time frame the machine's capacity to transport 
objects of matter into the past would be further complicated 
(see Chapter 5) -- I believe my addition is justified. 
However, even if it were not, because it is the nature of 
the traveller's behaviour that is of primary concern to 
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Putnam and Weingard, it is only necessary that the traveller 
and the surrounding universe of matter be physically 
separated from the anti-matter machine during the journey, 
and that some suitable explanation be found for the 
machine's abilities. Since I believe Putnam's intentions 
would be best represented in the graph I have provided, I 
will not examine the problems of interaction in this 
chapter. 
The first stage in Weingard's alternative 
interpretation employs what he terms a `matter transmitter' 
resident in New York. This machine records all of a person's 
mental and physical make-up, and in the process destroys 
them (a similar scenario was employed by Derek Parfit in 
chapter 10 of his book, Reasons and Persons). It then sends 
its recorded information, via radio waves, to a receiver 
(situated in Paris) that subsequently creates the person 
from matter stored within it, using the information provided 
by the New York transmitter as a blueprint for the process. 
The result, as witnessed by an external observer, is 
illustrated in Fig. 3.7. Causal continuity and connectedness 
is preserved between the destruction of the person in New 
York and his subsequent creation in Paris by the information 
being transmitted via radio waves. Therefore, a line 
connecting these two points on the personal time overlay is 
appropriate. Within the framework of science fiction such 
matter transmitters are common-place, but this fact does not 
resolve those problems of identity associated with them. 
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Weingard claims that 
[i]f, for example, n person steps into one 
such transmitter in New York which then beams a 
directed radio signal to another one in Paris, the 
being that then stops out of the Paris transmitter 
would, I think, be naturally described as the person 
who stepped into the Now York machine and not just a 
copy of that person. 
Weingard, 1973, p. 119. 
This is an assumption that requires some justification, 
however, which Weingard does not offer, although he does 
provide a possible objection that highlights the potential 
problems of such a system. fie suggests that the signal from 
the New York transmitter might be picked up by receivers in 
other cities as well as Paris, resulting in more than one 
traveller being reassembled as a result of the initial 
transmission. He further claims that, since nothing could 
distinguish these beings one from another, and it is not 
possible that all of them could be the person who stopped 
into the transmitter in New York, therefore none of them is. 
Again, this argument is neither expanded nor supported, and 
consequently undermines the development of Weingard's later 
arguments8. Ignoring these problems, he adds a further 
qualification to his system. 
S. Perth would allow this as an example of survival (a many-1 relation) but not identity 
(a 1-1 relation). 
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We need to further imagine that once a 
person's structure is recorded in the memory of the 
transmitter, we can affect that memory and vary the 
structure recorded there. 
Ibid., p. 120. 
The purpose of this is to accommodate for the ageing of the 
time traveller during his journey within the machine. From 
this it is clear that Weingard does not support the concept 
of instantaneous temporal movement. It is necessary that the 
transmitted traveller age in order that he may mimic more 
closely the time traveller of Putnam's descriptions who, 
upon his exit from the machine at t1, B, has all the 
memories of a person who had existed from t1, A to t2, A and 
then travelled back in time to ti, B. An examination based 
on these aspects of Weingard's theory alone can already 
highlight differences between the genuine time traveller and 
the transmitted person, but first it is necessary to resolve 
a problem in Weingard's description. 
Throughout his discussion, Weingard refers to the 
`matter transmitter', yet his own description of the machine 
belies this title. He writes 
When an object is placed in it, the machine 
analyzes the object's molecular and atomic structure 
and stores this information in its electronic memory. 
In the course of the analysis, the object is decomposed 
into a pile of its basic elements in an uncombined 
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state. It then transmits this information by radio 
waves to another matter transmitter which, on the basis 
of the received information, reconstructs the original 
object out of supplies of basic elements which it 
contains for this purpose. 
Ibid., p. 119. 
The machine is thus shown to be a transmitter of information 
rather than matter. Consequently there is one obvious sense 
in which it differs from the time travelling Oscar, in that 
whereas the latter is free to travel to wherever and 
whenever he chooses (problems associated with freewill 
and/or causality will be laid aside at this stage) the 
transmitted person is constrained by the need for a receiver 
at the space-time in which he wishes to be reconstructed. 
This advantage may be overcome if Oscar is subjected to 
similar methods and constraints, and in this manner both 
systems can be reduced in complexity to the one, important, 
distinguishing feature. The physical intricacies of trying 
to preserve a signal intact in all its complexity across 
temporal, as well as spatial, intervals will therefore be 
ignored. The only difference between the time machine 
transmitter and Weingard's transmitter is that one can alter 
its occupant's temporal, as well as his spatial, position: 
both will require transmitters and receivers in order to 
travel, and both will be transmitted as information to be 
reconstructed at the intended place of arrival. 
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Using Weingard's own example of a problem with his 
machine, it can be shown that his traveller could perform a 
feat of which Oscar -- in his capacity as a time traveller 
alone, and not in combination with those powers acquired as 
a consequence of the method of transportation -- is 
incapable, namely appearing in several different places, not 
just at the same moment relative to the external time frame 
-- as Weingard has already suggested -- but also at the same 
instant relative to the personal time frame. Figs 3.8 and 
3.9 represent this activity as performed by the time 
traveller and transmitted traveller respectively. The 
difference between the two is not immediately apparent in 
the external time frame, but it becomes acute when the 
causal ordering of the events in each example is viewed from 
the perspective of the travellers themselves, i. e. the 
personal time frame. While the personal time overlay of Fig. 
3.9 reveals straightforward connections between the person 
in New York and each of his later stages appearing in 
Moscow, Paris and Berlin, the same does not hold true of 
Fig. 3.8. In the latter, each stage is connected either 
directly or transitively to all those preceding and 
succeeding it by means of a series of person-stages causally 
connected and continuous with respect to the personal time 
frame. In Fig. 3.9, in order to preserve the appearance of 
temporal movement, the travellers' information would have to 
be transmitted at the same moment from New York to all the 
receivers, but if that were so there would exist no direct 
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identity relation as previously defined between the persons 
arriving in Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. This raises some 
interesting consequences. 
It is possible to imagine an alleged time traveller who 
appears in Paris, steps out of the machine in order to prove 
his arrival, and is then killed by a freak accident. 
Simultaneously another traveller, with no knowledge of the 
accident, appears in Moscow. While some form of causal 
continuity and connectedness would be preserved with the New 
York transmitter, it is clear that no such relationship 
would exist between those at the Moscow and Paris receivers, 
except transitively via the earlier causal stage in New 
York. On the other hand, in order to create the same effect 
as his counterpart who is not time travelling, the genuine 
time traveller would have to be transmitted from New York to 
Paris and then, should Paris prove uneventful, be 
transmitted backwards in time and across space to appear at 
the same moment in Moscow and then, after a further journey 
in space and time, in Berlin. In this way he would appear in 
several cities at the same moment relative to the external 
time frame. Each reconstituted stage, however, would be 
slightly older than the one before, and would retain 
memories of the events that had occurred to each previous 
stage. Should any one be injured or destroyed, later stages 
would either bear witness to that injury, or not exist at 
all. No later person-stage than that at which he was 
destroyed could exist, because that would generate a 
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contradiction. 
Even if Weingard's artificial ageing were introduced, 
the problem would not be resolved. The older version in 
Moscow would still be unaware of the accident that had 
befallen his counterpart in Paris until he was informed of 
the same. This is because there would exist no direct causal 
continuity and connectedness, with respect to the personal 
time frame, between the stage in Paris and that in Moscow. 
The Moscow stage would therefore appear blithely unaware of 
his incongruous existence, claiming memories of an entirely 
successful reception at his `previous' port of call. Without 
knowledge in advance of the outcome of all the intended 
journeys, the only way by which this problem might be 
overcome is if each stage could be transmitted, successfully 
survive its reconstruction and emergence, re-enter the 
machine, then be transmitted to the next location, and so 
forth. Then, however, the illusion of time travel would be 
removed and pure spatial movement would remain. 
Under this description, the time traveller himself 
would be free to experience fission as his opponent does, 
but this would be in addition to his own abilities, and 
quite superfluous to his needs in this example. The time 
traveller can successfully perform the feat without fission, 
his opponent cannot, and this is because his opponent cannot 
travel backwards after each journey to make up the time used 
in the course of the experiment. Weingard's transmitter 
might be accepted as a means of future-directed temporal 
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relocation in keeping with Mellor's arguments outlined 
earlier if it were combined with a storage medium (see 
Introduction): the element of fission, however, remains 
controversial. 
The very fact that Weingard's traveller must resort to 
fission if he is to reproduce the appearance of the time 
traveller's behaviour makes Weingard's `solution' 
considerably more complex, and may, in some quarters, render 
it a more suspect explanation, both technically and 
philosophically, than that of time travel for the 
circumstances described. However, there remains one more 
component of Weingard's description that must be examined 
before any final opinion may be passed, and that is the use 
of anti-matter. 
Section 4 
Into the Past 
So far, this chapter has been concerned with a 
comparison between a time machine and a misleadingly named 
`matter transference' machine, in which the latter has not 
been expected to transfer information into the past. Yet 
backward temporal movement is a vital aspect of the time 
machine Weingard seeks to discredit. In fact, the limitation 
is recognised in Weingard's article, where only two small 
paragraphs are expended on the description I have challenged 
above. His main proposal involves an anti-matter based 
interpretation of Putnam's original example. This is 
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graphically represented in Fig. 3.10. 
Line 1 represents a person waiting until time t2 for 
what he thinks will be the arrival of a time machine. At 
time t1 at point B, a matter transmitter creates two people. 
One of these two (represented by line 3) has all the 
physical and mental characteristics that would be exhibited 
by a person who had time travelled from point A at time t2 
to point B at time t1: he is older, and he has the 
appropriate memories. The other person created at B 
(represented by line 2) is identical to the first except 
that he is composed entirely of anti-matter. This person is 
created inside (and with) a so-called time machine, and 
behaves in a manner indistinguishable from the time 
travelling Oscar (in keeping with the theories of particle 
physics). At time t1 at A Oscar steps into the machine, and 
at point t2 he and his anti-matter double are destroyed 
together with the machine. 
I will now attempt to show that, despite the scientific 
basis for his argument, Weingard's anti-matter description 
nevertheless fails to account for all the necessary aspects 
of a time machine. Consequently, it is not as 
`philosophically unimpeachable' a description as he claims. 
A comparison of Figs. 3.6 and 3.10, which represent 
Putnam's and Weingard's interpretations respectively, 
reveals that they are not identical. There is no causal 
continuity and connectedness with respect to personal time 
between lines 1 and 2 at time t2 (marked *) in Fig. 3.10, 
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and this is a consequence of the problem raised earlier. Had 
these two not met, there is no reason why they would not 
continue to lead their own separate lives -- although the 
life-style of the anti-matter Oscar would appear strange to 
those not sharing his opposite nature, and would also 
require some method by which it might be preserved from an 
explosive interaction with any form of matter (not just his 
double). Furthermore, if they did continue to live separate 
lives, the matter Oscar represented in line 3 would not, and 
could not, preserve memories befitting his status as the 
last stage in a world line that began at t1, A9, and this in 
turn casts doubt on the appropriateness of the identity 
relation between lines 2 and 3 at t1, B. In fact, the only 
relation between these two would be the fact of their mutual 
generation at the same space-time and their physical 
resemblance: their subsequent histories are quite 
independent. It is partly because of this that other 
differences emerge between the popular and the anti-matter 
interpretations of time travel. 
If a matter/anti-matter partnership were created at 
time t1, the `earlier-stage' anti-matter version could be 
destroyed at time t2 (that being later than t1 relative to 
the external time frame) without any effect on the 
activities of its `later-stage' matter copy (see Fig. 3.11). 
Furthermore, even if on every occasion (for reasons as yet 
9. Due to the fact that the anti-satter version's causal history would continue to grow 
after the supposed beginning (at t2, A) of his time travelling journey. 
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unexplained) that the anti-matter individual or object was 
destroyed independently of its counterpart, the matter 
version also ceased to exist at the same instant relative to 
the external time frame, the fact would remain that, until 
the moment of annihilation, there would have existed a 
matter version that appeared (under the time travelling 
interpretation) to be a later stage of an object or person 
that had been destroyed at an earlier stage in its personal 
time line (Fig. 3.12). Still more incomprehensible is the 
fact that, if the anti-matter version were destroyed at time 
t2, there would remain the anomalous existence of what 
appeared to be a causally later stage of that anti-matter 
being between times t1 and t2 (Fig 3.13). In contrast, once 
the time traveller is destroyed, no later person-stages 
(relative to the personal time frame) can exist, any more 
than an object that is not time travelling can continue to 
exist after its moment of total destruction. To resolve this 
problem, restrictions might be placed on the freedom to 
create anti-matter 'time-travellers'. Thus any attempt to 
create an anti-matter traveller would fail on those 
occasions when the being is destroyed before the moment of 
its combination with the person claiming to be a would-be 
time traveller, i. e. on those occasions when destruction 
occurs after t1, B and before (external time) t2, A on the 
Weingard diagram (Fig. 3.10). This not only poses extreme 
restrictions on the freedom of would-be time travellers (a 
subject that will be examined in the next chapter), but it 
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also generates a bilking experiment. This is because in 
order that the substance of the anti-matter being's initial 
existence can be determined, it must exist, for otherwise 
how is its non-existence as a consequence of events lying in 
the future relative to both the ordering of events from 
creation to destruction in the personal time frame 
(appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, see below) and 
the external time frame to be known? This is not a factor 
for the backward-moving time travelling object, because that 
comes from the future. While the non-existence at a pre- 
departure specified time and place in the external past 
(relative to the moment of departure) of a backward time 
travelling object might be interpreted as a warning that 
events will not turn out as anticipated -- because that 
event lies in the object's personal future -- it cannot 
affect the substance of the time travelling object's 
physical existence until that point is reached in its 
personal time line. From the above it may be seen that all 
the problems of the anti-matter interpretation stem from the 
fact that whereas the appearance is of an object coming from 
the future, the fact is that the moment of anti-matter 
creation is at the earliest moment of its existence relative 
to the external time line, and the moment of its 
annihilation is at the latest. Conversely, the creation of 
the time travelling object may lie at the latest moment of 
its existence relative to the external time line. 
D. H. Mellor also rejects the anti-matter interpretation 
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as an example of time travel. He writes 
we must distinguish sharply between reversing 
the temporal order of types of events and reversing the 
order of particular event tokens. el, e'1 and e ''l are 
all tokens events of one type, namely a clock hand's 
passing a numeral 'P, while e2, e'2 and e''2 are all 
of another type, namely hands passing a numeral `2'. 
What matters for backward time travel is that the 
temporal order of a pair of these tokens be reversed, 
i. e. that by the standards of the outside world their 
causal order be reversed. Of what types these tokens 
are is immaterial... It is irrelevant to time travel 
that clock hands normally go round clockwise and that 
electrons outnumber positrons. A positron is not an 
electron going backward in time, any more than an anti- 
clockwise clock is an ordinary clock time-travelling -- 
or, come to that, than an ordinary clock is a time 
travelling anti-clockwise clock. 
Mellor, 1981, p. 173 (my emphasis). 
The difference between the anti-matter and popular 
interpretations, from which may be derived all the problems 
cited above, may be found in the definition of the latter 
given in the Introduction. There the time travelling object 
or being was defined as carrying information from the future 
relative to the moment of arrival. At its most basic, that 
information is only enough to communicate its futuristic 
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origins and so prove its characteristic ability. Scars, 
marks, or a failure to arrive at a designated time and place 
after the necessary arrangements have been made, all 
communicate information about the future, even though, in 
the last case, it is merely that something will go wrong. 
Mellor use this point to show that time travel is not 
synonymous with backward causation -- although he argues 
that it does, ultimately, lead to it. He highlights the 
difference of causal and temporal orderings inside and 
outside a time travelling machine, and asks why these 
orderings should be opposed. He writes 
I get the answer to this question from the 
indubitable proposition that to arrive is to have 
travelled. If Dr Who's Tardis sets off in 1984 and 
arrives later in 1884, it has travelled back in time. 
Dr Who set off in 1984 before he arrived in 1884 
because his nineteenth-century appearance is affected 
by his twentieth-century departure, not vice versa. His 
wearing his scarf as he emerges from the time machine 
is an effect, not a cause, of his putting it on as he 
set off, as is his 1884 recollection of having done so. 
Ibid., p. 174. 
The anti-matter being brings nothing from the future: it 
either loses tell-tale signs as it journeys backwards, so 
that there is no moment -- relative to the external time 
frame -- at which it has information inappropriate to the 
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period; or it simply never has that information because it 
has not come from the future, the object merely giving the 
appearance of having done so. The choice of explanation 
depends on the beliefs of the person speaking, but, 
whichever is cited, it is the lack of causal continuity and 
connectedness with respect to a personal time frame that is 
always positive for the traveller that is the underlying 
cause of the problemlo. The various stages of the anti- 
matter being lack an identity relation, as defined, with an 
object that has come from the future relative to the moment 
of examination, and the physical and logical inability to 
provide that evidence is a direct consequence. The success 
of the identity analysis is, in turn, dependent on the 
existence of a personal/external time frame distinction that 
is absent in the anti-matter interpretation. 
It is worth noting that without the above distinction 
and the identity relation that depends on it, the anti- 
matter being must be assumed to be exhibiting an example of 
backward causation whenever it is interpreted as time 
travelling into the past. Since backward causation is a 
feature often attributed to time travel into the past, a 
10. Mellor does not refer to temporal passage inside the time machine, referring instead 
to the causal passage within the machine in contrast to the temporal and causal passage 
outside it during backward time travel. This appears to support Lewis's reluctance to 
refer to the passage of time inside the machine as time -- although he admits it plays the 
same part in the traveller's life as time. I note the difference of opinion but, since 
there appears to be no means of discerning a difference between time inside and outside 
the machine (if it was discovered that the entire universe as we know it was time 
travelling with respect to another universe would we claim that what we experience was not 
'genuine' time? ) I feel that 'time' is a term that may be justifiably applied to the 
duration experienced by the traveller inside his machine. 
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more detailed examination of the subject will be provided in 
Chapter 5 (Causation). There, its relevance (and the 
relevance of arguments placed against it) to the present 
system will be examined. Consequently, further discussion 
will be reserved until then. 
Can the above example be considered proof of the 
effectiveness of the specified identity criteria as a means 
of exposing alternative interpretations that do not fulfil 
the requirements of the time travel system under 
examination? Inasmuch as it has revealed something about the 
needs of the popular formulation of time travel, the answer 
is `Yes', because any claim to time travel in which 
information regarding future events is transmitted into the 
past must be based on an identifiable discrepancy between a 
time travelling object's personal experience of time, and 
that of an ideal observer at rest with respect to the 
external time frame throughout the period of the claim (as 
shown in the Introduction and Chapter 2). And in order that 
the discrepancy may be appreciated as such it is necessary 
that the experience belong to one span of existence, 
causally connected and continuous with respect to the 
personal temporal reference, for which the moment of 
creation is always the earliest moment of personal 
experience, and the moment of destruction the latest, 
regardless of the positions of these moments relative to the 
external time frame. In other words, the discrepancy, in 
combination with a system of identity that limits the 
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experience to one object relative to which the causal flow 
is always positive, both defines time travel and, as a 
consequence, identifies counterfeit claims. 
Section 5 
Other Applications and Some Problems 
The last two sections were concerned with a study of 
how identity relations could be used to distinguish between 
genuine instances of time travel and imitations that appear 
convincing on a superficial level. In what way might the 
conclusions drawn from this study aid an understanding of 
personal identity relations on a wider scale? 
According to Derek Parfit, the simplest view of 
identity relations is of the following form: 
[t]he criterion of identity over time -- or 
what this identity involves -- is the physical 
continuity, over time, of my brain and body. 
Parfit, 1984, p. 204. 
Yet, by the application of a thought experiment that 
affected our use of the external temporal reference, it was 
shown that day-to-day appeals to the causal continuity and 
connectedness of persons with respect to that reference are 
only of value inasmuch as it does not differ, under normal 
circumstances, from that of personal time, and it is this 
reference that is important to the identity relation. The 
passage of time for the individual is therefore to be 
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considered a higher priority than the passage of time per 
se. 
The importance of the nature of the causal relationship 
from the perspective of the stages being related cannot be 
over-emphasised. The remainder of this chapter will be 
dedicated to an attempt to highlight the value of this 
perspective, and, in so doing, apply the conclusions of this 
chapter to other identity problems not directly related to 
time travel. However, this study will also reveal further 
problems with the causal continuity and connectedness 
criteria. While efforts will be made to resolve these 
problems it will be seen that although the system of 
identity suggested is a necessary feature of successful time 
travel into the past, it includes features that may, in some 
minds, detract from its claim to resolve the problem of 
identity for the time traveller. 
In his article `Survival and Trivial Facts' (Analysis, 
1987) Douglas Ehring attacks, by means of thought 
experiments, Parfit's claim that what really matters is 
survival (not identity") and what matters for survival is 
his `Relation-R'. Parfit defines Relation-R as 
psychological connectedness and/or continuity 
with the right kind of cause... The right kind of cause 
11, Identity is always a 1-1 relation; survival may be a 1-many or even a many-i relation. 
This point, and the consequences arising from it, will be returned to later in this 
chapter. 
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could be any cause. 
Parfit, 1984, p. 215. 
Ehring gives the following argument: 
Case 1. Imagine it is possible to encode information 
regarding a person's personality traits and memories onto 
tape. After the destruction of the original body (A), the 
information is in some manner passed, in its entirety, into 
a new body (B). The outcome, claims Ehring, would satisfy 
Parfit's Relation-R and so should be considered by A to be 
as good as ordinary survival. 
Case 2. Imagine that, after the original person (A) has been 
destroyed, the tape holding the information is dropped onto 
the encoding machine and damaged beyond repair. However, the 
striking of the machine by the tape causes it to 
malfunction, creating a tape that is totally identical to 
the one that had been damaged. This created tape is not a 
copy, as Ehring is at pains to emphasise, but merely the 
result of an unlikely coincidence. The information on this 
new tape is then passed into another body (B), who now has 
all the memories of person A. Here also there is an R- 
Relation, according to Ehring, because Parfit allowed any 
causal route from A's experiences to B's apparent memories. 
Case 3. The tape is destroyed and a totally unrelated 
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malfunction of the encoding machine subsequently causes a 
tape to be manufactured that is an exact duplicate of the 
original, despite there being no causal link between tape 
A's destruction and tape B's production. 
As Mark Siderits points out (Siderits, 1988, p. 30), 
the problem requiring resolution is not between cases 2 and 
3, but between cases 1 and 2. A causal relation exists in 
case 1 that is not repeated in case 2: in the former, the 
nature and structure of the information on tape A directly 
causes the structure of the information on tape B; in the 
latter case no such direct relationship exists and 
the falling of a blank tape might have caused 
the second encoder to produce a tape capable of 
duplicating all of A's brain states.... [I]t is not, as 
Ehring claims, the move from (2) to (3), but rather the 
move from (1) to (2) that eliminates the relevant 
causal dependence... And [Parfit] can maintain that the 
difference between (1), where R does obtain, and (2) 
and (3), where R does not obtain, is deep. It is the 
difference between A's psychological states causing B's 
psychological states, and something else causing B's 
psychological states. 
Siderits, 1988, p. 30. 
Consequently, no further consideration will be given to the 
final stage of the thought experiment. 
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Ehring's argument hinges on a conflict between the 
intuitive and logical responses to each scenario. Intuition 
demands that person A reject the series of events in case 
two as an unacceptable means of survival; logic points out 
the undoubted causal relation existent between each stage 
which, in turn, seems to imply the presence of Parfit's 
Relation-R, established as intuitively and logically 
acceptable in the first scenario12. The undermining of 
Parfit's Relation-R is dependent on Ehring forcing his 
antagonist to admit a preference for the intuitive response 
to the second scenario, thereby denying the importance of 
Relation-R to survival criteria. An analysis of the 
structure of Ehring's thought experiment to reveal why this 
preference arises would, therefore, be productive. 
One response may be that while there does exist a 
causal relation between person A and person B, it is of `the 
wrong sort'. But this leads to the inevitable question: what 
would constitute `the right sort'? Rather than attempting a 
careful deconstruction stage by stage of Ehring's scenario, 
the application of the conclusions of this chapter can be 
invoked since they are independent of any outside influence, 
being, by their very nature, restricted to nothing more than 
the object claiming identity, and even divorced from frames 
of temporal reference with no direct influence on the 
object. In this example the objects between which an 
12. There are those who would disagree with 8hring's assumptions regarding the first 
scenario, but in order for the argument to proceed it is necessary that a general 
agreement be assumed. 
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identity relation is said to obtain are not the tapes or, 
directly, the persons (although they are clearly affected in 
the long term), but the memories themselves. The question is 
whether or not the memories implanted into person B, that 
were encoded as a result of the accident described in case 
2, can be considered not just identical in content (a fact 
that is not disputed), but so related to person A's memories 
as to make the subsequent implantation in B sufficient to 
enable B to claim that he is the mental heir to A, and so 
should be accorded the rights and privileges due to A, even 
though the body is differentl3. 
Taken from the perspective of the memories themselves - 
-a study that requires that all external temporal proximity 
be ignored as potentially misleading -- there is a breakdown 
of the direct relations between the stage of existence 
represented by tape 1 and that represented by tape 2, and it 
is this breakdown that makes the identical content of tape B 
a matter of coincidence. A causal relation of 'the right 
sort' would require that it is the structure and content of 
the memories, and not the tape on which they are stored, 
that must determine the nature of the memories on tape B 
and, therefore, the memories in person B. The close external 
temporal proximity of the incidents can act as a smoke- 
screen, giving the illusion that Parfit's Relation-R exists 
when it does not. Once that time frame is ignored, the way 
13. I an assuming the body is of the same sex. Clearly if this were not so, certain rights 
must be withdrawn, but this does not affect whether the memories in B's mind are those of 
A. 
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is easier to recognising that the relation is one of 
coincidence: any external time interval could have 
intervened between the annihilation of tape A and the 
creation of tape B, and the relation would have been the 
same. 
It is, perhaps, worth remembering that in this instance 
the problem of defining object-stages can once again be 
raised (see Section 2). Specifically human-orientated 
thoughts or behaviour cannot be carried out while the 
person's psychological structure is encoded on inanimate 
tape. While a physical distinction between the existence of 
person A up to and including his encoding on tape and the 
existence of person B starting from and including the 
encoding on tape B can be drawn, in order to avoid any pre- 
judgement of the issue of identity it would be more 
appropriate if it were supposed that on every occasion when 
a person's psychological structure was physically relocated 
in its entiretyi4 to another place of storage -- be it on 
tape, computer, encoding machine, or whatever -- the period 
spent in that place of storage were considered another, 
separate stage. In this manner the problem of defining an 
object stage might be resolved, while the question of the 
existence of appropriate causal relations between the 
object-stages will remain to be determined in the manner 
outlined above. Yet that analysis may not be enough. What of 
14. It will be assumed that the whole of a person's psychological make-up is present at 
any given person-stage, thereby obviating the need to examine the highly controversial and 
involved subject of matters of degree. 
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examples where there exists an even stronger causal 
dependence between the end (or destruction) of one stage and 
the beginning (or creation) of another? 
In `Personal Identity and Causality: Becoming Unglued' 
(American Philosophical Quarterly, 1987), Daniel Kolak and 
Raymond Martin provide an interesting counter-example to 
test the value of a purely causal analysis of identity 
relations, based on Parfit's Relation-R. The structure of 
their argument is paraphrased below. 
Imagine a super-computer that creates mathematical object- 
configurations (MOCs) by a random manipulation of variables. 
These MOCs can be perfect descriptions of every detail in 
the make-up -- both physical and, where appropriate, 
psychological -- of any object or person who has, will, or 
might have existed. By this totally random method perfect 
descriptions are created of Socrates, Hitler, Florence 
Nightingale, the Eiffel Tower, blobs of matter, and Lenin's 
tomb. In addition blueprints are created for people and 
objects that have not been, and may never be, realised in 
this universe. In order to operate the machine, a person or 
object is placed in one side that is devoted to analysing 
(in the writer's example they suggest Robert Nozick). The 
computer creates an MOC of the object analysed that it 
stores, updating it moment to moment in order that it is, at 
all times, a perfect record of the analysed person or 
object. Simultaneously it begins randomly manufacturing MOCs 
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at an enormous rate. After a while it manufactures, quite by 
chance, a description that qualitatively matches that of the 
object or person being kept in storage. Once this occurs, 
the computer uses the blueprint to manufacture, out of new 
matter, an exact replica of the object in storage, and 
simultaneously destroys the original. As a result, it is the 
manufactured person or object that is retrieved from the 
machine after the experiment is ended. 
The rejoinder to this example15 is that the replica 
does not arise out of the original: its generation is 
entirely spontaneous, and it is not a continuer of the 
object with which the relation is supposed to hold. 
Consequently there is no identity relation. This is akin to 
approaching the argument from the perspective of the object 
concerned. Furthermore, it is worth noting that although 
there is no doubt that the eventual manufacture of the 
replica and the destruction of the original are dependent on 
an exact match being obtained between the two, there is no 
logical reason why both replicas could not be permitted to 
leave the machine and co-exist in the outside world. Under 
such circumstances, would the causal relations between the 
two be sufficient to support a claim to survival (or 
identity)? Like the well-worn example of the ship of 
Theseus, while the original continued to exist it seems 
15. By Nozick in an earlier attack: see Kolak and Martin, 1987, p. 343. The authors argue 
that the example is not so clear-cut as to admit Nozick's attack, but I do not find their 
argument convincing. 
152 
unlikely that the replica would be granted the status of 
heir to the original and/or identical with it: but the true 
test comes when the original no longer exists. In the 
absence of any closer relation one might be inclined to hold 
the replica to be the heir to the model on which it was 
based and, in human cases, morally responsible for acts 
committed by its model before the moment of the replica's 
creation, and this, is turn, suggests the assumption of an 
appropriate identity relation. Yet once the idea is put in 
this manner the situation appears absurd. How can a person 
be held responsible for something that he could not have 
committed because he had not been created? 
Kolak and Martin argue that if one can accept an 
identity relation between a person before and after the use 
of a transmitter (or other `transporter' device) there seems 
no logical reason why this MOC example cannot also be 
considered an example of survival and/or identity. Yet 
because the copy is manufactured spontaneously and 
accidentally the required causal continuity and 
connectedness from the perspective of the objects claiming 
identity is lacking. True, it was physically created because 
it matched that in the other side of the machine, but the 
reasons for its material construction are not the same as 
those for its mathematical creation. The latter is 
accidental and spontaneous, and since the MOC is the 
blueprint for the material person who finally emerges, that 
person's structure is a matter of accident, although the 
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fact of the material construction was dependent on a match 
being detected. Where true identity or survival exists, 
therefore, no aspect of the relation is accidental. Both 
Ehring's example and that of Kolak and Martin can be 
labelled examples of deviant (or wayward) causal chains. The 
intended result has been achieved in both examples, but the 
external appearance of the situation in each case -- and the 
assumption of relations based on that appearance -- differs 
markedly from the facts of the subsequent object's creation. 
Here it may be worthwhile to analyse my use of 
`identity' and 'survival'. In the above they have been 
regarded, to all intents and purposes, as interchangeable. 
This is because the primary distinction between survival and 
identity -- that the former is a many-one or one-many 
relation, and the latter is a one-one relation -- has not 
been a matter of concern. Regardless of whether there are 
many persons created as a result of the processes outlined 
above, or only one, the important aspect in each example has 
been to question whether the causal relation between the 
original and the subsequent object/s has been appropriate to 
either identity or survival. Despite the ingenuity of the 
counter-example, I do not believe Kolak and Martin succeed 
in proving that causal connectedness and continuity are 
insufficient to survival or identity. The previous 
discussion has, however, introduced the concept of deviant 
causal chains. 
From a practical point of view, an analysis of the 
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causal conditions that obtain at the moment in question, to 
determine whether or not the end result was achieved by luck 
or design, would probably be more efficient than attempting 
to analyse the relations from the perspective of the objects 
concerned, although the result amounts to the same thing. In 
identity relations based on the causal continuity and 
connectedness of person-stages, a deviant causal link would 
be one that did not fulfil the appropriate relations from 
the perspective of the person- or object-stages concerned. 
Deviant causal chains are, of course, subject to further 
philosophical discussion16, but they are sufficiently well- 
known for their inclusion to be an important consideration 
when forming the identity criteria for the time traveller. 
Therefore, rather than undertaking the (technically more 
difficult) task of analysing all identity relations from the 
perspective of the person-stages, henceforth the traveller's 
identity relations may be defined as dependent on the 
existence of a causal continuity and connectedness of 
person-stages relative to the personal time frame (still a 
valid distinction during time travelling activities) 
provided no deviant causal relation is found to exist. 
In reference to the survival/identity distinction, two 
more points may be raised. Parfit provides the following 
addition to his theory. 
Our identity over time just involves (a) 
16. See, for example, Michael N. Robins, 'Deviant Causal Chains and Non-Basic Action', 
1984. 
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Relation-R -- psychological connectedness and/or 
psychological continuity, either with the normal cause 
or with any cause, provided (b) that there is no 
different person who is R-related to us as we once 
were. 
Parfit, 1984, p. 216. 
Present day-to-day experience certainly supports (b), and 
while it is true that the time traveller's understanding of 
the passage of external time differs from that of persons 
who are not time travelling, there is no reason why his 
physical structure should in any way be affected by that 
experience, and indeed, the popular concept holds that an 
understandable mental disorientation would be the only 
physical manifestation of a human traveller's temporal 
activities. The first stage in this definition of identity, 
as distinct from mere survival, has been shown to be too 
wide, and must, therefore, be fortified in the manner 
already described if it is to serve the purposes of the time 
traveller (or, arguably) anyone or anything else), but the 
second stage could be used to ensure that any criticisms 
based in multiple reproductions or fission would be 
effectively invalidated as being in violation of (b) above: 
the question is, is it really necessary? A thought 
experiment can help to determine the answer. 
Imagine Chronos living a normal life until the moment 
when he begins his time travelling activities. His method of 
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transportation into the future employs a system similar to 
Weingard's transmitter described above, and through the 
course of one journey an accident occurs in which his 
information is simultaneously transmitted from New York to 
two independent receivers situated in Paris and Moscow, 
resulting in his being recreated at two spatial locations at 
the same moment relative to the personal time frame, i. e. 
fission. Being informed of the error, Chronoses `A' and `B' 
determine a way of recombining into one using the 
transmitters, with each centring their transmissions on the 
original cause of the error in New York. As a result, the 
being who finally emerges in New York has the memories of 
both the person called Chronos who existed as one individual 
up to the moment of fission, and the memories contained 
within `A' and `B' of Paris and Moscow. 
It is difficult to see how such a situation as that 
described could arise, because the resulting person stepping 
out of the New York receiver would contain within his memory 
two conflicting accounts of the events of the last few days 
-- one of which may even record the death of that version. 
Furthermore, both memories would be of the same periods of 
personal time and would be equally valid. Yet it is not the 
mental or physical problems that are of immediate concern, 
but the identity relations between each stage. 
The required identity relation is satisfied in the 
normal manner up to the moment of fission. At that moment 
each version stepping out of the receiver in Paris and 
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Moscow would have equal claim to a survival relation (the 
word identity is not applicable here, since that can only be 
applied to a 1-1 relation) with the person who stepped into 
the transmitter in New York, but not directly with each 
other. There is no direct causal continuity and 
connectedness between Chronos in Paris and Chronos in 
Moscow, except via the original in New York. Consequently, 
while both could, and should, be held responsible for acts 
committed by the person in New York before the moment of 
fission (relative to the personal time frame), without a 
direct identity relation lying in the past personal time 
line of one or other version, neither could be held 
responsible for an act committed by the other subsequent to 
the moment of fission. Indeed, they could engage in actions 
aimed at the destruction of one or other of them without any 
detrimental consequence -- rooted in their mutual genesis -- 
being experienced by the surviving individual. However, once 
fusion had taken place the version in New York would be 
equally a product of both previous persons because there 
would exist the same relation between him and the persons in 
Paris and Moscow. Once again, because this is a many-one 
relation it represents survival as opposed to identity, but 
because the relation in question, if it exists at all, is 
also symmetrical (see above, Section 3) the persons in Paris 
and Moscow could both claim a direct causal relation (i. e. 
non-deviant) with the subsequent (in personal time) person 
emerging in New York, were they aware of his existence as a 
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result of their time travelling activities. Indeed, they 
could claim the relation without that knowledge (although 
this is not usual), because whether or not they are aware of 
the successful outcome of attempted fusion will not alter 
the fact, if it should occur, of his existence in their 
future. 
In this way the identity method outlined in this 
chapter provides a system by which fission and fusion might 
be detected, as well as a method for determining the 
appropriate relations between those persons created as a 
result of such activity. This factor has been noted by 
Elliot (1991) where he writes 
[w]hile Parfit thinks that CCR [the causal 
continuity requirement] is necessary both for personal 
identity and survival, CCR might nevertheless be 
thought to underwrite somehow the distinction between 
personal identity and survival. For example, where 
causal pathways branch, linking more than one 
psychologically similar person to an earlier person, we 
have survival. Where the causal pathway is non- 
branching we have identity. 
Elliot, 1991, p. 62. 
From the psychological perspective, the difference might be 
determined as follows: if all the events experienced by each 
version can be traced back using the identity relation 
without mutually contradictory assertions being made about 
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the same instant of personal time at any moment in that past 
history, the individual in question has not experienced 
fission. Should mutually contradictory assertions be made 
regarding events occurring at the same moment relative to 
the external time line, although at different points 
relative to the personal time frame (for example, 
experiencing an event that occurred before the person 
concerned was born, or experiencing an event in place A and 
simultaneously, though at a later or earlier stage relative 
to the personal time frame, experiencing an event in place 
B), time travel can be assumed to have taken place, the 
exact moment in personal time at which backward temporal 
movement occurred being revealed by an analysis of the 
stages at which these contradictory assertions began and 
ended. In contrast, should contradictory assertions be made 
about events occurring at the same moment relative to the 
personal time frame, fission will have taken place. Should 
further contradictions occur relative to the external time 
frame (for example, on the first day of his twentieth year, 
Chronos is in New York in the year 1999, and on the first 
day of his twentieth year, Chronos is in Moscow in the year 
2036) time travel can also be said to have taken place as 
above. 
The use of a , system of causal continuity and 
connectedness between person-stages by non-deviant means is 
therefore shown to accommodate both time travel and -- 
physical, mental or theological conundrums notwithstanding - 
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- fission and fusion. This last may not be considered an 
attribute that lies in its favour, and some would doubtless 
argue the unacceptability of such a system on the grounds 
that fission and fusion are a priori impossible. What the 
above does show, though, is that in finding a system for a 
time traveller, other, perhaps unwanted, by-products may 
also be permitted. In order to negate this conclusion it 
would be necessary to assume that the contradictory nature 
of the memories relative to the personal time frame of the 
recombined person would prevent fusion. This does not, 
however, prevent fission. In order that the time traveller 
be in a position to communicate with previous and subsequent 
stages in his personal time line via time travel, as well as 
merely exist at two different spatial positions at the same 
moment relative to the external time frame, it is necessary 
that the identity criterion should unify without demanding 
indivisibility, and in this way fission is enabled. It is at 
this point that the value of Parfit's extra premise is 
revealed. 
If identity, as opposed to mere survival, is deemed 
more important to the time traveller, questions over fission 
and fusion would no longer be applicable. Since neither 
fission nor fusion is a necessary logical feature of time 
travel as popularly defined, by restricting the relation 
between person-stages to one of identity, examples of ersatz 
time-travel that utilise these other methods might be 
revealed, and in this manner the most important aim of this 
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chapter -- to determine a system of identity that would 
distinguish time travel from its would-be imitators -- will 
be achieved. 
Section 6 
Conclusion 
To what extent have the initial aims of this chapter 
been fulfilled? A system of identity has been outlined that 
is appropriate to time travel, and that can distinguish the 
genuine instances of that activity from mere appearances. 
The thought experiments in this chapter have also helped to 
reveal a symmetry of identity relations through time, 
indicating that references to the relation from present to 
past, although more common, have no more intrinsic value 
than those from present to future in a world in which time 
travel into the past is possible, a world in which every 
appearance of a time traveller at a moment anterior to that 
of his departure is proof of the existence of the future. 
The strength of present to past relations lies instead in 
the knowledge they are based on and our assumptions 
regarding the immutable nature of the past. This reveals a 
distinction between our understanding of identity relations 
(the epistemological view) and the relations themselves (the 
ontological view). From the further analysis of the causal 
system chosen, the irrelevance of external temporal 
proximity to matters of identity, except inasmuch as that 
temporal reference does not differ, under normal 
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circumstances, from the personal time frame, was revealed. 
From this aspect was highlighted the importance of the 
causal connections between person-stages from the 
perspective of the stages themselves, and this, in turn, was 
applied to other thought experiments that did not use time 
travel. The relation was shown to be equally applicable to 
such examples. While this is not surprising, because the 
causal continuity requirement was originally designed with a 
view to resolving problems that did not, generally, involve 
time travel, it does show that a system of identity that 
includes aspects appropriate to a time traveller remains 
commensurate with systems of identity proposed for persons 
or objects that are not time travelling -- a feature 
necessary if the time traveller is ever to halt in his 
journeys. 
From the analyses of the examples from Ehring, Kolak 
and Martin the technically simpler but, nevertheless, 
philosophically debatable concept of deviant causal chains 
was introduced, replacing the need to analyse causal chains 
initially from the perspective of the objects concerned with 
the more general task of analysing all causal relations, and 
only examining relations from the more specific perspective 
when indications of causal deviancy are revealed. Finally, 
the inclusion of Parfit's qualifier, limiting the number of 
persons capable of holding the appropriate causal relation 
with a previous person-stage to one, ensured the exclusion 
of fission and fusion from time travelling examples, 
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although it was shown that there are methods of revealing 
whether or not these events had taken place, should the need 
arise17. 
Many problems remain. Discussions on the nature of 
identity for persons -- regardless of whether or not they 
are also time travellers -- will continue, and there appears 
no means by which they may be resolved once and for all. The 
system outlined in this chapter is adequate for the present 
purposes of this thesis, however, and can be reconsidered 
should the need arise. It is therefore appropriate to move 
on to the next topic of discussion. To this end it should be 
recalled that earlier in this chapter the question of 
personal liberty was raised. When a time traveller visits an 
earlier person-stage -- either directly to communicate 
information or simply to watch -- the freedom of that 
earlier stage not to travel in time appears to have been 
violated, because the consequences of that future act are 
already being felt. The next chapter will be devoted to the 
study of this problem. 
17. Once again, it must be emphasised that there is UQ logical reason why time travel 
should involve fission or fusion. In contrast, many ersatz models of time travel do demand 
these features. 
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The moving finger writes and having writ 
Moves on. Nor all thy piety, nor wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line 
Nor all thy tears wash out one word of it. 
Omar Khayyam, 1859, Stanza LI. 
In the preceding chapter it was argued that problems 
arising from the association that exists between identity 
and responsibility are not as important, for the study of 
time travel, as those between identity and freedom of will 
or identity and liberty. The word `liberty' would allow for 
the consideration of all time travelling objects, and not 
merely sentient beings capable of self will, but this 
chapter (like the thesis in general) will be primarily 
concerned with the problems as they arise when viewed from 
the perspective of a rational being, and 
... to every rational being possessed of a 
will we must also lend the Idea of freedom as the only 
one under which he can act... we cannot possibly 
conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from 
outside in regard to its judgements. 
Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, A448. 
Consequently I have deemed the word `freewill' more 
appropriate to the circumstances. 
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The problems to be considered are those that pertain to 
the freedom of will of an individual travelling into the 
past in one possible world, i. e. a person who is in a 
position to affect his own recent or distant past. By 
`recent' is meant any temporal instant lying in the past 
relative to the traveller's personal time line -- i. e., any 
moment that he could have experienced in his lifetime as a 
person who is not a time traveller; `distant' is defined as 
any temporal instant lying in the past relative to the first 
occasion -- as recorded by the time traveller -- on which he 
uses atime machine, that is not contained within the first 
category. 
Consideration will be given to the problem of the 
traveller's own knowledge of actions and events that lie in 
both the external past and the personal future of the 
traveller, with a view to determining whether or not he is 
`consciously directed from outside in regard to his 
judgements'. In order that the examples -- in the form of 
thought experiments -- may be subjected to the most rigorous 
analysis, each will be approached from an incompatibilist 
standpoint, and then gradually modified as each successive 
test is failed. In this way it is hoped both that all the 
alternatives available to the potential time traveller will 
be considered, and-that the analysis will be the clearest 
and most practical available for the problems being 
encountered. 
What is the relation between identity and freedom of 
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will? In the next few pages a variety of thought experiments 
will be proposed in which it appears that Chronos' ability 
to think and act freely has been curtailed by his activities 
as a time traveller. However, it will become clear as the 
chapter progresses that the appearance, but not necessarily 
the fact, of causal determinism experienced by Chronos is a 
consequence of the existence of events at a moment that is 
previous (relative to the external time frame) to the moment 
at which the causes of that event were initiated; and these, 
in turn, lie in the traveller's personal -- as well as the 
external -- future. Thus the effects lie at a point relative 
to the external reference that is anterior to the moment at 
which the decision was made to journey to that point, 
whereas the causes lie in a moment posterior, in the 
traveller's personal experience, to the moment of decision. 
This difference between the location of events relative to 
the personal and external time frames is only possible 
because there is only person involved. Thus it is the 
identity relation between the person in the future who is at 
an earlier person-stage, and the person in the past who is 
at a later one, that reveals the direction of cause and 
effect through personal time that creates the appearance of 
a causal violation when viewed from the external 
perspective. In simplified terms, this means that a person 
in the year 2000 who is aged twenty could decide to travel 
into the past in the year 2001 when he is aged twenty-one, 
and arrive in the year 1066 aged twenty-one and (say) four 
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hours. Under these circumstances the moment of arrival in 
1066 will precede, in external time, the moment in 2000 at 
which the decision was made to make the journey to 1066, 
while the cause of the arrival -- the throwing of a lever by 
Chronos in 2001 -- lies after the moment in 2000 at which 
the decision was made to journey into the past. Furthermore, 
whereas the moment at which the lever is thrown could either 
precede or follow the moment of decision relative to the 
external temporal reference (the traveller could make 
various intermediary journeys through time), it can only 
follow -- and never precede -- the decision relative to the 
personal time frame. 
Popular fiction writers rarely consider the matter of 
the time traveller's freedom in isolation: problems of 
causal violation are by far the more popular, and the two 
are often intermingled. Hence, while R. A. Heinlein's short 
story By His Bootstraps begins with the traveller's 
frustration at his own inability to alter the course of 
events, it is the self-contained nature of his history that 
finally confounds the reader. Similarly, in All you Zombies 
it is the entirely isolated and closed causal loop that 
describes the origins of each of the four characters in the 
story which is revealed as the twist in the tale, rather 
than the total inability of the traveller to affect that 
loop adversely. Causality and freedom of will are intensely 
interconnected, and it is impossible to discuss the one in 
any detail without some reference to the other. However, in 
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this chapter every effort will be made to keep all 
references to causal relations to a minimum, since these are 
to be analysed in greater detail later. 
The convoluted nature of Heinlein's stories makes them 
unsuitable as explanatory aids, but others have provided 
clearer examples. Anne McCaffrey is the author of a series 
of science-fiction/fantasy novels concerned with human 
descendants who have travelled to a planet with limited 
resources. As a result they are forced to make use of the 
native creatures, which include a large form of aerial 
lizard (dragons) with capacities for reason, communication, 
and time travel. McCaffrey uses the resulting problems in 
the fields of causality and freewill to stretch both her 
characters' imaginations and that of the reader. The 
following passage illustrates the difficulties encountered. 
F'nor, the rider of a brown dragon, has returned from a 
journey into the past and stumbled upon his commander 
(F'lar) and the latter's wife (Lessa), who are just 
contemplating the act that will send F'nor and other riders 
to the earlier date in order that more dragons may be bred 
in time to cope with an imminent disaster. 
eF'1ar, it's not working out! You can't be 
alive in two times at once! '... 
'I don't understand. '.. . 
'I can't stay. I'm here already. Too close. 
Makes it twice as bad. But I had to warn you... ' 
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Before F'lar could move the brown rider ran, 
half crouched, from the room. 
'But he hasn't gone yet! ' Lessa gasped. 'He 
hasn't even gone yet! ' 
McCaffrey, 1983, pp. 191-192 (my emphasis). 
As a result of this visit the following conversation takes 
place: 
'What can have happened? ' Lessa demanded... 
'We haven't even told F'nor. We ourselves just finished 
considering the idea... ' 
'However, he has come back. So he did go, ' 
F'lar remarked... 'Yet we now know the venture is not 
entirely successful even before it begins. And knowing 
this we have sent him back ten [years] for whatever 
good it is doing... Consequently we have no alternative 
but to continue with the experiment. ' 
Ibid., p. 193 (my emphasis). 
It is the reasoning behind this claim, and the validity of 
the conclusion drawn, that will now be examined. 
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Section 1 
The Challenge 
Arguably the strongest argument for the claim that time 
travel will never be physically realised in the future lies 
in the total lack of any historical incidents involving a 
person claiming to be a time traveller. Stephen Hawking has 
recently drawn attention to this feature in his article `The 
Chronology Protection Conjecture'. He challenges the claims 
of physicist J. Richard Gott of Princeton University 
regarding the potential for time travel into the past (using 
the space-distorting features of two cosmic strings hurtling 
past each other at 99.999999992% the speed of light') and 
further cites as `strong empirical evidence' the fact that 
`we have not been invaded by hordes of tourists from the 
future' (Hawking, 1992, p. 24). 
Hawking's statement derives its significance from the 
assumption that the system of time travel under examination 
enables visits to a period before the invention of the time 
machine and occurs within one possible world. Should such a 
system ever be realised, it will follow that the 
consequences of time travelling activities begun in the 
future relative to us will already be in evidence. It is 
logically impossible for there to have been no time travel 
until the invention of a time machine, after which event 
1. Hawking's paper is concerned with quantum effects and is not written for the layman. 
Simpler articles argue for a rejection of Cott's claims on the grounds that while each 
string is travelling at sub-light speed, the total system exhibits tachyonic energy and so 
violates special relativity. See: Deser, 1992; Travis, 1992. 
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past history -- that is, the time period antecedent to the 
first moment at which the time machine is operational -- is 
somehow altered to accommodate for the comings and goings of 
visitors from the future (as has been suggested by some 
poorly thought out science-fiction cinema). This is because 
there is only one occurrence in external time of any 
particular event, and change implies two states, those of 
before and after. Events, which are essentially temporal by 
nature, cannot, by definition, be altered. This is because 
alteration occurs in time, and in the case of an event would 
necessitate not the change from one state to another that 
may occur in objects -- such as a grey chair being painted 
blue -- and which preserves in time the existence of the 
previous state (it remains a fact of history that it was, at 
a previous moment, grey), but the entire negation of its 
original state so that it never existed in any other manner 
except that now being experienced. Hence there is no 
`change', because there is no alternative state against 
which such change may be measured. Change could only be 
preserved if the alternative past occurred in one possible 
world that was accessible from -- or known to -- the 
occupants of another possible world in which a different set 
of circumstances obtained. It has already been emphasised 
that this discussion will be restricted to one possible 
world unless the nature of time travel should dictate 
otherwise; consequently, since the past cannot change, if a 
time traveller from the future were to journey to the Battle 
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of Hastings then it is a fact today that such a person was 
there at that place and time, even though we, in the 20th 
century, have not yet invented time travel. 
This highlights a necessary condition of time travel: 
namely that all moments in time -- whether past, present, or 
future relative to any given moment in the external 
reference frame -- have equal value to the time traveller. 
The ordering of events personally experienced by Chronos 
need not agree with the ordering according to the external 
time frame that is the standard experience of those who do 
not travel in time. From Chronos' perspective, yesterday may 
have been the 23rd June and today the 22nd. Tomorrow may be 
2019 AD and yesterday 3000 BC, while today is 1984 AD. All 
moments of time -- whether the dinosaurs are walking the 
planet, or man is visiting the stars -- must therefore be 
considered of equal reality to the time traveller, because 
any of those moments could be experienced in his personal 
present. This, in turn, has consequences for the latter half 
of the twentieth century; for although the 21st century 
appears to be mere potential from our perspective, for 
Chronos it is actual -- he can visit it and may even have 
been born there -- and therefore whenever he travels into 
the past he is proof that the future already exists, for if 
it did not Chronos -- being a product of that future -- 
would also not exist. 
These two factors -- the equal status of all instants 
relative to the external time frame, and the existence of 
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consequences before their causes in external time -- must be 
constantly borne in mind throughout the following thought 
experiment and its subsequent analysis. 
In an attempt to prove the capacity of his time machine to 
an incredulous observer, `A', Chronos accepts the latter's 
challenge to bury a book, in a sealed container, at a time 
and place named by A. This item is to be grouped together 
with something more readily available at the time of burial 
than at the time of departure -- e. g. a newspaper of the 
day, or a letter written by someone presently unavailable 
due to physical distance or death. When he returns, Chronos 
accompanies A to the site and with him unearths the book and 
the temporal measure buried with it. Yet A remains 
dissatisfied. 
He agrees that there would seem no reason to question 
the existence of the book in the place cited after the 
traveller's return. Since Chronos buried it there in the 
past, it must remain there if it has not been destroyed or 
moved elsewhere. But if the traveller intends to put it 
there anyway, and the consequences of his actions lie in the 
past, then (the doubter argues) the book should be available 
for discovery even before Chronos begins his journey. 
Therefore, if A now specifies another site for burial of the 
book, demanding that Chronos repeat the previous experiment 
with only that change, there would seem to be no reason -- 
originating in the fact that Chronos has not, in his 
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personal past, buried anything there -- why they cannot 
successfully excavate the site now. Since the argument 
appears coherent, a new location is requested and the 
experiment begun. 
Success in unearthing the book would be in keeping with 
the results of the first experiment. If the book has been 
successfully planted in the past then it must be there to be 
disinterred at a time subsequent to that of burial, provided 
it is not moved in the interim: but the key word here is 
`if'. Suppose that, after excavating the book, A argues that 
because they now have the item in their hands there is no 
reason why Chronos cannot refuse to travel into the past, or 
even destroy the book at an earlier stage in its life 
history before it can be buried. The book has already been 
unearthed, therefore no physical impediment to the 
experiment exists, and while it is true that a failure to 
bury the book in the past would result in a causal 
violation, nevertheless the book cannot disappear because 
this would entail a logical contradiction. This is because 
it would not be the case that the book was there and then it 
was not. If the book is destroyed before it is buried it 
never was in the hole, and therefore it will not disappear 
but never have been, and all memories of its being there 
would also never have been (see above). But if the book -- 
having been disinterred -- is already in their hands, that 
fact cannot be altered and there must, therefore, be some 
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explanation of its being there. In the world as we 
understand it, something as large and organised as a book 
does not spontaneously appear in the past merely in order to 
satisfy some future desire that it be there; and this 
chapter is concerned with the nature of time travel in this 
world. 
What would happen if Chronos successfully destroyed the 
book before taking it into the past? In that event either 
the existence of an identical, but unconnected, book in the 
hole was purely coincidental, or they unearthed an earlier 
stage of the book just destroyed whose complete history has 
yet to be revealed. In the latter case, events in the future 
may explain its presence in the hands of the observer before 
the experiment as well as its presence in the hole at a 
stage in its personal history antecedent to its existence in 
A's hands. However, in that case the existence of the book 
in the hole would not have been a result of Chronos' 
actions, but merely a coincidence resulting from earlier 
events that culminated in its burial and subsequent 
discovery in the hole, as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. 
If an identity relation is to be maintained between the 
book in A's hand and the book excavated from the hole, it is 
necessary that the book be in A's possession at a moment in 
its personal history that is subsequent to its burial and 
recovery. This is because the entire personal history of the 
book, from the moment it is seen in A's hand to the moment 
of its destruction, is known. At no point on that world line 
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(labelled 1) does the book disappear, nor is such a scenario 
possible if it is to be destroyed. To understand why this is 
so, imagine the book is taken from A at point * and carried 
into the past to be buried in the hole (see Fig. 4.2). Under 
this description, the world line that exists in the original 
diagram between points * and + would not exist, and the life 
history of the book would be a closed causal loop in which 
it is neither destroyed nor created but simply appears and 
continues to exist until it is carried backwards in time to 
the moment of its initial appearance (initial with respect 
to the external time frame -- there is no first instant with 
respect to personal time). Since the aim of the exercise is 
to destroy the book at a moment in its personal history that 
is anterior to its being placed in the hole, this solution 
is unsatisfactory. 
If appropriate precautions are taken to ensure the book 
is destroyed at point 3 (see Fig. 4.1), then its existence 
in the hole will be coincidental and will not depend on the 
actions of Chronos. He can only take it back in time at a 
moment subsequent to its being taken out of the hole (line 
2), and if he then uses that opportunity to ensure that its 
existence in the hole is a result of time travelling 
activities, the identity relation between the book in the 
hole and the book in A's hand is severed -- as shown in Fig. 
4.3 -- and instead there are two separate books: one that 
comes into the possession of A and is then destroyed; one 
that exists in a closed loop and whose history consists of 
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being buried in a hole in the ground, unearthed, taken back 
in time, buried, and so on, as illustrated by lines 1 and 2, 
Fig. 4.3. 
From the above argument it follows that the world line 
of the book illustrated in Fig. 4.1 is the only one that 
will both ensure an identity relation between the book in 
A's hand and that in the hole, and utilise backward time 
travel as a means to explain the connection. However, this 
solution not only fails to illustrate the doubter's 
arguments, but it also poses a problem for freewill. 
The single book in this thought experiment can be 
destroyed because the occasion of its destruction occurs at 
the most extreme point in its open world line. Yet it comes 
into the hands of A at the culmination of a series of events 
that involve its backward temporal movement at a moment in 
its personal history that is after point 2 and before point 
3. From this it may be inferred that a time traveller, 
although not necessarily Chronos, will take it back in time 
at some moment in the external future, and since the 
consequences of that act are already in existence -- A has 
the book -- the act must be performed. Hence the doubter's 
conundrum remains, albeit in a slightly modified form to 
that originally intended. The question now is not how the 
book came to be in the hole, but how it came to be in A's 
hands. 
Let the following be assumed for the sake of 
simplicity: that (a) there is only one time traveller; (b) 
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no object bearing an identity relation with the book in A's 
hands has ever been transported by Chronos at any previous 
point in his personal world line; (c) the book's final 
location in A's hands is a direct result of an act to be 
committed by Chronos at a moment in his personal future. 
Does it follow from this that Chronos' freedom to act 
according to the dictates of his own will has been 
compromised? 
It is a fact that once any act -- be it as spectacular 
as the murder of a warrior before his most famous battle, or 
as simple as picking up a leaf -- has been committed by 
Chronos in the external past, no attempt to refrain from 
performing such an act can succeed under the present 
description, because that would generate a logical 
contradiction -- even though the act is yet to occur in 
Chronos' personal future. However, I will argue that this is 
not a reflection on the freedom, or otherwise, of the time 
traveller, but merely a misinterpretation of events arising 
from our intuitive (if not consciously acknowledged) 
assumptions of an absolute, rather than a relative, temporal 
reference. 
Section 2 
Occurrence Versus Experience 
The assumption that the book in the hole and the book 
in A's hand-are physically identical but temporally 
different -- the one in the hole being at an earlier object- 
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stage in its personal history -- combined with the fact that 
it is in A's possession at a time that is later in its 
personal history, but earlier relative to external time, has 
led to the conclusion that it must inevitably be carried 
into the external past at some future moment (future from 
both the personal and external temporal perspectives). Since 
the book need not communicate any information with regard to 
precisely when and how it was/will be relocated in the past, 
Chronos could be as ignorant of those facts as any person 
who is not a time traveller. It is not, however, ignorance 
of the future that preserves his freedom; and if ignorance 
does not provide sufficient grounds for a claim to freedom, 
then neither does knowledge deny the possibility of that 
claim. 
There is no logical reason why Chronos could not make a 
video of himself with the intention that it be carried, by 
way of the time machine, to a moment in the past that 
preceded the time of the recording. At that point the tape 
could be handed to Chronos' earlier self, who would then be 
in a position to view events that had not yet occurred from 
his perspective. In this way he could be fully conversant 
with events that are logically unalterable -- because they 
lie in the past world line of the video -- but which he 
would appear to be in a physical position to change -- 
because they lie in his personal future -- and nevertheless 
preserve his freewill. The reason why we intuitively deny 
Chronos' freedom of will is because when we imagine him 
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giving the video to his younger self, we assume that what 
that earlier self will see is a recording of a person who is 
acting in ignorance of the contents of the tape. The earlier 
person-stage of Chronos, having been apprised of that 
information in advance of the events recorded upon the tape, 
would appear to be in an ideal position to behave 
differently. It would therefore seem reasonable to assume 
that if he does nevertheless carry out to the letter the 
actions recorded upon the tape, there must be some 'external 
pressure' that either restrains him or forces him to act in 
a particular manner. Chronos assumes that, for example, if 
he should attempt to prevent himself from picking up a piece 
of paper, something will force his hand, while he remains 
ignorant of what this `something' is. Yet in making that 
assumption, he is also making a fundamental error, in that 
he is confusing the number of occurrences of an event with 
the number of experiences of that same event available to 
him, and it is this distinction that may be used to preserve 
the traveller's freedom. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 (which have been simplified for the 
sake of clarity) illustrate what in fact is the case, and 
Chronos' interpretation, respectively. In the former there 
appears what may be termed a temporal loop. The recording is 
made by someone who has already seen the results, and is 
therefore fully apprised of his actions before committing 
them. Every subsequent act is therefore a consequence of 
that knowledge. Yet because the event in fact only occurs 
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once, Chronos is in no better a position than a person who 
is not a time traveller and who views a recording of his 
behaviour after the event. The difference lies in the fact 
that whereas such a person can physically experience any 
particular event only once, and cannot be in possession of 
knowledge regarding any event in his personal future, 
Chronos can revisit any temporal moment a potentially 
unlimited number of times (see Fig. 4.6). He can witness his 
own future actions from the position of an observer, and 
thus acquire knowledge regarding those events. Each time he 
will do so from a different perspective, because he cannot 
occupy the same physical space at the same time as two 
different person-stages (see Chapter 1). However, that 
limitation aside, the potential of his position for 
providing information regarding future events would appear 
limitless. 
In Fig. 4.5 Chronos' error is made apparent. The two 
lines represent, in fact, the two experiences that Chronos 
has of the event, but that he has interpreted as two 
different occurrences of the same event, with each 
occurrence occupying the same physical place and time. In 
the first, the person being recorded has no knowledge of the 
contents of the tape in advance because the recording has 
yet to be made, whereas in the second he is fully informed 
and attempting to alter it, the recording having been taken 
back in time to be viewed in advance. 
It is this confusion which leads Chronos to the 
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mistaken beliefs that (a) he can change the past because the 
origins lie in his future, and (b) he must be directed by 
some outside influence if he cannot. In fact, what Chronos 
sees on the video are the actions of someone already aware 
of what will happen and behaving freely with that knowledge 
in mind. The temptation to imagine that the event itself 
occurs an infinite number of times is a result of the 
peculiarities of closed loops in time. The automatic human 
response is to ask which came first -- the recording of the 
events, or the time traveller's viewing of the recording. 
Since the viewing of the recording takes place earlier with 
respect to external time, it is tempting to place that event 
first. Yet the recording itself must be made in order that 
it can be watched, therefore this event is given precedence. 
Finally, the person in the recording has already seen the 
video that Chronos is now watching, and so begins a vicious 
circle. Nevertheless, the event in question only occurs 
once, as does the viewing2. The particular paradoxes 
surrounding closed time-like (or causal) loops will be 
considered in more detail in the next chapter. One aspect 
may be examined here, however, because it has some bearing 
on the problems presently under consideration. 
The following scenario, which is normally applied to 
problems of causality, is an example of what has been termed 
2. Chronos could view the tapes many times before making his journey into the past, but 
each such event occupies a separate period of external time, and only occurs once on each 
such occasion. The first time he watches the tape is only ever the first time, it is not 
$jW the second and third relative to the external time frame, or even -- in this example 
-- the second or third time relative to the same moment in his personal time frame. 
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a `bilking experiment'. 
Chronos decides to travel back in time to murder his father 
at a moment previous to that of Chronos' own conception. The 
method of attack chosen employs brute force rather than 
automated means since this removes the possibility of a 
mechanical failure and, he believes, enhances his chances of 
success. 
Even before Chronos begins the exercise it is already 
apparent that he cannot succeed because, as Norwich 
succinctly puts it, 
... only those who fail will ever be in a 
position even to make the attempt. 
Norwich, 1987, p. 117. 
Yet while the answer to the question why he will fail has 
already been determined, it remains to discover precisely 
how that failure will be engendered. 
It is conceivable that, while he is lying in wait, 
Chronos might find himself joined by a large number of 
people, all of whom are himself at various future stages in 
his personal existence. Older versions could assure him that 
every one has"a hand in the attack, but in each case 
something occurs that frustrates their efforts. Chronos may 
thus be presented with the imminent failure of a future 
event before every attempt made in his personal time -- 
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which in turn could be any number physically possible within 
his life-span -- and, despite having this foreknowledge, his 
future selves have nevertheless made the trip. Furthermore, 
this knowledge is not presented in the form of a non- 
interactive and therefore unresponsive video recording (as 
in the example raised above), but is instead the verbal 
testimony of several individuals standing at the site of the 
event seconds before it occurs. Each, including the earlier 
stages, may be questioned by the others and may even reveal 
the nature of the problem that led to the failure of the 
attempt made by the previous person-stage. Here there would 
seem to be ample opportunity to agree a change of tactics, 
but because, for each speaker, the events relating to their 
particular error lie in the personal past of that person- 
stage, and are therefore unalterable (or else their memories 
of those events would never have existed), there would seem 
to be no alternative but to conclude that the time traveller 
is causally determined. 
There is, in fact, no justification for the assumption 
of this extreme position, for in this example also there 
arises a confusion between experience and occurrence. The 
same event -- the attempted murder of Chronos' father -- is 
experienced by Chronos many times, and from many different 
viewpoints, but the event itself -- which includes the full 
complement of individuals making the attempt -- only occurs 
once, as do the conversations before the attack. The 
illusion of multiplicity is generated by Chronos' repeated 
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experience of the event at different moments throughout his 
personal time line, but the necessity of his past-directed 
temporal journey after each attempt, in order that he may 
return to the moment of the event, is sufficient proof of 
its singular nature under the present description (i. e. 
within one possible world). Arguments for cyclical time -- 
e. g. Weir, 1988 -- are not being considered, because travel 
into the external future in order to experience a 
qualitatively but not quantitatively identical event is not, 
by definition, the system of time travel presently under 
consideration. The external time event experienced by 
Chronos is quantitatively and qualitatively identical, even 
though Chronos' personal experiences of that one event are 
quantitatively and qualitatively different due to his 
changing physical position and increasing age relative to 
the personal time frame. 
At each stage Chronos sees his earlier and/or later 
selfs acting in full awareness of every other stage and 
incident in the fight, and their actions are shaped by that 
awareness in a similar fashion to the way in which the 
actions of any other individual are shaped when a person 
informs them they are going to do X, and they decide to do Y 
in an effort to disprove the prediction. This might be 
termed an `Oedipal' determinism. The event cannot be 
changed, and therefore either it must be assumed that the 
very act of attempting to thwart it is the cause of its 
successful outcome, or arguments must be presented 
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supporting the existence of an outside influence shaping 
events. There is no empirical justification for the latter 
assumption based on our present experience of space and 
time, however, and the introduction here of the experience 
versus occurrence distinction that was made earlier further 
reduces the scope for such empirical support. In addition, 
such a force would only come into play when a time traveller 
attempted to change the past, and would necessitate the 
postulation of a number of new physical laws that are only 
applicable under such circumstances, where they would have 
priority over all other laws. On the other hand, the 
`Oedipal' explanation appears to support the logical outcome 
of events for which fore-knowledge is available without 
recourse to such extraneous forces, thereby minimising the 
number of factors involved. 
Oedipus did not know all the relevant facts, however, 
and Chronos does. Why, therefore, would he repeatedly 
attempt the murder of his father when he already knows (due 
to logical necessity and verbal information) that he must 
fail? The experience/occurrence distinction, while logically 
defensible, is intuitively disconcerting, and if the 
introduction of an outside force is unacceptable, the only 
possible explanation under the circumstances -- the denial 
of time travel as presently described -- remains logically 
indefensible by means of the present arguments. There 
remains one other option, however, and that is to examine 
the question of whether or not there exists a logical 
187 
argument to support the contention that the above situations 
will simply never arise. 
Section 3 
Sufficient or Necessary? 
In order to answer the above question, it is simplest 
to return to the challenge posed by A and re-examine the 
causal relation between the discovery of the book in the 
hole and its appropriate planting as described in section 1. 
This in turn necessitates an analysis of the application of 
sufficient and necessary condition labels to these 
circumstances. 
Although success in excavating a book physically 
identical to the one in A's hand does indicate a need in the 
book's personal future for a backward temporal journey to a 
moment anterior (in external time) to its existence in A's 
hand (see Fig. 4.1), this need is not the cause. The only 
legitimate conclusion is that a cause must exist, and while 
that cause may be its actual presence in the hole -- that 
led the time traveller to make an assumption regarding his 
own freewill, resulting in his stepping into the machine and 
travelling backwards in time to plant the book in A's house 
-- this is by no means assured. The book could be left until 
after Chronos' death, and only then, perhaps by accident, be 
taken back in time and sold or left behind to be bought by A 
in a bookshop. It may be taken back by someone during 
Chronos' lifetime, or even make many trips backwards and 
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forwards through time before finally falling into A's hands. 
A himself (or an ancestor) might have been taken into the 
future and seen the book, bringing it with him when he 
returned to his own time. The list of causes for the 
presence of the book both within the hole and in A's hand is 
potentially infinite, and the only essential conditions are 
that it is not damaged irreparably before it enters A's 
possession, and that it makes at least one trip into the 
past at some moment in its history after the excavation. 
Similarly, failure to find the book is a sufficient but 
not a necessary cause of its not being there. If the book is 
not disinterred in that place, nothing one can say or do 
will make it appear there -- for it cannot spontaneously 
materialise as if by magic and the cause still be attributed 
to time travelling activities. Consequently, no further 
effort need be expanded in making the attempt, and this is a 
sufficient reason for the original failure to excavate the 
book: it is not there because no one made the effort to put 
it there, and no one made the effort because it was not 
there. Although this explanation is sufficient to account 
for the book's non-existence, it is not the only solution 
possible. Chronos might make the attempt and be distracted; 
his machine might fail; or he might die in the enterprise 
due to a malfunction. The book might be destroyed, or the 
machine lost, or the book may be taken into the future or 
too far into the past and never retrieved. Even if it is 
placed in the hole, it might be removed by an animal or 
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human before the test dig. Once again the potential is 
infinite, and the only necessary feature is that it must not 
be in the hole at the precise moment of the experiment. 
From the above it follows that although the existence 
of the book, both in the hole and in A's hand, may be 
causally self-explanatory -- as outlined above -- and this 
is a sufficient condition of the actual circumstances, it is 
not a necessary one, and therefore it is no guarantee of the 
time traveller's future behaviour. Consequently it need not 
be regarded as proof of the existence of an externally 
determining factor governing the actions of the time 
traveller. 
With this in mind, a re-examination of the experiment 
may be presented in order to supply an answer to the 
following question: which is the more likely? That the book 
is discovered in the hole, or that it is not? If A intends 
to destroy the book in his hand after the copy in the hole 
has been unearthed, and he further intends to destroy the 
buried book, then I suggest that the buried book will never 
be found. For if it is discovered and proved identical, any 
subsequent attempt to destroy both copies must be foiled, 
regardless of how simple or complex the process. Matches 
would fail to strike or simply not light the paper, attempts 
to tear individual pages would be thwarted, and acid would 
either fail to strike the book, or the bottle would prove 
not to contain the substance its label purported to provide. 
Although each individual failure would be explicable, the 
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cumulative failure would not: partly because it would be a 
violation of presently accepted levels of probability, and 
partly because such violations must necessarily occur on 
every occasion that one attempts a bilking experiment, 
thereby compounding the problem. While this is not a logical 
reason for rejecting time travel as so far defined, it is 
intuitively unappealing, and it necessitates a series of 
qualifiers that a simple failure to find the book in the 
first instance does not. 
The problem becomes more acute if, instead of the book, 
consideration is given to the position of a rational being 
attempting the logically impossible -- for example, the 
repeated attempts perpetrated by Chronos on his father's 
life that were cited above. The existence of several 
temporally separate person-stages of Chronos, all 
communicating information to an earlier stage regarding the 
latter's future, has not been proved logically impossible, 
but the question remains as to why he would repeatedly visit 
the same time and place once the inevitability of failure 
had been established. The mental confusion experienced by 
Chronos as a result of repeated encounters with various 
future person-stages at such an event is difficult to 
imagine. Chronos does not know how they came to be there, 
nor why (unless, of course, he should ask), but their 
existence is proof that somehow or other he will occupy this 
particular time and locality on many occasions in his 
personal history and, despite both numbers and knowledge, 
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fail on every occasion. The repeated appearances of an 
inanimate object such as a book seem explicable on the 
grounds that the history of such a non-reasoning object is a 
matter of chance, but with the introduction of a rational 
being, aware at one and the same time of what has happened 
and will happen, such explanations seem inadequate. Chronos 
could be apprised not only of the current situation of a 
future person-stage, but also of the method by which it was 
achieved, and be aware that this information was known to 
the stage telling the tale and so on ad infinitum, yet it 
would remain a fact that nothing could be done to alter what 
had, for the later stage, already happened3. 
Similarly, if Chronos is aware that his trip must end 
in failure, then reason dictates that to make the attempt is 
pointless, because all he could achieve in so doing would be 
a greater understanding of why he failed. Yet not to make 
the attempt at all is also an explanation of why he failed. 
The difficulty is that it is also a self-verifying 
explanation -- he failed because he did not try, and he did 
not try because he failed. This would indicate the existence 
of a closed causal loop that is, at this stage, 
psychologically dissatisfying due to the lack of any 
external explanation4. 
3. In Heinlein's By His Bootstraps, the traveller's inability to alter the course of 
events is furthered by both the inebriated state of the earliest person-stage involved -- 
which proves detrimental to later memories -- and the hurried nature of the events 
themselves, which inhibits questions. The driving force behind his continued fulfilment of 
role is a mere by-product of over-excitement or ignorance and is never fully explained. 
4. As proof of this, imagine that the question 'which came first, the chicken or the egg? ' 
were 'resolved' by means of the relocation of a number of fertilised eggs in the past. 
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Even potentially useful side-effects prove worthless 
under this examination. It is conceivable that a friend of 
Chronos, finding herself in danger, could be rescued at a 
fortuitous moment by the sudden appearance of the time 
traveller, whose remarkable timing is only explained later 
when she (let us call her Vremya) questions him and 
discovers that the person-stage she is presently 
communicating with is an earlier one to that which saved 
her. Now informed regarding the time and place of rescue, 
Chronos is capable of fulfilling the task, but should he? It 
may be argued that so long as he does not, he is assured of 
his own safety. Nothing can prevent him from delivering 
Vremya from her fate, and any accident severe enough to 
affect this would create a paradox. Chronos' future 
survival, therefore, would appear guaranteed until he makes 
the trip. Yet this is not so. Chronos has no means of 
proving that the person who saved Vremya was identical with 
himself. If he was not, Chronos' future remains open and 
insecure inasmuch as it pertains to this matter. If the 
person who saved Vremya was a later person-stage of Chronos, 
he still lacks knowledge regarding the circumstances of that 
rescue, even though he knows it must occur, and because it 
lies in Vremya's past any attempt to delay the rescue must 
end in failure or contradiction. 
Throughout the above examination, the importance to the 
argument of the conditions that obtain on the first 
occasion, relative to the external time frame, at which a 
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part of the paradox exists has proved pivotal: whether or 
not it was Chronos who rescued Vremya; whether he made the 
attempt upon his father's life once, more than once, or not 
at all. Decisions regarding future behaviour can -- but need 
not -- be based entirely on knowledge of the events 
concerned, and a minimal understanding of human nature 
warrants the assertion that any decision made by an 
individual in possession of such knowledge will be, at the 
very least, influenced by it. For example, although Chronos 
cannot prevent the Black Death -- because it is an 
historical fact -- he can cause it, either by carelessness 
or by deliberately arriving in the fourteenth century while 
infected with the disease. In the latter case, his awareness 
that the plague decimated the country at that time may lead 
him to seek a peaceful demise in the historical period in 
which the nature of his death would neither generate an 
anachronism nor cause unnecessary suffering, rather than 
returning to his own time and risking another generation. In 
this way the fact of the Black Death -- the unalterable 
nature of which diminishes the moral repugnance associated 
with the traveller's actions -- would be the cause of his 
choice of arrival time in his personal future. On the other 
hand, the choice could be an entirely arbitrary decision, 
without any basis in knowledge of the conditions that 
obtained in that century. Under these circumstances it is 
still possible, although not necessarily the case, that 
Chronos will prove to be the cause of the ensuing disaster 
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without being aware of the fact, if he has unknowingly 
contracted the disease at an earlier stage in his personal 
history. The initial circumstances are therefore an 
indication of how the traveller might behave. He is 
logically incapable of preventing the Black Death, or any 
other actual past event -- hence there already exists 
information regarding what he cannot do -- but any moment of 
poorly documented history may provide an opportunity for the 
time traveller to discover that he has a place in the causal 
scheme which shaped that event, and from this situation may 
be derived information regarding what he can do. 
Inasmuch as Chronos does not change the event, but 
merely discovers his place within it, he does not differ 
significantly from any other being with causal potential. If 
the future is open, then no one is in a position to change 
it, because there is nothing to change -- there is only the 
discovery of that being's position within the events which 
go to shape that future. Similarly for the backward-moving 
time traveller, 'because the past only occurs once there is 
nothing to change, and consequently he can only discover his 
position within the events that went to shape that past. The 
difference between the two positions stems from the 
assumption that the ignorance regarding future events that 
is displayed by those who are not time travellers is due to 
the fact that there is nothing to know, the future having a 
different ontological status to that of the past. However, 
if time travel within one possible world can exist, then the 
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`open future' is open only in so far as we have yet to 
discover what we did do when viewed from a later 
perspective. This puts the free status of Chronos and those 
who do not time travel at exactly the same level. He, being 
from the future, is already aware of how we will behave, 
because we are in the past relative to him, and he may also 
be aware of how he will behave in his personal future 
(provided those events are in the external past relative to 
his moment of departure). Consequently, either it is the 
case that both those who do and those who do not time travel 
are free, or both are determined, and it has been argued 
that the time traveller is free. 
This brings the argument full circle to a point raised 
earlier regarding the equal status of past, present, and 
future. If there are discovered unmistakeable signs of a 
time traveller's interference in the past or in the present, 
then it will follow that time travel must be invented at 
some point in the future; but if no such signs should exist, 
what hope is there for time travel? The physical inability 
to verify the exact structure of events in the past leaves 
the way open to future research that includes this study, 
but if it is a fact that there have been no time travellers 
in the past would that research be necessarily unproductive? 
This question raises an interesting point in that 
whereas if a person fulfilling the description `time 
traveller' exists, he may consider himself a free agent, if 
such a person qua that description does not exist, then no 
196 
attempt to enter the past can succeed, simply because it did 
not. He is therefore not free to be a time traveller if he 
was not one previously in external time, although he is free 
to try. This is not to claim that he is causally determined 
not to be a time traveller by the fact that he was not one, 
only that the non-existence of a time traveller in the past 
is proof that any attempt must fail, for whatever reason, 
and may in itself be a sufficient condition of the potential 
time traveller's decision not to try. 
Everything argued above need only be the case if one 
insists on an adherence to a system of time travel contained 
within one possible world. With the introduction of an 
alternative worlds thesis the appearance of determinism 
might be removed, together with the problematic non- 
existence of an historical time traveller (as far as anyone 
is aware), thereby enabling the continued useful study into 
the possibility of manned time travel. Consequently it is to 
an examination of this solution and the problems arising 
from it that the next section will be dedicated. 
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Section 4 
Possible Worlds I 
Human beings have a great propensity towards the asking 
of counterfactual questions, or the statement of assumed 
counterfactual results, such as, `Would I have caught that 
plane had my train not been delayed? ', or `If you hadn't 
left that box in the doorway, I would not have fallen over 
it'. When a time traveller travels into the past in the hope 
of changing that past, he is posing and attempting to answer 
similar questions. He thinks he is asking `What would have 
happened if X had occurred rather than Y (which did 
occur)? '. In fact the question is 'What would happen if a 
time traveller went into the past and made X occur, rather 
than Y? ' The consequences of these two questions are 
different. 
In the first, the proposer is trying to determine what 
might now be the case had a certain key event been resolved 
differently: for example, if Hitler had not embarked on 
Operation Barbarossa. In this model, the people who existed 
at the time of the key events had no knowledge of the future 
outcome of any given decision, and so either the choice 
could have been the result of a long stream of previous 
events, or it could have depended on the simple tossing of a 
coin. In the asking of this question an implicit assumption 
is made, namely that there is an answer that could, in 
principle, be discovered were it possible to examine 
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thoroughly the complex interplay of cause and effect 
stemming from the incident cited. The fact that if this 
counterfactual supposition had been realised, the answer to 
the question, as an answer, would not be appreciated -- 
because neither the question nor its proposer would exist in 
their present form -- is resolved by means of thought 
experiments. These enable the preservation of the two 
alternatives -- that which occurred and that which might 
have occurred -- and their separate consequences, and in 
this manner the self-defeating aspect of the question is 
circumvented. 
When the question 'what would happen if a time 
traveller went into the past and made X occur rather than 
Y? ' is raised, the agent can be fully conversant with the 
immediate results of one choice, because they will lie in 
the past relative to the moment of his departure in the time 
machine. The natural assumption is that a person in such a 
position could make a difference, and whereas, in the 
earlier question, the problem was that without the 
introduction of a thought experiment the answer could not be 
appreciated as such, here it is that the traveller, in so 
doing, would be affecting his own past and memories, and 
thus the cause of his actions. Yet if the sole cause were 
negated -- the traveller being the only person with the 
knowledge of the future required to attempt such an act -- 
the act would not be committed and a bilking situation would 
obtain. Nor should it be imagined that the traveller could 
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pass on his information to someone else who then performs 
the necessary act, for here also the cause of the act -- in 
this instance, the information divulged by the traveller to 
the agent -- would not (and indeed, never did) exist and 
therefore the act would not occur. (On the present findings 
of this thesis it is perfectly consistent for a person from 
the past to be aware of the future, provided that 
information is never used in such a way that it might 
adversely affect the future from which the information 
came. ) 
Were time travel a reality, questions regarding 
Chronos' powers to affect the past would need to assume a 
possible worlds thesis. Only then would it be legitimate to 
assert that an answer to the counterfactual queries raised 
had any genuine ontological status. The time traveller's 
existence would be proof that one world -- the one he was 
born in -- had been realised, and the past of that world 
cannot be changed for the reasons outlined above. Thus the 
time traveller who is successful in changing the past must 
enter an alternative possible world, as real as the one he 
left. 
Such a bald statement requires qualification: what 
assumptions must be made in order to permit such a claim? 
What would an alternative possible world that may be visited 
by a time traveller consist of? How can it be integrated 
into the system of time travel so far outlined in this 
thesis? All of these questions will now be considered. 
200 
The most famous exponent 
theory that every possible (i 
contradictory) alternative is 
equally real possible worlds, 
- is David Lewis. In his book 
defines possible worlds as he 
of `modal realism' -- the 
. e. internally non- 
realised in a multitude of 
our own being one among many 
On The Plurality of Worlds he 
conceives them. 
There are countless other worlds, other very 
inclusive things. Our world consists of us and all our 
surroundings, however remote in time and space; just as 
it is one big thing having lesser things as parts, so 
likewise do other worlds have lesser other-worldly 
things as parts. The worlds are something like remote 
planets; except that most of them are much bigger than 
mere planets, and they are not remote. Neither are they 
nearby. They are not at any spatial distance whatever 
from here. They are not far in the past or future, nor 
for that matter near; they are not at any temporal 
distance whatever from now. They are isolated: there 
are no spatiotemporal relations at all between things 
that belong to different worlds. Nor does anything that 
happens at one world cause anything to happen at 
another. Nor-do they overlap; they have no parts in 
common, with the exception, perhaps, of immanent 
universals exercising their privilege of repeated 
occurrence... There are so many other worlds... that 
absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is 
201 
a way that some world is. 
Lewis, 1986, p. 2. 
The system of possible worlds presently being proposed for 
the time traveller is similar to Lewis's system in respect 
of their equal reality with this one. From the perspective 
of a person living in World a -- that being a world in some 
way different to our own -- our world is as unreal as theirs 
is to us, but to a person living in any one of these worlds, 
that world is real. Under this description, reality becomes 
an indexical matter. However, in many ways the system 
employed by a time traveller is necessarily different to 
that outlined above. 
For David Lewis, the value of a system of possible 
worlds lies in its capacity to solve problems in the logic 
of modality. Here, they are being used to resolve subjective 
objections to the nature of the traveller's freedom of will, 
and they do this by enabling him to `change' the past by 
providing a system of equally real possibilities that can be 
compared by the traveller and -- via his experience -- by 
any person in communication with him. Such different aims 
will necessitate different understandings of what is meant 
by a `possible world'. As with the Lewisian system, these 
worlds are not finite in number, and each of the infinite 
variety of time travel worlds consists of other 'lesser- 
worldly' parts, but there the similarities end. 
It is necessary for the traveller to move between 
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possible worlds; consequently, Lewis's claim that they are 
spatio-temporally and causally isolated must be abandoned, 
and each must be considered physically accessible from this 
world, either directly or transitively (i. e. via one or more 
other worlds). World X might be causally affected by 
activities in World Y via the movements of the time 
traveller, and World Z transitively affected by the birth 
and subsequent actions of the traveller from World X via 
World Y. The difference between Lewisian and time traveller 
accessible worlds may be more easily understood in graphic 
form. 
In Figs 4.7 and 4.8 respectively, the Lewisian possible 
worlds system is compared with one that uses alternative 
branching worlds. Each line in Fig. 4.7 represents a 
complete Lewisian possible world. There are no spatio- 
temporal relations either existent or possible between them. 
On the other hand, in Fig. 4.8 (which has been much 
simplified for the sake of clarity) the alternatives are 
shown as branching, with any one possible world (for 
example, this one) represented as a particular path taken 
among the infinite possible choices, rather than just one 
branch alone. Thus the left-hand fork above the point 
labelled 1066 is the one actually taken, while the right- 
hand fork is the alternative. This might represent the 
moment at which Harold chose to follow the apparently 
retreating Norman forces down the hillside, rather than 
await their repeated attacks and grind them down from above. 
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At a later moment another choice is presented, and this time 
it is the right-hand fork that is chosen, and so on. The 
combination of all these decisions, and an infinite number 
of far smaller ones, may be traced as the path of the actual 
world as we understand it. In this way an obvious question 
may be answered: namely, if the possible worlds are 
accessible to the time traveller, why are they not 
accessible to us? In fact they are, but because (unlike 
Chronos) we are never, by definition, in a position actually 
to experience the alternative that we did not choose, we 
believe that it does not exist except, perhaps, as 
unrealised potential. Every decision made actualises a 
potential-that is subsequently deemed a part of the `real 
world'. If the time traveller, by his actions, changes that 
decision then, if he is to continue to exist in his present 
form, he must enter another possible world which then 
becomes actualised from his point of view. 
If there are alternative worlds accessible from this 
one, the time traveller may prove to be the key to such 
`inter world' travel. That is because only he could affect 
and experience the 'change' that would be a necessary 
feature of such movement. This 'change' would be only an 
appearance generated by the difference between what the 
traveller knows to have been the case in his own past in 
World X, and what he presently witnesses after travelling 
backwards in time, affecting events, and thereby entering an 
alternative world, Y -- hence the use of inverted commas. 
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However, because, from his perspective, subsequent events 
are different to those that he recalls as having occurred at 
that time, the appearance of change under these 
circumstances might be considered sufficient to warrant his 
use of the term, even though persons occupying either world 
without the benefit of the traveller's experience would not 
consider any change to have taken place. 
This raises questions regarding the nature of change 
under these circumstances. Can it be said to have taken 
place only if it is between two differing states of one 
object in one world, or can it be invoked with equal force 
to cover the difference between qualitatively similar (up to 
the moment in question) objects or events occurring at 
identical times across worlds? Without the linking factor of 
the time traveller this last suggestion leads to absurdity, 
in that a person might claim there to have been a change 
between the colour of the chair upon which they are sitting 
(a colour that will remain identical for the foreseeable 
future) and the colour of a possible chair in another world 
that will be painted in the next five minutes. This would 
indicate that while change need not occur in one world, if 
it is to be recognised across worlds there must be a 
unifying consciousness within which not only must a before 
and after aspect be established, but the ontological status 
of the two have equal value. Whether a person living in 
World Y, who is told by a time traveller of events in World 
X, would be capable of assigning such equal status to those 
205 
events is debatable. It is also a reflection on the nature 
of change within one world over considerable periods of 
time, in that in both cases change is only registered by the 
comparison of present experience with the memories of those 
long dead, that information being acquired transitively or 
via written documents. Similarly, would the person in World 
Y express his understanding of the contrast between his 
immediate experience and that reported to him by the time 
traveller from World X as an example of change, or mere 
difference? It may also be noted that whereas within one 
world change is normally a term reserved for the altered 
state of an object, between possible worlds it has become a 
term applicable to the differing experiences of an event by 
the traveller. This was the purpose of the introduction of 
branching worlds at this juncture, but are there grounds for 
the claim that two events -- neither of which has causal 
priority except within the experience of the time traveller 
(an arbitrary relation at best) -- may be said to represent 
the two stages of change? Although both originate in the 
same world, at the moment of partition the two become 
physically isolated as well as qualitatively different. 
Furthermore, relative to an extra-world observer each occurs 
at the same temporal instant. Once again, this was one of 
the reasons for introducing the system of branching possible 
worlds, but further study into the causal relations that 
exist between worlds and between the events contained within 
them is clearly required before an entirely satisfactory 
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understanding of 'change' as experienced by the inter-world 
time traveller can be established. Since the analysis of 
causal relations, both within one world and inter-world, is 
to be the subject of the following chapter, further 
discussion of this topic will be reserved until then. 
To return to the graphs mentioned earlier, it may be 
noticed that in Fig. 4.8 the direction of time runs up the 
vertical axis from the past to the future, indicating that 
Chronos may travel from a moment in the future (labelled 
3000) into the past (labelled 1066) and then, by affecting 
the key decisions at the battle, advance through time on a 
different path. This indicates that the passage of time for 
every possible world is the same, and therefore if Chronos 
wishes to visit an alternative 1066 AD, he must first travel 
backwards in time to 1066. He cannot move directly from 3000 
to 1066 merely by finding a method of travelling between 
worlds and then somehow choosing one most similar to our 
world in 1066, because to do so would be to invalidate the 
claim to time travel in favour of the no less intriguing, 
but nevertheless separate, claim to inter-world travel 
alone. In this last lies a clue to the inadequacy of the 
Lewisian description for the present purposes. 
Were Lewis's possible worlds formula to be employed, no 
time travel that uses them could take place because, as 
Lewis himself makes clear, there are no spatio-temporal 
connections between his possible worlds. It would therefore 
be legitimate to suppose that World X is this world, World Y 
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is a world in which the closest counterpart to England on 
the planet Earth resembles England as it was in 1066 AD, 
World Z is one in which this planet's closest counterpart 
resembles a post-nuclear future, and so forth. By travelling 
between them (per impossibile where there are no spatio- 
temporal relations) Chronos would achieve the appearance of 
time travel without actually accomplishing it, and although 
this would solve the paradoxes, it is not an acceptable 
alternative. 
Temporal paradoxes are the result of a clash between 
those acts that a physically unrestrained and mentally 
unimpaired individual should be capable of performing, and 
what can actually occur given the known facts of the event 
in question that lies in the past. A freely acting 
individual should be capable of recovering a pen from the 
floor; however, if an examination of the site twenty minutes 
later reveals that the pen has not been retrieved, no amount 
of temporal activity in the past of that world can change 
the fact. Should the traveller move between worlds but not 
backwards in time, the problem would be resolved but at a 
price. Chronos would be free to pick up the pen, but because 
it is not identical with the pen he wished to recover the 
act would be no more significant than if he were to move 
into another room and pick up a similar pen lying on the 
floor there. It is not the event alone with which this 
thesis is concerned, but also the moment of its occurrence. 
If Chronos merely moves into another room or another 
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possible world, he will not be moving the chosen object at 
the time in question, but merely a similar object at a time 
that, at best, appears to be the moment in question, but is 
not. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 4.9. By moving 
directly between possible worlds Chronos may, if he is 
fortunate, witness events that appear identical to those 
which occurred on Earth in 1066,1665, and 1940, but the 
similarity is no more than a coincidence. Arrows indicate 
the traveller's personal experience of the passage of time 
as he ages in the normal way, and because the illusion of 
time travel has been preserved, the temporal direction of 
each world accessed by the traveller in this example must 
have been such as to appear normal to him. No more general 
temporal arrow may be included, however, because no genuine 
relations of time or causality exist between these possible 
worlds. 
The branching system, on the other hand, preserves both 
the need for temporal movement and the identity relation (as 
defined) between objects and events in one world and its 
alternatives. This is due to the fact that in order to enter 
a branch, Chronos must first travel backwards in time and 
attempt to alter the pattern of events so that they no 
longer match those that form the recorded history of his 
time line -- for example, by enabling Harold to win the 
Battle of Hastings. It is only when an attempt is made to 
alter the past relative to the actor making the attempt that 
the need for an alternative world becomes necessary, for 
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then it can resolve the potential paradox inherent in the 
act. 
With the introduction of communication between possible 
worlds comes the need to reconsider the identity relation. 
The present system cannot account for the relation between 
persons occupying equivalent positions in worlds visited by 
the traveller (e. g. William in 1066 W1 and William in 1066 
W2). In order to resolve this problem, just as temporal 
parts were introduced to enable an identity criterion for 
the time traveller, so now must be added to that the concept 
of modal parts. Every person and object occupying the time 
and place of the Battle of Hastings must be understood as 
having a modal part in the alternative world that Chronos 
enters. These modal parts are virtually indistinguishable 
from those persons and objects occupying the same relative 
position and time in Chronos' original world, and they have 
a common root in this world: the branching taking place at 
Chronos' moment of arrival. These are the people we would 
have been had we behaved differently at the time. The status 
of the options available is of equal value before a decision 
is made, and if Chronos ensures that the choice favours an 
alternative to that which is recorded in his own world's 
history then, because Chronos cannot cease to exist 
retroactively, both his world (the one he was born in) and 
the world his activity brings about must be equally real, 
both to themselves and to Chronos when he is occupying them. 
This raises two interesting points: one is that if the 
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persons occupying the time at which Chronos affects his 
alterations have modal parts in all possible worlds in which 
they exist, surely Chronos has as well, for he is no less 
human and therefore should enjoy all the same qualities. 
Consequently, Chronos could well run into his own time 
travelling alternative modal part, and this raises further 
identity problems. Second, it follows from the branching 
system outlined above that no person attempting to re-create 
the circumstances of Chronos' departure on his journey 
backwards in time could do so, which in turn indicates that 
the problem of determinism has not been solved, but merely 
removed one stage in the argument. The reasoning behind this 
second claim is somewhat obscure, however, and therefore 
requires further clarification. 
Section 5 
Together, Or Not At All 
Imagine Chronos preparing to travel backwards in time 
to change the outcome of the Battle of Hastings. When he 
arrives at the required time and place he takes a gun and 
shoots Williams staying to watch the events unfold. Now 
suppose that a second time traveller, Vremya, is added to 
the scenario. She wishes to intercept Chronos and witness 
with him the results of his activities, but only hears of 
his intentions after he has departed. Climbing into her time 
machine, Vremya travels back to the moment of Chronos' 
departure in his machine. But if, as a matter of fact, she 
211 
was not in the laboratory at that instant, no attempt to 
change that fact while remaining in this world can be 
successful. Assuming that laboratory technicians have 
already informed her that Chronos left alone, if Vremya is 
to be successful in her attempt to join him she must either 
make arrangements with Chronos before his departure for a 
meeting at some designated time and place where he can pick 
her up after leaving the laboratory, or she must attempt to 
recreate the circumstances under which the change Chronos 
planned to enact occurred. In either case the results are 
unsatisfactory. 
Should Vremya arrange to meet with Chronos, then the 
moment of the meeting must be in the future relative to the 
moment of Chronos' departure. This is because if the meeting 
is in the past relative to his departure, it must be 
arranged in one of two ways: either Chronos met Vremya in 
the normal manner (i. e. without the aid of a time machine), 
or he used a time machine to travel backwards to a moment 
before his departure. In the first instance, Vremya would 
already be aware of Chronos' intentions before his departure 
and therefore would be with him in the time machine at the 
moment of his departure5. She was not, and consequently this 
does not describe the situation that requires analysis. On 
the other hand, if it is suggested that Chronos take the 
5. It is worth noting that it is improbable that Vre®ya could follow Chronos into the past 
using her own machine, because the very act of using an independent method would enable 
the introduction of further variables with the potential to move her into another world 
that is separate to that occupied by Chronos. 
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active part in the arrangement, and use his machine to 
travel backwards in time to meet her-the week before his 
departure for 1066, then it follows that had the meeting 
occurred and Vremya been duly collected she would not exist 
at the later date to ask for the lift6, and in that case he 
would not offer it and a bilking situation would obtain. On 
the other hand, if it is supposed that either one or both 
agree to travel backwards in their respective time machines 
to meet at the same time and place a week before Chronos' 
intended departure from the laboratory, then deterministic 
problems arise. For either the world a week later (i. e. at 
the moment of departure in the machine(s)) is as it is as a 
result of Chronos' and Vremya's meeting -- in which case 
they could not fail to meet since it is a part of history -- 
or the state of the world after the time of the meeting is 
not a result of the encounter, but instead reflects the 
consequences of a history in which no such meeting occurred. 
In this case it follows that, in order to be successful, the 
meeting must take place in an alternative possible world. 
However, while this last appears acceptable on a cursory 
examination, more careful study reveals that it cannot be 
the case. 
The effect that Chronos had on the events of 1066 (as 
cited above) did not include the existence of Vremya in that 
6. After Chronos has visited 1066 and effected his alterations it will be virtually 
impossible for his to return to this world; consequently any suggestion that she be 
returned to this world at the appropriate moment to request the lift is unrealistic. It 
would assume that Chronos could guarantee to return to this world after he had coved into 
another. 
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world. Furthermore, he did not have her with him at the 
moment he travelled back in time. Consequently a successful 
encounter by Vremya in an alternative possible world with 
Chronos could only arise if the man she met were not a later 
person-stage of the man who left the laboratory, but a modal 
part of Chronos existing in an alternative possible world. 
From this it may be concluded that should Vremya travel back 
to 1066 and witness the alteration of events there effected 
by a traveller called Chronos, then at least three 
alternative possible worlds have been realised. One is this 
world -- W -- from which both travellers initiated their 
journeys; one would contain Chronos alone -- W1; and one 
would contain another modal part of Chronos and the Vremya 
who left W -- W2. This in turn raises a problem for 
determinism, for Vremya can no more affect a possible world 
she did not, in fact, enter, than she can affect the past of 
this one. She cannot join Chronos in W1 unless she arrives 
with him at its inception, and if she does enter at that 
point then, because the creation of that world lies at a 
moment in the past of the world from which they both began 
their journeys, the time traveller's freedom to enter or not 
is once again denied. If it is a fact that he was in W1 in 
1066, then because the passage of time for W1 must agree 
with that of W if time travel between the two is to occur 
(otherwise the traveller will fail to travel backwards in 
time at all, or fail to travel back to 1066, see above) it 
follows that, as with this world, W1 is presently nearly a 
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thousand years beyond that date, and therefore the time 
traveller's intervention lies in that world's past and 
cannot be changed7, even though the invention of the machine 
that will enable that act still lies in the future of this 
world at the present time (1993). The distinctions made 
earlier between sufficient and necessary conditions, and 
experience and occurrence, must still be applied, therefore, 
if the time traveller's freewill is to be preserved, because 
ignorance regarding whether or not a time traveller has 
entered an alternative possible world in the past does not 
imply freedom. 
The problems raised above are further compounded by 
complications stemming from possible worlds theories. What 
is the ontological status of possible worlds? Do they exist 
indexically, independent of the intrusions of time 
travellers who may visit them, but are not the architects of 
their existence, or do they depend entirely on the 
paradoxical activities of time travellers for their 
creation? If the former, then determinism is preserved as 
argued above. If the latter, it seems extravagant to suggest 
that the simple utterance of an anachronism can create a 
universe, and simpler to deny the possibility of time travel 
altogether. 
The system of modal parts also requires closer 
examination. How does one determine one's modal part in 
7. Otherwise problems arise regarding the ontological origins of the alternative worlds 
(see below). 
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another universe? Lewis's counterpart theory is a likely 
candidate, but there seems no clearly defined means of 
ascertaining which person in a given alternative universe is 
the closest to an individual in this universe. In his 
article `Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic' 
(1968) Lewis writes that 
Your counterparts resemble you closely in 
content and context in important respects. They 
resemble you more closely than do the other things in 
their worlds. But they are not really you... The 
counterpart relation is a relation of similarity. 
Lewis, 1968, p. 114-115. 
In other words, an object a in World 1 is the counterpart of 
an object a in World 2 iff there is no object in World 1 
that more closely resembles A in World 2 that is not the 
proscribed object. However, as Graeme Forbes points out (The 
Metaphysics of Modality, 1985), 
It is consistent with this criterion that x 
in [World 1] has more than one counterpart in [World 2] 
since two or more objects in [World 2] may be equally 
similar, as they are there, to x as it is in [World 1], 
although more similar than all the other objects in 
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[World 2]. 
Forbes, 1985, p. 58. 
Which, then, is the closer counterpart between the one that 
thinks the same and the one that looks the same, when a 
combination of the two is unavailable? Is it the one with 
blue eyes, or the one with green (when in this world the 
person in question has brown eyes)? In the case of Chronos' 
journey to 1066, because the origins of W1 lie in this world 
-- its separate status as an alternative world being 
achieved only at the moment of the arrival of Chronos -- and 
the only difference between the two worlds at the moment of 
branching is the initial and continuing existence of the 
traveller in W1, such problems may well not arise. However, 
let it be supposed that Chronos moves forwards in time using 
his machine. Since this would no more engender logical 
contradiction than a similar journey into the future of this 
world, Chronos would remain in W1 
(there being no cause for 
his relocation). Suppose he then encounters a man in his 
youth who bears a disturbing similarity to Adolf Hitler in 
both looks and mentality. Should Chronos assume the worst 
and attempt to destroy the alternative Hitler, or wait in 
the knowledge that history has been affected already (by his 
own arrival) and the chances of the same outcome from two 
different origins are very slim? The moral implications 
arising from this problem of 
identity are considerable. 
Should his judgement -- based on the assumption that history 
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has already been affected -- prove erroneous, he can only go 
back in time and enter another world (W3) in which he may be 
faced with a similar dilemma; he cannot correct his mistake 
in W1. 
On a more fundamental level, there remains the 
possibility that Chronos could enter a world in which there 
exists one of his own modal parts. While identity might 
prove difficult to determine visually, the in principle 
possibility of examining the causal history of each modal 
part would be sufficient to determine which came from which 
world, unless there existed exceptional circumstances. Such 
circumstances would require that both versions came in an 
identical manner from other worlds resembling each other in 
all essential details. Yet even under these conditions one 
would arrive before the other or, if they arrived 
simultaneously, each would occupy a slightly different 
spatial position, and consequently it would be possible (in 
theory) to distinguish between the two. It is also a matter 
for debate whether or not the modal parts of a traveller 
would merge when meeting'in one possible world, but this 
does highlight another problem. 
As has already been shown throughout this thesis, 
although time travel has yet to be realised (if, indeed, it 
can be) it is possible to argue coherently about the logical 
consequences in a thought experiment generated world in 
which such activity occurs. This is because certain 
parameters must be adhered to if the concept is to be 
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discussed at all. For example, a world in which time travel 
can occur because there are no systematic and/or predictable 
(if only in small part) laws of physics would be 
incomprehensible and irrelevant to persons from a world as 
highly ordered on the macroscopic scale as this one. As the 
purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not a time 
machine could operate in this world, the physical and 
logical laws that obtain here (as presently understood) may 
be invoked as a basis for argument. Once the discussion 
encompasses the realm of possible worlds, however, the 
question arises as to whether or not they are subject to 
these same laws. If they are not, any conclusions drawn may 
be easily undermined by the denial of any agreed physical 
structure existing-. between this world and the one cited. 
Possible worlds, by definition, should contain within 
their number members whose physical and/or logical structure 
does not agree with that of this world (provided internal 
coherence is preserved). Critics may argue that no further 
discussion is possible, because the traveller may enter a 
world that differs so vastly from this one that its very 
nature invalidates the relevance of any conclusions drawn; 
while this is certainly true of a system of possible worlds 
in which-there exist no spatio-temporal relations, it is 
arguable whether or not this proposal retains its force when 
applied to a branching system of possible worlds. The 
traveller will enter a world as a result of his attempt to 
alter the past, and consequently the world entered should 
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reflect this. Thus an attempt to introduce a machine gun to 
the Battle of Hastings will be met by relocation in a world 
in which a machine gun and its operator magically (to the 
local inhabitants) appeared, and not relocation to a world 
in which gravity has been reversed. This argument 
necessarily extrapolates from present experience. Although 
quantum physics claims anything is possible, probability 
theory prevents the more outlandish from occurring on the 
macroscopic scale. Similarly, although there could be a 
world in which gravity was suddenly reversed on the Earth in 
1066, it is improbable that the act of introducing a machine 
gun would lead to the traveller's relocation in such a 
world. Yet the fact remains that there is no sound basis for 
argument. To what extent an alternative possible world can 
be guaranteed to agree in all fundamental respects with that 
vacated by the traveller, depends on the causal relations 
existing between those worlds. If the link is akin to that 
which exists from one moment to the next within one world, 
the probabilities governing that world may be applied with 
equal justification to another. If not, the increasing 
number of assumptions and hypotheses required to support the 
argument may be such as to render it meaningless. Once 
again, the nature of this connection depends on causal 
relations, and so further discussion must be reserved until 
the next chapter. There does, however, remain one aspect of 
possible worlds theory that may be analysed in more depth: 
should they be invoked, how would one then prove the 
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existence of time travel? 
Section 6 
Proving Inter-World Time Travel 
In any attempt to prove the success, or otherwise, of 
an expedition involving time travel within possible worlds, 
three different perspectives must be borne in mind: that of 
the time traveller; that of the inhabitants of the world in 
which the journey began; and that of the inhabitants of the 
world in which the journey ended. Each has its own unique 
view of events, and none is free from complications. 
When considering the pattern of events as witnessed by 
those left in the laboratory after Chronos' departure, there 
arise several possible explanations for his disappearance. 
(1) He has been successful in his attempt to travel into the 
past, and that has necessitated his movement into an 
alternative possible world. (2) He has been unsuccessful, 
and his ship has been vaporised. (3) He has moved into an 
alternative world but he has not moved backwards in time. 
(4) He has moved in space but not in time. Of these, 3 and 4 
may be dismissed by reasoning and empirical evidence 
respectively. In the case of 4, sensing devices, radio 
signalling, and subsequent investigation of any sign 
indicating the continued existence of the machine or its 
occupant within the confines of this solar systems should 
8. Or whatever spatial distance the machine is capable of achieving between the went of 
take-off and that at which contact is lost. 
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prove sufficient to forestall such an eventuality. As to the 
third explanation, it is reasonable to assume that if the 
traveller has not moved in time, he is no more likely to 
move into an alternative universe than any other human being 
at any other moment in their lives. For without time travel 
there is no potential for paradox, and therefore whatever he 
does -- including the total destruction of the launch site - 
- may be included as part of the history of this world and 
those objects contained within it. 
In option 2, complications arise only if there are no 
detectable pieces left of the time machine to indicate its 
destruction. Around the launch site sensors could be 
installed that are tuned to the molecular structure of the 
machine and its occupant's DNA: but once a position has been 
established outside Earth's atmosphere -- in order that the 
movement of the planet around the cosmos since the date in 
question may be accommodated -- the difference between total 
annihilation and the natural effects of attempting to 
violate `time's arrow' may prove difficult to distinguish. 
It would be impossible to receive signals from a transmitter 
aboard the machine after its time (as opposed to space) 
departure, because any signals would already have been sent 
long before during a'successful journey into the past. 
Consequently, lack of success in the receipt of such 
messages (if they are still around to be received) might 
cause the traveller to assume the failure of his venture 
before any attempt is made, and a self verifying situation 
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may be created. From this it follows that because the 
message has not been received in this world, the moment a 
traveller attempted to send such a message he would enter an 
alternative world. As a result, not only would there be no 
proof of the traveller's success, but Chronos could never 
travel back to the closest possible world to this one in 
1066, only to the 1066 of the world he first entered as a 
result of his initial transmission, and in the next chapter 
I will question the possibility of his doing even this. 
Finally there remains the possibility that the hoped- 
for result is achieved; but how could this be verified? 
Those continuing to exist in the world Chronos leaves behind 
will not experience any effects resulting from his 
activities in the past; therefore the only direct method of 
verification would depend on the return of the same modal 
part (but a later person-stage) at some point in the future. 
However, the probability of this occurring is extremely 
remote. This is because in order for him to return, the 
world Chronos inhabits as a result of his actions, and the 
world he left, must grow sufficiently similar that the 
correct temporal-movement by the time traveller will enable 
him to `hop across the gap' and reappear in the world where 
his initial journey began. The two worlds cannot simply 
coincide in the future, because this would require that a 
person who did not exist in one world (Chronos) suddenly 
appear without the aid of his time machine at the moment of 
unification, and two worlds that differ by even so much as 
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the position of one molecule, much less the physical 
presence of an entire human being, could not merge to become 
one. Nor can this be used to support the claim that two 
modal parts of Chronos would merge when meeting in one 
world, because under such circumstances one person -- the 
result of this merging -- would contain within his memory 
two accounts of events up to the moment of merging that 
could be slightly or vastly different, and either way would 
be contradictory. Even when considering inanimate objects, 
contradictory causal descriptions of the events leading up 
to the moment of unification cannot be held within the past 
history of one object. From this it appears that the 
traveller must in some way determine the moment at which the 
two worlds are closest, and then make a brief journey into 
the past in an attempt to return to his original world. The 
chances against his predicting precisely the activity in 
which he must engage in order to successfully complete his 
journey are enormous, and therefore the chances of his 
return are remote. In fact, provided he makes the attempt at 
a moment subsequent to that of his initial departure (recall 
that time must agree across worlds that are accessible under 
this system), he is as likely to re-enter a world after the 
moment of his departure by the performance of an act that is 
totally outrageous in the world he is inhabiting, as by 
attempting a slight modification at one minute past that 
instant. If his initial journey began at 12.00 on 29 May, 
2050 in World 1, and at 12.05,29 May 2050 in World 2, World 
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1 and World 2 are as physically close as they can be with a 
traveller existing in one and not the other, he is as likely 
to return to World 1 by using his machine to travel back to 
12.00.1 and picking up a piece of paper, as he is if he 
waits until 3000 and then travels back to 2090 in order to 
murder an'important diplomat. 
Another means of verifying Chronos' activities would 
depend on a time traveller from an alternative world -- but 
not any previously occupied by Chronos, for reasons that 
will be explained in the next chapter -- entering this one. 
If this traveller's time machine functions on the same 
principle as that in which Chronos left, then by means of 
inductive reasoning (with all its associated problems) the 
scientists could argue consistently for the success of their 
venture. 
Consideration must now be given to the perspective of 
those occupying the world Chronos enters: would they be 
better placed to appreciate his achievement? It seems likely 
that once Chronos has affected the past -- especially in a 
manner as significant as the outcome of a major battle -- he 
will no longer be in a position to predict subsequent events 
with total accuracy, because they will differ from those 
with which he is familiar. While it is conceivable that the 
resemblance between certain events that Chronos remembers 
occurring in the world he departed from and those happening 
around him in W2 would be sufficient to enable him to 
provide more or less accurate predictions regarding their 
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outcome, as each bad prognostication is acted upon and so 
prevented, fewer events will resemble those with which 
Chronos is familiar, and consequently his accuracy will be 
diminished until he is as incapable of precisely predicting 
the future as those around him. Once this stage has been 
reached there will no longer remain any tangible evidence of 
his futuristic origins. Indeed, since he did not travel from 
the future of that world but rather from this one, he could 
not honestly claim to be from the future relative to them, 
only a possible future, the proof for whose existence 
depends on the assumption that the traveller is telling the 
truth, which in turn generates a circular argument. His 
original success could be attributed to luck, his subsequent 
failure to being human. He could demonstrate an ability to 
meet people at a pre-arranged time and place in the future, 
having aged no more than a few minutes against their years, 
but while this might be considered satisfactory evidence of 
a journey into the future it would not endorse his claim to 
movement into the past. 
Finally, there remains the perspective of the time 
traveller himself. He would appear to be in the best 
position to validate his claims, yet he may, in fact, be no 
better equipped than those left behind in the laboratory. 
Chronos has left one world of which he has memories, and has 
entered another world that differs from the former in 
certain respects, but at that particular point generally 
resembles the place called Battle in Sussex as it would have 
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appeared in 1066 AD. However, it is unlikely that he will 
have physical proof, beyond these basic indicators, that he 
has moved both backwards in time and between worlds, and 
there remains the possibility that he has moved solely 
between worlds. The only reason for doubting this is the 
same as that considered by those in the laboratory, i. e. 
there would be no reason for a person to move between worlds 
unless they attempted to alter the past. Yet the powers of 
his machine may be more or less than anticipated. Thus it is 
reason, and not physical fact, that may be the only 
indicator of a success that is fully appreciated by the time 
traveller alone. 
This chapter has considered the problems of freewill 
and determinism both for the time traveller and for those in 
the world he occupies. In an effort to preserve freedom of 
will the importance of distinguishing between the number of 
experiences possible of any given event and the one 
occurrence of that event has been emphasised, as has the 
application of necessary and sufficient conditions to the 
causes of the time traveller's behaviour. Finally, in order 
to dissolve intuitive objections to the above arguments, a 
system of branching possible worlds was introduced and 
analysed. In the course of that analysis it was argued that 
the system contained considerable internal problems, the 
attempted resolution of which would be reserved until all 
other avenues of investigation 
had been exhausted. These 
avenues will be examined more thoroughly in the next 
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chapter, that is concerned with the commonest attacks 
levelled against the possibility of time travel within one 
world: those that originate within the field of causality. 
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In the definition of time travel that was provided at 
the beginning of this study it was claimed that the popular 
definition includes the ability of the time traveller to 
causally interact with objects and events in the past, and 
this has ensured the high profile of problems connected with 
causality. In addition, the identity criterion for such a 
person has been described as being necessarily dependent on 
the causal continuity and connectedness of person-stages 
(excepting deviant causal chains) with respect to the 
personal time frame. Time travel and causality are therefore 
intimately connected in the popular system, and the 
examination of that relationship and the complications 
arising from it will be the concern of the following pages. 
Before any discussion can begin, however, the assumptions 
that underpin the causal relations to be examined must be 
clearly delineated. 
It will be assumed that causal relations may be 
transitive. In other words, if event A causes event B, and 
event'B causes event C, then event A is a causal ancestor of 
event C. Furthermore, if A is a necessary condition of B, 
and Ba necessary condition of C, then A is a necessary 
condition of C. This assumption is so rudimentary that we 
often neglect the intervening stages and simply report that 
A caused C. Thus, the flicking of a switch is said to cause 
the bulb to give off light, when a full description of 
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events would require the mention of circuits, connections, 
filaments, and friction. To deny the transitivity of causal 
relations is to deny a major tenet of human existence and 
scientific experimentation, yet our assumption of this 
transitivity will prove of vital importance to later 
discussions. 
This chapter will be particularly concerned with the 
following causal considerations (in order): those of 
backward causation; closed causal (time-like) chains and 
world lines; causality violation and logical contradiction. 
From this analysis will be determined the logical 
possibility, as well as the probability, of repeated, non- 
accidental, backward temporal movement within one possible 
world. Should the results prove unsatisfactory, I will 
consider some alternative models, and I will examine whether 
these are also subject to the logical problems that have 
been raised. 
Section 1 
Backward Causation 
- The spontaneous human reaction to the possibility of a 
reversal of the causal direction is normally negative. The 
reason for this may well lie in a deep-rooted association 
between the temporal direction and the causal one. For 
example, when observing the widely scattered pieces of a 
wine glass lying on the floor beneath a table upon which 
stand similar glasses, the assumption is made that this is 
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the culmination of a series of events: the glass was 
originally standing upon the high table, whence it was 
knocked to the floor and consequently shattered with such 
force that the pieces flew some distance before coming to 
rest in their present positions. It is not usual to imagine 
that in the next few minutes the pieces will gather 
sufficient energy from their surroundings to fly together to 
form a complete glass that will then rise from the floor and 
alight upon the table intact. Even the sentence structure in 
this example reflects human preference. The glass is 
described as being 'originally' intact upon the table, and 
as a `consequence' of being struck directly or indirectly, 
it falls to the ground to smash with such force that its 
pieces are widely scattered. Both temporal and causal 
phrases are linked together, with the causes being 
associated with the earliest moments, and the effects 
associated with the latest moments. Yet this intuitive sense 
of temporal and causal direction is not always supported by 
modern science. Once the analysis is centred on the 
behaviour of the individual particles that compose the 
glass, there is found to be no reason why the opposite 
series of events -- that the glass should begin upon the 
floor in pieces and end intact upon the table -- should not 
occur; in fact, the description of these events by a 
particle physicist could contain a temporal indicator that 
is totally indifferent as to its direction. In philosophy it 
has also been argued, most notably by Michael Dummett in his 
231 
article `Can an Effect Precede its Cause? ', that while we 
`feel a strong a priori objection' to the idea that the 
occurrence of an earlier event might be explained by the 
occurrence of a later one, nevertheless it is not 
impossible. The reason for the objection lies in the fact 
that, if it were possible, then it might also be possible to 
act with the intention of bringing about a past event, i. e. 
to act in such a way that a past event should have occurred. 
This, in its turn, appears plainly nonsensical; and yet, as 
Dummett argues at the end of his article, if we found that - 
- to take his example -- the utterance of the word 'click' 
before the opening of a letter ensured that it was not a 
bill, and-there was no other explanation for the non- 
arrival/sending of a bill other than this, and only on those 
occasions when we forgot to say 'click' before opening a 
letter would it prove to be a bill, then `it could not but 
be rational to believe in it and so make use of it' 
(Dummett, 1978, p. 332). 
Yet, despite the claims of particle physics and some 
philosophies, probability, human intuition, and day-to-day 
experience favour one temporal and one causal direction: the 
`arrow of time' points from the past to the future, and 
causes always precede their effects (sometimes via a series 
of intermediary causes). If particle physics is abandoned in 
favour of an examination of the macroscopic general view, 
rather than the microscopic particular one, there is 
revealed a study that is not only more appropriate when 
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considering a human being and a machine built to carry him, 
but that also contains a temporal indicator with a marked 
preference for one temporal direction. Entropy is not 
indifferent to the direction of the temporal arrow, but 
instead increases with the passage of time in keeping with 
the temporally asymmetrical Second Law of Thermodynamics'. 
If the description of a time traveller into the past appears 
to invoke backward causation, and thereby violates common 
experience, probabilistic preference, and our intuitions, 
there would seem good reason to find some alternative 
explanation. 
A brief analysis of every description of time travel 
into the past would appear indistinguishable from that of an 
example of backward causation: i. e., the traveller steps 
into his machine and begins his journey at a moment in the 
future relative to the moment of his arrival. For example, 
Chronos enters his machine in the year 2000, flips a lever, 
and, as a direct or indirect result of this activity, 
appears in the year 1066, nine hundred and thirty-four years 
before his departure. No one would wish to deny that the 
operation of the lever was a necessary cause of his 
appearance in 1066 inside a time machine, because that is 
the function of such a machine, and if the appropriate 
operation of levers etc. does not cause the operator to be 
re-located at some earlier temporal instant, then the 
machine does not work as it should and there can be no 
1. See P. Coveney and R. Bighfield, 'The Arrow of rise', pp. 32-33 et passim. 
233 
guarantee that the intended place and time of arrival will 
be achieved on every occasion of operation. Although the 
possibility exists that the operation of the levers is 
unnecessary, and the time traveller will always arrive at 
his intended destination by pure coincidence, it may be 
ruled out for the purposes of the present study because the 
assumption is being made that time travel is taking place as 
a direct result of the traveller's programming activities. 
Accepting, therefore, that the operation of the lever at 
time t1 is a necessary condition of the arrival of the time 
machine at time t_1, must it be assumed that there has been 
a case of backward causation, or can an alternative 
explanation ease any residual sense of discomfort? 
In fact there are (at least2) two other ways of 
explaining the series of events described above, both of 
which nullify the need for backward causation. They are also 
more accurate descriptions of the sequence of events from 
the perspective of the time traveller, and are therefore to 
be preferred because -- as has already been indicated in the 
last chapter -- only Chronos can have any physical 
appreciation of the consequences of his temporal activities. 
Unfortunately, each of these descriptions contains serious 
consequences for the possibility of time travel under our 
present description. 
2, most other time travelling descriptions can be reduced to these two choices. Mental 
time travel (such as that envisaged in Jack Finney's Time and Again or in the film 
Somewhere in Time) does not correspond to either method, but such temporal relocations of 
the body through thought require a great many more assumptions about the nature of time 
and thought than 1 feel can be justified 
in this study. 
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The first alternative has already been encountered in 
Chapter 2. There I considered one of the most fundamental 
attacks that has been directed against time travel -- the 
apparent contradiction in affirming that such a person has 
travelled both five minutes and one hundred years. The 
solution was to assume more than one temporal reference. By 
this means the answer is then qualified by the addition that 
he has aged five minutes relative to his personal time 
frame, while travelling one hundred years into the past 
relative to the external time frame. This solves many 
problems -- not least the one presently under discussion -- 
because time travel (appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding) does not involve backward causation from 
the time traveller's point of view. Chronos experiences the 
passage of events in a standard progression, with the 
flicking of the lever coming before the moment of arrival in 
1066 according to the personal time frame. From Chronos' 
perspective, therefore, there is no difficulty in explaining 
both the remote and the immediate causes of a given event 
and the relations between them, because the ordering of 
causal activity inside the machine is directed in the normal 
way relative to him. It is only when the activities of 
Chronos are examined from the perspective of an observer who 
is at rest with respect to the external time frame that the 
appearance of backward causation arises. 
In Fig. 5.1 the first appearance of the traveller is at 
point At while the cause of that appearance does not become 
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evident until point B. Due to the fact that the ordering of 
temporal experience for the external observer is identical 
to that of the history of the planet, and he has no sense of 
the passage of events as experienced by the backward- 
travelling Chronos, he must assume one of the following: (A) 
that the arrival of Chronos in 1066 was a spontaneous 
creation with no antecedent or consequent causal 
explanation; (B) that the ordering of events is such that 
the spontaneous creation of Chronos in 1066 was the remote 
cause of his setting the co-ordinates (both temporal and 
physical) and pressing the lever that caused his 
annihilation in 2000 AD; (C) that there has been an 
incidence of backward causation, such that the appearance of 
a person called Chronos in 1066 was/will be caused by the 
activities of a person in 2000 AD. In this last scenario the 
existence of a causal relation does not necessarily imply 
the existence of an identity relation; furthermore, none of 
the above descriptions includes a reference to time travel 
into the past. For these reasons they all fail to describe 
3 
the actual state of affairs that has been revealed by an 
analysis of the causal relations through the personal time 
frame. This, then, demonstrates that there is scope for a 
more considered analysis of the importance of time frames to 
the study of causal relations arising from time travel. 
D. H. Mellor (1981) argues that time travel necessarily 
involves backward causation and closed causal chains3, and 
There may be some ambiguity here. There is no question that Mellor associates tine 
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his analysis depends on the importance of the external 
perspective. In his book, Real Time, he attempts to prove 
the impossibility of backward causation by analysing a 
thought experiment that is similar in structure to Dummett's 
dancing tribal chief. Mellor gives the example of fires 
whose ignition at time to is said to depend on the 
application of matches at time t2. Yet a time traveller 
could not fulfil the activity Mellor describes. Whether or 
not the fire (or the match) is lit in the future (t2) and 
then transported via the time machine into the past (to) 
does not detract from the fact that the sequence of events 
according to the personal time line of the fire requires 
that the match be applied before ignition occurs. Genuine 
backward causation would demand that the match be applied 
after the ignition of the fire relative to the personal time 
frame. 
The introduction of the closed causal loop stems from 
Mellor's claim that the departure of a scarf-wearing Dr Who 
in his `Tardis' in 1984 is the cause of his arrival wearing 
that same scarf in 1884, and his arrival in 1884 will have 
consequences for his departure in 1984. These consequences 
could be significant and apparent -- such as a report in The 
London Illustrated, revealing the exact moment of his 
travel with backward causation and closed causal chains, but whereas I take it that he is 
arguing against backward causation (hence his inclusion at this stage in my argument), 
Biggs (1991) claims that Mellor's argument hinges on the contradictory nature of olosed 
causal loops. This does not affect my argument, however, because here jr an taking issue 
with Mellor's association of time travel and backward causation (either directly or via 
closed causal chains). 
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arrival and his attire, that is subsequently read by Dr Who 
and shapes his decisions regarding these factors -- but, as 
was argued in the previous chapter, the fact that the 
traveller's activities in the external past are known to him 
before he begins his journey need not necessarily shape his 
future personal behaviour. The past cannot be changed, and 
therefore his awareness of the nature of events related to 
his behaviour that lie in the external past and his personal 
future makes no difference to their causal effect on him. 
Although the personal/external distinction inhibits any 
reference to backward causation during time travelling 
activities according to the popular definition, there is 
another means by which Mellor's arguments against time 
travel might be circumvented that depends on the nature of 
the physical method employed by the traveller in his 
journeys to the past. It hinges on the Gödelian 
interpretation of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity; 
this alone makes it worthy of study, but it also raises 
issues that will prove useful to later discussions. 
According to Gödel's cylindrical interpretation of 
space-time, there might be worlds in which 
... by making a round trip on a rocket ship in 
a sufficiently wide curve, it is possible... to travel 
into any region of the past, present, and future, and 
back again, exactly as it is possible in other worlds 
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to travel to distant parts of space. 
Gödel, 1949, p. 560. 
Using this method, Chronos' temporal movements would always 
entail travel into the local future even though, from a 
global perspective, he would travel into the past, and 
therefore there would be no local violation of the causal 
direction and no need for an independent personal time 
frame. Throughout any journey into the past, the time 
direction and the causal direction would remain positive 
both inside and outside the machine. This can be better 
understood using Fig. 5.2, which is based on that used in 
Horwich, 1987 (p. 113). Here, due to the combination of a 
cylindrical space-time model and two space-time dimensions 
lying at 90' to one another, the traveller eventually comes 
full circle, finding himself at a moment in the past 
relative to his moment of departure, even though he has 
travelled consistently into the future relative to the light 
cones of each space-time dimension in turn. 
While Gödel's description obviates the need for the 
personal/external time distinction to resolve the problems 
of backward causation, it does not contradict the existence 
of those time frames, leaving the way open to their use in 
resolving other problems that the Gödelian model might not 
accommodate. Yet Gödel himself doubted the practicality of 
his model on logical grounds, and in order to forestall 
complaints that his description must be incorrect because it 
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would enable bilking experiments he introduced a physical 
limitation. 
This and similar contradictions, however, in 
order to prove the impossibility of the worlds under 
consideration, presuppose the actual feasibility of the 
journey into one's own past. But the velocities which 
would be necessary in order to complete the voyage in a 
reasonable length of time are far beyond everything 
that can be expected ever to become a practical 
possibility. 
Ibid., p. 561. 
In making this claim Gödel reveals himself to have committed 
what may be termed the `super-time' fallacy. This is the 
same as the error, highlighted in the previous chapter, that 
led to the introduction of the experience/occurrence 
distinction, and it is common to time travel thought 
experiments. The origins of the error, and the causal 
continuity and connectedness on which it depends, are the 
reasons for its introduction at this point, but while its 
relevance to alternative space-time descriptions explains 
its presence in this section, it is necessary for some 
consideration to be given to closed causal chains before the 
full implications of Gödel's words may be understood. This 
will be the subject of the following pages. 
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Section 2 
Causal Chains4: What Are They? 
A distinction can be drawn between closed and open 
causal chains, and between closed and open world lines. An 
open world line represents a person's path through space- 
time: he is born, lives, and dies. The temporal arrow 
expressed in the world line is future-directed with respect 
to both the external and personal time frames, it is 
continuous, and it has a beginning and an end. A closed 
world line, on the other hand, represents an object that is 
the cause of its own initial and continuing existence. Here, 
a series of person- or object-stages is so arranged through 
time that each stage is both the ancestor and the descendant 
of every other stage, including itself, and consequently 
each stage depends on the existence of every stage -- 
including those that lie after it relative to the external 
time frame -- for its own existence. No one stage has 
personal temporal precedence over any other, and none may be 
discarded without profound consequences for the existence of 
the entire closed world line. 
An open causal chain can be used to describe the events 
surrounding a steam train's operation. Coal is shovelled 
into the coal-hole, and this heats the water that turns to 
steam: this drives the pistons, that turn the wheels, that 
4, Many refer to causal or tics-Ilke loops. While this describes their appearance on 
space-time diagrams, it 
does not evoke their physical structure. I have therefore deeaed 
the word 'chain' more appropriate to the circumstances, although the word 'loop' My be 
substituted by the reader 
if it is preferred. 
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make the train move along the track. Once again there is a 
beginning and an end, and the flow of causal relations is -- 
as with the direction of the temporal arrow in the example 
of the open world line -- future-directed for both temporal 
reference frames, emphasising the strong association that 
exists between time and causality. On a larger scale, a 
similar causal chain could represent the entire history of 
the steam train, indicating that world lines are simply a 
special case of causal chains. And just as a closed world 
line depends on time travel, so too does a closed causal 
chain. For example: imagine that Chronos steps into his time 
machine and travels one hundred years into the past. At the 
moment of his arrival he makes love to a girl who has a 
child. The child grows up, gets married, and in due course 
has a son who is named Chronos, and it is this child who 
travels into the, past and makes love to a woman who proves 
to be his own grandmother. A more involved version of this 
story has been suggested by Robert A. Heinlein in his short 
story All You Zombies. There, the same individual -- by 
means of a sex change -- succeeds in becoming the sole 
member of what appears to be a four-member family, being his 
own mother, father, daughter, -and son5. Closed causal chains 
may be of a very short duration, or they may be spread over 
many years or even centuries, with each step being the 
remote rather than the almost immediate causal ancestor of 
S. It is interesting to note that, according to the arguments of St Aquinas, Heinlein', 
'unmarried mother' is God! 
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itself. Their generation is as a direct result of time 
travelling activities, and, as before, they do not 
necessarily have any causal dependence on anything outside 
the chain. Since world lines have been shown to be special 
cases of causal chains, the phrase 'causal chain' will 
henceforth represent both terms. 
If a closed causal chain is entirely interdependent, 
the question remains as to how it can ever begin. No one 
stage can come into existence before any other stage; 
consequently, in order to exist at all as a causally 
integrated whole, every part of the chain must come into 
existence `simultaneously'. This word is somewhat ambiguous, 
however, for what interpretation can be placed on the 
concept of simultaneity when stages in the loop are in the 
past or the future relative to other stages, according to 
the external time frame? Even if this problem could be 
overcome -- perhaps by the introduction of another time 
frame -- the problem of causal interaction remains. How can 
each stage be causally associated with every other stage 
when there is, by definition, no causal priority? Without 
causal relations between person-stages, the identity 
criterion that was cited in the third chapter would be 
unfulfilled, and consequently none of the problems 
associated with a time traveller in the popular image would 
arise, because it would not be one being who existed 
throughout the duration of the journeys into the past and 
the future. 
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What if the concept of simultaneity were abandoned in 
favour of a linear development of the events that are said 
to form a closed causal chain, developing from the earliest 
moments of the chain's existence with respect to the 
external time frame? This situation is represented in Fig. 
5.3. If one ignores the information on causal relations that 
is provided by the personal time frame, and instead follows 
the pattern of events according to the ordering imposed by 
the external time frame, it can be seen that point A is 
first: it exists before the moment of the (so-called) closed 
causal chain's completion and -- because the events that 
occupy the future relative to any given moment are not to be 
interpreted as coming into existence either before or at the 
same time as events lying in the past on this diagram -- 
events at A cannot be dependent for their existence on those 
at either B or C. The representative graph might be 
interpreted by an observer at B in one of two ways. 
1) An object is spontaneously created travelling backwards 
in time at point B1. At the moment of its arrival at point 
As the object stops and takes up a normal temporal direction 
until point B2. As B2 lies in the present, the object's 
future activities remain unknown. This is unsatisfactory 
because at point As point B, and those events and stages 
associated with it, will lie in the future, and therefore 
they will not exist. The observer in this example has 
illegitimately placed himself at a moment in the future, 
relative to the earliest moments in the order of events, and 
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this has resulted in an inaccurate interpretation -- albeit 
one whose simplicity and convenience are extremely 
seductive. This leaves the second alternative. 
2) Two objects are spontaneously created at point A. One 
moves off in the forward temporal direction to point B2, 
while the other moves toward point B1, all the while growing 
younger6. At any given point, the future activities of the 
beings remain unknown. 
In interpretation (2) there is no causal association 
between the object at B1 and the object at B2 to indicate 
any mutual dependence, because the future of the objects is 
unrealised. They are two spontaneous creations advancing 
through time, with one revealing a reversed personal 
temporal indicator. In each case the stages already in 
existence have no dependence on future events, because 
otherwise they could not exist. The future in this example 
is an unknown quantity -- not because we have not 
experienced it, but because there Is nothing to experience. 
Consequently, any apparent causal association that may one 
day seem to exist will be at best coincidental, and at worst 
illusory in the best traditions of Humean empiricism. To 
guarantee the existence of a closed causal chain, it is 
therefore necessary that two aspects of time -- the past juld 
the future (aspects whose ontological status has been 
traditionally a source of much discussion) -- must be 
6. M example of this interpretation has already been discussed in Chapter 3, where Robert 
weingard's article on Travelling Backwards in Time was shown to be an unacceptable 
description of the popular systems of time travel. 
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granted equal status with the present and, in some sense, 
co-exist. Therefore, just as it is the case that for time 
travel to occur at all the future must, at least from the 
point of view of the time traveller, exist, so also closed 
causal chains require that the future exists. The 
similarities between the needs of closed causal chains and 
time travel may not be coincidental, but the true nature of 
their association has yet to be revealed. 
One method by which closed causal chains might be 
achieved has already been mentioned. Kurt Dödel's 
cylindrical universe model, by its very nature, endorses the 
creation of closed causal chains. Yet Gödel also claimed 
that such a system would, in theory, permit the occurrence 
of mutually contradictory events, and it was stated that 
this indicated that he had succumbed to what was termed the 
`super-time' fallacy. The claim that physical limitations 
would prevent such occurrences does not account for the fact 
that closed causal chains -- and not just closed, or nearly 
closed, world lines -- can also generate contradictions as 
profound as those of which Gödel spoke, e. g. the inadvertent 
destruction of the first amoeba by a time traveller. This 
problem can now be investigated. 
Super-time is an intuitively appealing concept that is 
a vital aspect of the so-called 'Myth of Passage', and as 
such it is a popular misconception of western thought. 
Graham Nerlich, in his article Can Time Be Finite, discusses 
Gödel's claims regarding the possibility of contradictions 
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arising from the latter's space-time model. 
We add to a perfectly coherent picture of an 
almost-closed time-like curve the idea of a unique, 
ontologically distinguished time, the present... The 
events which make up... x's life are like a circular 
array of lights, each being lit only when it is touched 
by the passing nimbus of realty, the present. As the 
present passes (in super-time) round the circular array 
of events of cosmic time it comes back to an event a 
second time (super-time) and the light is lit 
again... Without these dubious assumptions nothing lends 
even an air of intelligibility to any claim that x is 
at 1970 at two times. The ease with which we follow 
Gödel's footsteps shows how ingratiating those 
assumptions are, provided only that we keep them 
unformulated. 
Nerlich, 1981, p. 233. 
As has already been made clear in the preceding chapter, the 
events in external time only occur once, and so Gödel's 
suggestion that the traveller can in some way change the 
past is nonsense. Yet the image of a time traveller greeting 
his earlier self and committing an act he knows did not 
occur is, as Nerlich points out, easy to follow as a direct 
consequence of our intuitive belief in the 'Myth of 
Passage'. Nerlich claims that the image is acceptable only 
so long as its status remains unformulated, and so some 
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consideration should be given to the questions that might be 
asked when attempting to provide such a formulation. 
How is super-time related to the external time frame? 
If it is defined as something that contains every event in 
external time at one and the same instant, to what extent 
may it be called time at all? If the sum total of events in 
external time are co-present in a super-time that contains 
no additional events that are peculiar to super-time alone, 
then the duration of super-time would be as brief as the 
shortest possible interval of external time (however that is 
to be defined: recall Newton-Smith's comments on the nature 
of temporal structure in Chapter 3). If this is not the 
case, how are events to be temporally divided? Is every 
event in the history of the planet to be granted an equal 
temporal value, so that the Battle of Ypres will occupy as 
much super-time as that required by an athlete to break the 
four-minute mile? If this were the case super-time would 
appear to lack duration, for how long does it take actually 
to win a race or a battle? It is tempting to imagine all the 
events of external time laid out linearly before a person 
existing in super-time, or, like the Boethian cart-wheel, 
surrounding a hub from which we gaze across external time. 
In imagining this picture, however, we introduce an 
observer, and super-time becomes more than the instant of 
indeterminate duration required in order that an infinite 
number of events may simultaneously co-exist; it is also the 
passage of time required for the observer to observe and to 
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exist?. Alternatively, every event in external time could 
have infinite duration in super-time. In this way the 
problem of the indeterminate minimal duration of any given 
event is overcome, and an observer could experience any 
given instant in the past, present, or future of external 
time in conjunction with any other moment: but then mutually 
contradictory states -- such as the non-existence and 
existence of the planet Earth -- would co-exist, and if such 
events were not distinguished by their temporal positions, 
then the question arises as to how this situation would be 
possible. Suppose instead that events occurring in external 
time have their temporal position indicated in super-time by 
their spatial position. Thus a Boethian interpretation has 
been re-introduced, with all the events contained within it 
having infinite duration in super-time. Such an 
interpretation would require a more detailed examination of 
the relationship between external time and super-time that 
permits a spatial interpretation of temporal events, and 
that is outside the purview of this thesis. Even the brief 
analysis provided here is sufficient to reveal a 
considerable number of problems associated with the concept 
of super-time. It is therefore unsuitable to the problem of 
explaining the creation of closed causal chains, to which 
this study now returns. 
A brief resume of the problems encountered so far may 
7. The Introduction of Cod as the observer brings with it too many theological 
implications to justify such a 'solution' to the problem, and consequently I have not 
attempted to include such a suggestion in this analysis. 
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be of some assistance. 
1) No person- (or object-) stage in a closed causal chain 
can be causally anterior to any other one, because the whole 
is interdependent, with each stage both preceding and 
following all others in the chain, including itself. 
Consequently, the existence of any one stage requires the 
existence of all the others that constitute the structure. 
Since none have causal priority, all stages must come into 
being simultaneously. 
2) A closed causal chain exists across an interval of 
external time; consequently, instantaneous creation relative 
to that reference frame is not possible. 
3) The concept of super-time is a more complex solution to 
the problem of closed causal chains than can be reasonably 
justified, and premise (2) prevents appeals to the external 
time frame. There remains one reference frame not so far 
considered: that of personal time. 
4) Some causal dependency between stages is required to 
ensure that the appearance of an organised causal 
association on the level of external time is representative 
of a genuine association on the level of personal time. This 
will preserve the necessary identity criterion for persons 
or objects, as well as genuine causal interaction (as 
opposed to coincidence) for actions and events. 
How may all these points be reconciled? Let it be 
supposed that the causal chain comes into existence 
simultaneously relative to a moment in the personal time 
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frame (the only temporal reference remaining). This would 
seem to pose a problem for the identity criterion, because 
the creation of person-stages as described above obviates 
the possibility of a causal continuity and connectedness 
between those stages. How can each stage be causally related 
to those preceding and succeeding it in personal time when 
every stage -- relative to that reference frame -- is co- 
temporal? Even were a system of causal relations introduced 
which ensured that the creation of any one stage in a closed 
causal chain instantly caused the creation of every other 
stage associated with it, and the absence of any given stage 
prevented the creation of every other one, a problem of 
meaning remains. What does it actually mean to say that 
every stage in a closed causal chain has been created 
simultaneously relative to the personal time frame, while 
the whole chain is extended through the external time frame? 
When the traveller is journeying into the past within his 
time machine this interpretation would seem to imply that 
his journey would be instantaneous, because the duration of 
the journey within the machine is measured according to the 
personal time frame, and every person-stage has been created 
simultaneously relative to that reference. Consequently, the 
journey itself will be'instantaneous according to those 
measurements. Alternatively, each person-stage could be 
imagined as coming into existence at the same instant 
relative to the personal time frame, while their physical 
ordering and their duration would be determined relative to 
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the external time frame, even during a journey into the 
past. Even if sense could be made of this last suggestion, 
the eradication of the external/personal division that it 
appears to entail not only re-opens the door to the problems 
of backward causation, it also makes a nonsense of the 
popular concept (as shown in Chapter 2). 
Suppose each stage were causally dependent on those 
preceding it, but not on those succeeding it, or itself, for 
its existence. In order that the illusion of a closed causal 
chain might be preserved under such circumstances, at least 
one stage would have to be a spontaneous creation whose 
existence was independent of those stages either side of it. 
Unfortunately, this still does not resolve the problem. Not 
only would such a structure fail to fulfil the necessary 
criteria of a closed causal chain, but the coincidental 
nature of the independent stage would become suspect when 
every attempt to generate such a chain by a time traveller 
was met with such a convenient and specific creation. 
Furthermore, so long as a causal relation exists such that 
an event in the future (the departure of the machine) is the 
cause of an event in the past (the arrival of that machine 
at a later point relative to the personal time frame), the 
problem of, explaining the necessarily co-temporal nature of 
events lying at different points relative to the external 
time frame remains. This is due to the fact that the 
consequence cannot exist without the cause (if a genuine 
causal relation is to exist), therefore the existence of the 
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machine in the past is proof of the necessarily causally 
anterior occurrence of the moment of departure that lies in 
the external future. Furthermore, the presence of anv cause 
at a moment in the future relative to its consequence, 
including any intermediary causes that lie between the 
moments of departure and arrival, is sufficient to generate 
the problem. Consequently, no stage in a causal chain that 
runs from the present (or future) to the past could exist 
without this problem occurring. The logical solution to this 
dilemma has proved evasive and, at best, ad hoc. It would be 
far simpler to deny the initial existence of closed causal 
chains in general or open causal chains running from the 
future into the past relative to the external time frame. To 
deny the latter, however, is to deny time travel altogether, 
and while the previous discussion has revealed conceptual 
and physical problems associated with the creation of such 
chains, this is not enough to prove the logical 
impossibility of time travel as defined. Further examination 
is essential to determine whether or not time travel 
requires both of the causal chains that fulfil the above 
descriptions (open and closed), and should one or both prove 
indispensable it will then be necessary to examine whether 
the chain/s are not only conceptually absurd (space travel 
was once regarded in a similar fashion) but also internally 
contradictory. If it can then be shown that a prerequisite 
of time travel is logically contradictory, time travel as 
defined will have been proved impossible. 
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Section 3 
What Do They Do? 
The popularity in academic and science fiction 
literature of problems arising from closed causal chains has 
provided considerable variety from which examples may be 
chosen. An excellent science fiction example already 
mentioned is Robert A. Heinlein's short story All You 
Zombies. If attention is concentrated solely on those 
examples arising from purely philosophical studies, rather 
than those contained in popular literature and films, there 
is still considerable choice, but since some are merely 
alternative versions of the same story, I have chosen two 
that seem to represent most clearly the strands presently 
under consideration. These are Murray MacBeath's Who Was Dr 
Who's Father? and Graham Nerlich's Can Time be Finite? 
(especially section 5 of that article, entitled 'A problem 
about time travel in closed time'). I will analyse the 
problems that arise in these articles jointly with two 
simpler stories of my own devising. In this way I hope to 
reveal more clearly the assumptions that underlie closed 
causal chains, as well as the logical contradictions that 
all similar time travel stories involve. I will show that 
closed causal chains, as well as closed world lines, are 
always contradictory, and that any attempt at backward time 
travel has the potential to generate them. I will then 
examine methods by which. this potential might be nullified, 
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and attempt to determine both the practical and the logical 
feasibility of these methods. 
The first analysis is based on section 5 of Graham 
Nerlich's article, Can Time Be Finite? There, the author 
claims that time travel stories leave one with the 
impression that there is something very amiss, and continues 
... I think this impression is correct. I will 
argue that, if we were to tell a consistent story about 
X [a time traveller], in full detail, it would be 
necessary to claim experiences for him which depart 
drastically from the norms of our temporal experience - 
- so drastically that many would regard the story as 
conceptually absurd. 
Nerlich, 1981, p. 234. 
He then asks the reader to imagine that there be a clock 
which has a closed history (all the particles 
which compose it have closed time-like curves as their 
world lines) and which X always has with him. 
... [S]uppose that X-young enters the time machine and 
goes on his travels as soon as X-old leaves it and that 
the clock is handed from X-old to X-young as they pass 
at the entry. We can suppose this "clock" to be a very 
crude, simple mechanism. For example, it might be a 
stick in which X cuts a notch at every mealtime. Now we 
can certainly say of X, consistently, that he ages, 
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accrues memories, scars and so forth. Whatever he gets 
by way of traces he can consistently keep. This is 
because his world line is not quite closed. But 
somewhere, somehow, the stick must lose notches if 
somewhere, somehow, it gains them. For its world line 
is closed. We can easily see how it could get notched. 
But how can it get unnotched? 
Ibid., pp. 235-236 (his emphasis). 
The story contains two closed world lines -- that of 
the time machine and that of the stick -- but this 
complication may be simplified because the scratches, 
knocks, and wear and tear suffered by the time machine 
during its journeys make that an equally valid but less 
obvious `clock'. (Here, the word 'clock' signifies a means 
of indicating the increasing passage of time and consequent 
growth of causal history for the object concerned. In this 
sense, the development of rust makes the Titanic an equally 
valid clock, because this also indicates the passage of 
time. The accuracy of the measurement to an outside observer 
is of no logical importance to this argument. ) Just as the 
stick must lose any notches as it goes backwards in time, so 
the time machine must lose any scratches or marks it 
receives that it did not have at the moment of its delivery. 
Yet even if all the signs of wear and tear were repaired 
before the time machine was delivered to an earlier person- 
stage of Chronos this would not be sufficient, because these 
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are only signs of a more significant difference between the 
time machine at time t and the same machine at times to and 
t_1: namely, that the machine has grown older. The increased 
causal history of one party, that indicates a dissimilarity 
of age with another otherwise identical object, is a genuine 
difference with profound consequences for backward time 
travel as defined. It cannot be dismissed as mere `Cambridge 
change', because the longer an object exists, the greater 
its potential effect on other objects. The initial causes of 
major historical events are often not momentous in 
themselves. The mere existence at a particular place and 
time of an otherwise unspectacular object -- such as a rock 
-- can have momentous consequences. This point will be 
considered in greater detail later in this chapter, but at 
this stage (and to better highlight the problems of 
Nerlich's story) I propose a similar but simplified version. 
Imagine Chronos arriving in a time machine and greeting 
his earlier self. The older Chronos hands over a file that 
contains explicit instructions for the construction of a 
time machine, and then he leaves, taking the machine with 
him. Using the information, the younger Chronos eventually 
reaches a stage where he is in a position to go back in time 
to his earlier self and hand on the instructions, thereby 
completing the loop. At first he considers handing on the 
file he originally received, but this file is now dog-eared 
and damaged: there are marks on it that were not there when 
he received it, and therefore the file at its present age, 
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with its causal history, is not the file he originally 
received. In order to become that, the file would have to 
lose those parts of its causal history that were gained as 
it grew older in his hands. Would it be possible for the 
file to grow younger, and the time machine and everything 
else inside it to continue to grow older while travelling 
backwards in time? 
The answer to this question is important, for if would- 
be travellers cannot combine these two aspects then the trip 
will be impossible. If the time machine grows younger as it 
travels backwards, not only would we not encounter a time 
machine before the'moment of its functional completion, but 
there could never be any successful time machine. The reason 
for the former claim lies in the fact that, as the machine 
grows younger during its backward time journey, it would 
eventually be required to work at a moment relative to the 
external time frame, and (with the absence of the 
personal/external distinction) at a stage in its personal 
history, that is antecedent to the moment at which it can 
work -- the machine being incomplete at that point. 
Consequently, no time machine could visit 1992 or any date 
previous to this, because no working time machine has yet 
been invented. The reason for the second claim lies in the 
fact that the machine was not travelling backwards in time a 
second before the switch was thrown, and therefore as soon 
as it begins its travels it must stop again, because in the 
course of growing younger it will reach the point at which 
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it had not been turned on. Thus, reversing the temporal sign 
of the time machine during journeys into the past is not a 
solution8. If the file, alone grows younger, however, can it 
be carried by the machine? 
If the charge, parity, and temporal indicator of the 
object are reversed, symmetry is preserved and anti-matter 
is created (The Arrow of Time, 1991, p. 139). When anti- 
matter and matter are brought together both are annihilated, 
and therefore any object whose temporal indicator is 
reversed must be sealed off in order that no interaction may 
take place. This might be possible using strong magnetic 
fields, but does it solve the problem of the example cited 
above? The answer to this question -- already argued in 
Chapter 3 -- is `No' because, as has already been shown, 
what is required here is not a relative time reversal but an 
actual one: not the appearance of time running backwards for 
an object relative to the external time frame, but the 
rejuvenation of the object itself such that, as it is taken 
backwards inside-the machine, it actually loses causal 
history. To see the difference it is necessary to recall 
Weingard's example. His anti-matter time traveller was 
created with the memories and physical structure appropriate 
to a time traveller who had come from the future. As time 
passed he grew younger, until, at the moment of 
annihilation, he perfectly resembled the would-be time 
S. This effect emphasises the importance of preserving the external/personal time frame 
distinction when the time machine's journey is past-directed with respect to its immediate 
surroundings. 
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traveller, Oscarl. Suppose he were not annihilated, but 
instead placed inside a genuine time machine which then 
began to travel backwards relative to the external time 
frame. If a genuine temporal reversal (normally equivalent 
to rejuvenation), relative to the time frame with respect to 
which one is said to be travelling, were taking place, the 
being in this example would have to grow older as he 
travelled backwards, in order that at the moment of arrival 
at the place of his creation he would perfectly resemble the 
being who emerged from the anti-matter creator and 
transmitter. However, anti-matter always behaves in a manner 
that appears locally time reversed, and in this example that 
means time reversed with respect to the machine itself (or 
other beings inside the machine), which is ageing as it 
travels into the past. Consequently, such a traveller would 
continue to grow younger, and would therefore fail to 
replicate the conditions of his creation at the time of his 
arrival at that moment in the past. A genuinely rejuvenated 
traveller, on the other hand, would lose causal history as 
he was carried inside the machine, such that at no instant 
would he exhibit an age or causal history that was 
inappropriate to the particular point in time, relative to 
the external time frame, that he had reached. This would 
mean that he could only travel backwards within his own 
life-time, but since he would personally carry no 
information as to his temporal origins this alone does not 
appear to pose problems of either a logical or practical 
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nature. However, the absence of information regarding 
temporal origins does pose a problem for the definition of 
time travel. 
In the Introduction it was specifically stated that the 
popular concept required information to be carried into the 
causal past of the object concerned. If the object loses 
causal history according to its temporal position relative 
to the external time frame, that requirement appears to be 
ignored. In fact this is not the case, because in order to 
fulfil the definition either the time traveller himself or 
his machine must reveal their temporal origins, and in this 
example both do. 
The time machine is accumulating causal history as it 
travels backwards through time, and this effectively 
obviates the advantages gained by imagining the rejuvenation 
of the traveller according to his°external temporal 
position9. Yet even if this fact were ignored, the physical 
position of the traveller would be sufficient to provide the 
information demanded by the definition. This is because 
throughout the journey, as well as at the moment of arrival, 
there would be two persons occupying two different positions 
9. This scenario can be best understood If the reader imagines a machine at least 
generally similar to Dr Who's Tardis, where there is a sense of time passing in the 
reversed direction immediately outside the machine. If, for reasons already stated, auch a 
machine is abandoned as unfeasible, the traveller would either have to rejuvenate 
instantly at the moment of arrival, or, through some fora of action-at-a-distance, loge 
his causal history according to his position relative to the tine trans with respect to 
which he was travelling into the past -- even if that is on the other aide of the 
universe. Both these suggestions appear, at best, dubious, but if this study is to be 
thorough, all possible physical combinations that are not inherently contradictory must be 
taken into consideration. 
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-- not just at the same moment relative to the external time 
frame, but also at the same moment relative to the personal 
time frame -- and this would be achieved without the aid of 
fission. For example, at the age of 21 the traveller is at 
university studying philosophy, and at the same age he is 
also inside a time machine that is travelling into the past 
and may be thousands of miles from that university. The 
differing physical positions provide a qualitative 
difference that ensures that Leibniz's law is not violated, 
but it also provides information as to the temporal origins 
of the being not at university, and this raises further 
issues that must be examined. 
Section 4 
Annabel and Arthur 
When considering the problems posed by Nerlich's stick 
in the previous section, the difficulty appeared to lie in 
the fact that one object, at the same place and time 
(relative to the external time frame), would have to exhibit 
mutually contradictory states. The stick would have to be 
both notched and unnotched; the time machine both scratched 
and unscratched. Since it is apparent that the problem stems 
from the fact that the objects concerned are attempting to 
occupy identical spatio-temporal locations relative to 
external time, while at different temporal stages relative 
to the personal time frame, might all these problems be 
overcome by the simple physical movement of the objects 
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concerned such that these contradictions do not occur? 
Nerlich is right in stating that a contradiction is 
generated by his example, and we may therefore assume that 
if time travel into the past is to be possible these 
conditions must never obtain; but the question is, can they 
be avoided? To answer this, another thought experiment must 
be considered. I have chosen Murray MacBeath's 'Who Was Dr 
Who's Father? ' as an example of the appropriate group, 
although there are others (Jonathan Harrison provides one in 
Analysis Problem 18). The story-line, paraphrased from 
MacBeath, is as follows. 
Annabel is walking through the forest when she comes 
across a cabinet resembling a freezer. Inside it is a man 
who proves to have lost his memory. Annabel names him Arthur 
and, being of a whimsical frame of mind, makes his last name 
Who (because nobody knows). In time they fall in love, get 
married, and produce a baby boy. He so resembles his father 
that he too is named Arthur. Young Arthur proves 
exceptionally intelligent, gaining a Ph. D. by building a 
prototype time machine. Naturally eager to try his machine, 
young Dr Who-is halted by his parents who demand that if he 
wants to travel in time, he must take someone with him. 
Arthur senior volunteers and the two set out. Unfortunately, 
the machine proves to be faulty and the trip far longer than 
that for which provision had been made. As a result, young 
Dr Who is forced to murder and eat his father in order to 
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survive. Eventually Arthur's machine stops and he emerges in 
a potentially hostile world. He has travelled backwards much 
further than he had intended, and he is additionally worried 
that his crime might be discovered. His machine being 
completely useless, he destroys it and builds instead a 
freezer into which he climbs. Some years later, Annabel is 
walking in the forest... 
Here is a closed causal chain that does not, at first 
glance, seem to pose the same problems as Nerlich's closed 
world line. At no point is the same object asked to occupy 
the same point in space and external time whilst being 
physically older. The difference between the two stories 
becomes apparent if graphs are used to illustrate them (see 
Fig. 5.4). Whereas the first results in a closed polygon, 
the second resembles a spiral. Arthur has a beginning and an 
end, the stick and the time machine do not. Consequently, 
while young Arthur and old Arthur do not attempt to occupy 
exactly the same physical space at the same external time, 
this is not true of the notched and unnotched sticks. Yet 
despite all this we feel a certain apprehension when asked 
to believe the logical possibility of Macbeath's story. 
Annabel and Arthur are easy to imagine (a film could be made 
of their story), but the actual passage of events that they 
represent is not, which is why the story generates a feeling 
of discomfort that is hard to explain. The cause of this 
discomfort may now be highlighted by a similar, but simpler, 
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thought experiment. 
Young Chronos is handed a file, by his future self, 
containing instructions on how to build a time machine. In 
due course he completes the machine and prepares to hand the 
file back to his younger self -- thereby completing the 
chain -- but the physical state of the file reveals a causal 
history that is greater than that which it had upon his 
receiving it as a young man. In order to circumnavigate the 
problems already mentioned, Chronos copies the file and 
consequently -- since he cannot change the past without 
generating a contradiction -- it is the so-called `copy' 
that proves to be the earlier causal stage of the tattered 
file he now holds. This description -- that duplicates in 
spiral structure MacBeath's story-line above -- is equally 
unenlightening until a small emendation is added. 
When making his copy, Chronos adds a note to the effect 
that this is the first copy made from the original that he 
was handed. When handing the file to his younger self, he 
asks him to remember to add this index number. However, the 
copy handed to the younger traveller is labelled (1), 
therefore the copy made by that young man, when he grows 
older, must now be labelled (2), it being a copy of a copy - 
- the status of the original having been indicated by the 
statement followed by the number (1). Yet the events only 
occur once in the external time frame, and so the traveller 
cannot label his copy (2) since on the one occasion he 
labels it, it is labelled (1), as indicated by the index 
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number on the file he has just copied. To label it (2) is to 
create a logical contradiction, in that the file has now 
been labelled both (1) and (2) at one and the same external 
time and place, whilst at different points relative to 
something else (see Fig. 5.5). This `something else' would 
appear to be the personal time frame, but what precisely is 
this `thing' that plays the part of time in the traveller's 
life actually enabling? 
The contradictory change to the label does not 
represent the ageing of the piece of paper -- a simple 
physical phenomenon that is well understood -- nor travel 
through a third temporal reference such as the previously 
considered `super-time' -- the existence of the personal 
time frame is sufficient to ensure the generation of this 
paradox. The aforementioned examples both represent the 
combination of the open world line with the closed causal 
chain. The attempted re-numbering indicates the greater 
causal history and consequent growth of information around 
the closed causal chain that exists through personal time, 
and it is this growth of information, even if it were not 
indicated by the changing index number, that generates a 
contradiction. 
The data transmitted have a causal history at the same 
external space-time of both n and n#, and this is a 
contradiction. If such an event did occur, the growth in 
subsequent causal history would have to be negated as time 
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travel into the past occurred' in order that contradictions 
did not arise. Furthermore, when the story was told I chose 
an arbitrary point at-which Chronos began labelling the file 
copies, but as no part of the chain has causal priority, no 
point can be chosen, therefore the numbering either cannot 
start or would be infinite in both directions, containing no 
first or last number. The non-existence of a first number is 
unacceptable if it is agreed that the time traveller would 
not use negative numbers as labels, and the non-existence of 
a last is contradictory since it would require that the 
label constantly change. Therefore, if Chronos begins to 
label his copies, the information generated around the chain 
must be negated as travel backwards through time occurs, 
otherwise, regardless of whether the traveller attempts to 
label his copies from (1) or (w), contradictions must arise 
as he reaches (2), (3), or (m+n). Consequently time travel, 
where closed causal chains are engendered, can never begin. 
The physical complications of their generation that were 
mentioned earlier have now been superseded by the logical 
problems they engender by their very nature. 
The solution to this problem would seem to lie in the 
negation of all the accumulated causal history as the 
traveller moves into the past, and this, in turn, brings the 
discussion back to the point raised in the introduction to 
this section, regarding the physical location of the time 
10. If the information were negated when Chronos or the machine were not time travelling, 
neither would be able to interact in the world around them. 
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traveller. The complete negation of causal history required 
in order that a , closed causal chain may exist without 
engendering contradiction would necessarily include the 
negation of those events that led to his spatial location at 
the beginning of his journey into the past. If he was not 
sitting in his machine at the time period he wishes to 
visit, he cannot be in it when he arrives; and if he was in 
New York in 1980, he cannot travel from 2000 to arrive in 
London in 1980, or even to arrive one foot to the left or 
right of his position in New York in that year. In each of 
these examples information regarding the traveller's 
temporal origins in the future (relative to the moment of 
his arrival) is provided, and in this way is generated the 
potential for logical contradiction revealed above. Any 
causal history that is accumulated as the traveller moves 
from the present into the past in a closed causal chain must 
be negated, -or the chain cannot exist. Consequently, 
throughout his journey into the past, the successful time 
traveller can only occupy those spatio-temporal locations 
that he occupied as he grew older in the usual manner, i. e. 
when he was growing up without the time machine. 
Should a local and global temporal reversal be achieved 
within the aforementioned parameters, there will be no means 
of proving time travel either from past evidence or from 
future knowledge. There will be no evidence in the past of 
the incursion of a time traveller, because he will not be 
physically or mentally distinguishable from his earlier 
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self; there will be no means of deriving information at the 
moment of the traveller's return, because even assuming 
directives to recall or record past events were not erased 
as the traveller moved into the past, there will be no one 
in existence in the present after the traveller's journey 
begins to provide the answers. There would be no difference 
-- mental, physical, or spatial -- between the traveller and 
his earlier self. Time travel under this description would 
be indistinguishable from merely vaporising the would-be 
traveller: he would effectively be turned back on himself, 
and there would be no means of determining whether or not he 
had time travelled into the past or merely ceased to be in 
the present. Consequently, this description does not fulfil 
the requirements of the popular system, and must therefore 
be abandoned. 
Closed causal chains can be spread over immense 
intervals, and while the contradictions generated under the 
limited and specific conditions chosen for the 
aforementioned example are, I believe, defensible, some will 
undoubtedly point out that this argument does not prove time 
travel impossible. The total negation of all causal history 
required by such a chain proves that it is not an example of 
the popular system, because that requires that some 
information be transmitted into the past. Consequently, 
since small (i. e. of brief duration) and intimately 
interrelated (i. e. each stage is a sufficient and necessary 
cause of the next stage and itself) closed causal chains are 
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not logically possible, -Gödel's claim that they would not, 
in fact, be physically feasible can be resurrected. For 
physical reasons, therefore, the traveller will not be able 
to visit his own immediate past -- i. e. he cannot visit 
himself as a younger man or (as in Heinlein's All You 
Zombies or By His Bootstraps) interfere with those directly 
responsible for his present status. This argument makes the 
physical limitation either a consequence of logical 
impossibility, or a lucky coincidence whose results are 
convenient to the popular concept of time travel. Whatever 
the explanation, the traveller cannot enter the local past. 
However, by using a combination of the defined system of 
time travel and Gödel's limitation, it is possible to 
conceive of the traveller visiting the more distant past, 
and here the causal consequence of events that lie in the 
past, regardless of whether or not they are known to the 
traveller, become an important factor. D. H. Mellor refers to 
these effects when he writes 
[o]ne could I suppose object that the 1884 
arrival [of Dr Who], if sufficiently unobtrusive, might 
not have affected twentieth-century events, and a 
fortiori not Dr Who's departure, so that the two events 
need not be causally related both ways round. But being 
unobtrusive does not mean lacking effects, it only 
means not being perceived. And while Tardis's arrival 
might well not be seen, it can hardly be invisible. It 
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must have produced the effects of an incursion of an 
old police box... with a man emerging from it -- 
displacement of air, reflection of light, etc. If 1884 
saw no such effects, it saw no such incursion. 
Mellor, 1987, p. 175. 
Thus the question arises whether the consequences of the 
time traveller's actions might be absorbed by the passage of 
years, preventing the generation of closed causal chains. If 
this were possible, the one spontaneous link in the apparent 
causal chain that was mentioned earlier -- the link whose 
existence is independent of those that constitute the rest 
of the chain -- might be inserted, and Chronos might be 
capable of taking information into the past without logical 
contradiction (although with the aforementioned physical and 
conceptual difficulties). 
A defence of this position requires either partial or 
total denial of two assumptions: one is causal transitivity; 
the other is technically termed a 'sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions'. The repercussions of these denials for 
time travel as presently defined will be examined in the 
following section. 
Section 5 
Small Details and Causal Relations 
The following quote from the doctoral thesis of M. F. 
Cleugh elegantly summarises the position of those who would 
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interfere in the past. 
Common sense affirms, unhesitatingly, that 
the effects of a spider's crawl over a room in the 
Tower on January 1st, 1600, have long since ceased to 
be felt, and that nothing in the world now would be 
different if the spider had never crawled at all that 
day. On the other hand, it also holds that certain 
events, small in themselves, like Caesar's crossing the 
Rubicon, have a profound effect on the course of 
history, and that even today our lives would have been 
different had they not occurred. Once the two different 
views have been taken, the way is easy to showing that 
both examples are in much the same position. After all, 
a spider's crawl -- though at a different time and 
place -- was once responsible for important historical 
events; and in the heat death of the universe, Caesar's 
conquests will no longer matter. Once we admit that, we 
are bound to agree that there is no logical halting 
place between two extreme conceptions. One is, that 
whatever we do -- our most important decisions equally 
with the mechanical avoidance of an obstacle -- makes 
no real difference: it will all be the same a hundred 
thousand years hence. The other says that everything 
matters, and that, however trifling the occurrence the 
world never is as if it had not been. 
Cleugh, 1937, p. 214. 
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The assumption can be made that the mental, physical, 
and social make-up of the traveller from the future is a 
consequence of events that occurred both during his lifetime 
(perhaps specifically to him) and long before he was born. 
His birth and development will have taken place in a complex 
interactive environment whose level of social and scientific 
advancement would be a factor of many years' growth. Had 
that environment come into being spontaneously, not only 
would this be a spectacular violation of probabilistic laws 
as we presently understand them, but it would also deny the 
possibility, of time travel into the past because there would 
be no past to"travel to -- either because it is/was merely 
an illusion generated by ideas implanted in our memories, or 
because there would be no causal relation or direct 
awareness of any stage previous to that in which the would- 
be time traveller presently existed. In this study it is the 
concept of time travel into the external causal past of the 
person or object being temporally relocated that is of 
primary-concern, for only under such circumstances can the 
problems envisaged in both works of fiction and works of 
science or philosophy have any bearing. Consequently, 
further reflections on the possibly illusory nature of our 
past experience can be disregarded. 
Every detail of Chronos' existence -- from his 
political and social outlook to the colour of his hair; from 
his memories of past events both distant and more recent, to 
his hopes for the future -- is a consequence of events that 
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happened both before he made his trip backwards in time and 
long before he was born. By visiting his own causal past, 
therefore, the traveller will be in a position to determine 
his own being. How can Chronos avoid becoming a part of the 
intricate web of causal interaction in the past that helped 
to shape him? Merely being seen may be sufficient, and the 
accidental destruction of something as seemingly 
inconsequential as an insect could prove to be a vital 
incident in the sum total of events that go to make up the 
present from which he travelled. Ray Bradbury's science 
fiction tale A Sound Of Thunder, Time and Again by Jack 
Finney, Mellor's comment in Real Time (quoted above, Section 
1, pp. 237-238), and the aforementioned quotation from 
Cleugh all consider this possibility. Each gives an example 
of the potentially monumental consequences of apparently 
-insignificant events, and thereby displays evidence of the 
feature termed a `sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions'. It may be that Chronos' historical activities 
with the time machine will only affect one molecule in his 
body, or they may affect his entire life, but any effect, 
from the largest to the smallest, would nevertheless be a 
result of his own activities. The nature of his existence, 
in every detail, could be the transitive (or direct) result 
of an act performed by him in the past, and the performance 
of that act would be shaped by his physical and mental 
structure. This engenders a closed causal chain, with all 
the logical ramifications cited above. It has already been 
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argued that this problem can be resolved at the cost of the 
definition of time travel, but that should be considered as 
the last option. Is there any other means by which Chronos 
could enter his own causal past without generating a 
logically contradictory chain of events? Some potential 
solutions will now be examined. 
The first solution denies that the actions of the 
traveller at moments in his causal history will necessarily 
propagate a closed causal chain. It is not necessary to 
introduce spontaneous independent creations in order to 
achieve this end. Instead, either the causal repercussions 
of any given act performed by Chronos in the past must die 
out before they reach the time of his departure in the 
future, or they must not make contact with him. This 
argument would seem to imply the existence of an 
intelligence that can prevent or halt the causal 
consequences of the traveller's actions, but this is not so. 
It has already been shown that closed chains lead to logical 
contradiction; therefore, if Chronos should succeed in his 
attempt to journey into the past, it is a fact that he will 
not perform any act that will generate such 
contradictions". Under these circumstances Chronos can have 
no knowledge of the events that transpired on his journey, 
n. It is interesting to note that from this premiss it can be argued that the very 
absence of past reports of time travelling activities is a better proof of their actual 
existence than if history reported regular incursions by persons claiming to be time 
travellers. The existence of the latter would indicate either a need to reconsider the 
nature of causal relations in general, or a need to re-examine the credentials of such 
claimants. 
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and this obviates the intuitive response to the problem of 
freewill (see Chapter 4). In Fig. 5.6, graph A, the causal 
consequences of the accidental movement of a clod of earth 
by Chronos at time t_4 die out by time t_2. Consequently 
they do not affect him, and no closed causal chain is 
generated. In graph B, while the causal consequences do 
propagate to the future, they do not affect the time 
traveller before the moment of his departure. No one and 
nothing that has contact with him has been affected and so, 
while the effect exists, it does not generate a closed 
causal chain. To what extent are these descriptions tenable? 
It is possible that the mere movement of a clod of 
earth is not of sufficient causal importance as to have its 
consequences perpetuated through hundreds of years. However, 
it is equally possible that it could, in which case there 
remains the chance that the traveller is not affected by it. 
This latter would seem a realistic possibility in a medieval 
world where communications are poor, but very remote in the 
modern world where it is possible for large numbers of 
people to travel or communicate over great distances every 
day. This lends support to the point raised earlier, that a 
journey into the distant past would be more likely to 
succeed than one into the immediate past of the traveller 
himself. Difficulties arise because the success or otherwise 
of the journey is not dependent on the time traveller's 
cooperation. 
Chronos is aware that he can only successfully enter 
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the past if, as a matter of fact, he will not perform 
(personal time frame) and has not performed (external time 
frame) any contradictory act (as defined above). What, then, 
would go through his mind at the moment he realises that he 
has succeeded in his attempt to visit the past? To suggest 
that he would try to fulfil those requirements once he has 
arrived is to ignore human nature, yet his very success is 
sufficient proof if not of his acquiescence, then of the 
causal impotence of all his attempts to the contrary. The 
very ease with which the traveller could generate such 
contradictions appears to belie the chances of his success. 
The displacement of air and the absorption of photons that 
would be a necessary feature of his existence in the past 
could be sufficient, and since no proof of his success could 
ever be traced (regardless of his attempts to the contrary) 
the whole exercise appears to be of limited value -- except 
inasmuch as accurate information regarding that time and 
place could be gathered: reason enough to make the attempt. 
A potential problem remains, however, in that the 
success of his venture into the past depends on whether or 
not he leaves any traces of his existence, and this might be 
reinterpreted as implying that the cause of his success is 
the very absence of any causal resonance generated by his 
activities, thereby making the absence of a cause appear to 
be a cause in itself. This issue requires further analysis 
that will begin with the asking of two questions: is the 
absence of a time traveller's residual trace a cause of his 
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trying to enter the past; is the presence or absence of 
residual traces a cause of his failure or success in 
entering the past?. If the apparent non-existence of a 
traveller at any given moment in the past is a cause of his 
trying to enter that past, a closed causal chain does not 
exist. This is because to try is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of a success or failure. Trying does 
not cause success, and therefore the chain may be 
interrupted. Furthermore, an awareness of previous events 
need not even be a cause of Chronos making the attempt, and 
so once again the chain is severed. What of the second, two- 
part, -question? Can the presence of residual traces cause 
the failure of a time travel experiment? The answer to this 
part is clearly 'No', because it engenders a bilking 
experiment: that he has interfered with the past 
sufficiently to leave a trace cannot be the cause of his 
inability to enter that past, because his absence would 
ensure the absence of those features that would prevent his 
journey. Can the absence of causal traces directly or 
transitively cause his success? In order that a successful 
time traveller leave no trace of his presence in the past, 
he must first exist in that past, otherwise he is not a time 
traveller. Consequently the question becomes: does the 
traveller's presence in the past cause his successful future 
journey to that past? 
A time traveller cannot visit a time in which he never 
existed, for that would generate a contradiction. To examine 
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the problem from a different angle, if he did exist in the 
past he cannot fail to make the journey at some point in the 
future, for the consequences of that act -- that he walked 
and breathed in, for example, 11th Century England -- have 
already been realised, even if they have not directly 
affected his existence. It is therefore necessary that at a 
suitable moment in his lifetime he travel to the appropriate 
moment in the past, and because his failure to do so would 
also generate a contradiction it appears that a relation 
does exist, but it is not necessary for that relation to be 
a causal one. The fact of his existence -- if it was Chronos 
-- means that he will travel to the appropriate moment, but 
it is not a cause of the journey, only a necessary 
condition. Consequently the answer to the question, `Can the 
absence of a causal relation be a cause in itself? ' is `No'. 
The physical problems of time travel, such as the 
difficulties in conceptualising a successful journey into 
the past that were raised in Section 2, yet remain. The 
physical structure of space-time may be such as to resolve 
these problems, 'but that study is beyond the parameters of 
this thesis. Human psychology and the `sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions' mentioned in the introduction to this 
section also raise immense probabilistic issues. This last 
(a feature of Chaos Theory) is the key to the problem of 
time travel within one possible world. It is the (possibly 
minute) physical consequences of Chronos' behaviour that 
determine whether or not time travel is possible, and 
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therefore, while it might be possible for a time traveller 
to enter the past, the logical support for that claim lies 
in a physical (and still hotly debated) question: can any 
act, however small and insignificant, avoid the propagation 
of causal consequences on an ever-increasing scale? If not, 
time travel is logically impossible; otherwise, while the 
necessary combination of factors listed below makes 
organised time travel into the causal past of the traveller 
highly improbable, there is no reason why it should not 
occur. Strong causal relations and the transitivity of those 
relations are features required not only of the identity 
criteria of the time traveller himself, but also of the 
machine he uses and the world in which he exists, and they 
cannot be selective of their boundaries. Yet what is 
required is not the absence of causal relations, merely the 
possibility that a potential cause, itself a consequence of 
previous events, has no effect, and this is a question not 
so much for philosophers as for physicists. 
Just as in the previous chapter, the problems raised 
here do not imply logical impossibilities. They do, however, 
result in a compounded improbability. To succeed in a 
journey into the past, the traveller must fulfil all the 
following criteria: 
1) Restricted Access. He must not enter his own immediate 
past to communicate with himself or those in a position to 
communicate with him before the moment of his departure. 
2) Freedom D-f Will. Upon successfully arriving in the 
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distant past, the traveller's awareness of his success 
cannot and will not shape his behaviour in such a manner 
that his subsequent activities cannot fail to have causal 
consequences that will affect him before his departure -- 
e. g. he cannot affect the outcome of the Battle of Hastings 
such that Harold wins. 
3) Co-temporal Events in External Time. The existence of the 
personal and external time frames -- necessary to resolve 
other contradictions in time travel -- negate the need for 
backward causation, but in their place the successful time 
traveller will demonstrate the need for a radical 
reconsideration of our understanding of time or dimensions. 
For in order that an effect can occur, the cause must exist, 
and since, in the case of time travel, the cause lies in the 
future relative to its consequence, the previous or co- 
temporous existence of the cause must lie relative to a time 
frame other than the external (due to its definition) or the 
personal (due to problems with explaining the duration of 
the journey) time frames so far defined. 
4) Consistent Success. In order that the time machine may be 
a practical invention it must work on the majority of those 
occasions on which it is employed. This further compounds 
the problems cited in (1) and (2). 
The high improbability of time travel under these 
circumstances would appear to be sufficient to warrant the 
exploration of alternative avenues that are beyond the 
confines of the definition of time travel adhered to so far. 
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There are two alternatives. The first I will examine 
necessitates an appeal to possible worlds. In the last 
chapter, I considered a branching system as a solution to 
the problems posed for freewill when considering the time 
traveller from the future. The conceptual problems that were 
found made their use extravagant under the circumstances. 
However, in the light of the above discussions it now seems 
appropriate to re-examine the possible worlds thesis. 
Section 6 
Causal Relations and Possible Worlds 
The most minimal examination is all that is required to 
show that the branching system of possible worlds suggested 
in the last chapter needs revision before it can be 
considered of any use to the present discussion. This is 
because, as it is presently described, such a system would 
entail the traveller's entering his own past for (at the 
very least) a split second, and it has been argued that this 
is sufficient time for him to generate a closed causal chain 
with the logical contradiction that that entails. The high 
improbability of backward time travel under these 
circumstances makes the avoidance of such structures an 
important factor in determining a possible worlds system 
suitable for Chronos. However, the system chosen must 
nevertheless preserve some form of causal connection between 
this world and the one which Chronos enters if it is to be 
ensured that time travel, and not merely inter-world travel, 
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has taken place. This requires that a potentially 
contradictory situation be resolved: namely, that the system 
exhibit causal connections between worlds frequented by the 
time traveller, 'while at the same time preventing the 
possible generation of closed causal chains that can arise 
from travel into the past. 
One solution might entail Chronos entering an 
alternative world (W2) immediately he begins to travel 
backwards through time, as illustrated in Fig. 5.7. This 
would prevent his entering his own past, and so it would 
prohibit the possible generation of a closed causal chain in 
this world, but could Chronos then halt his journey in the 
past of W2, affect that world, and then remain there until 
it coalesced with W1? 
Chronos left Wi'at the instant he began his journey 
into the past; consequently, he does not exist in W1 in the 
time after his departure. If he attempted to remain in W2 
until it joined W1, he would either generate a contradiction 
-- by coalescing with an earlier person stage -- or he would 
have to spontaneously appear (without the aid of his time 
machine) in W1 immediately after his departure. The 
contradictions outlined in the former suggestion cannot 
occur, nevertheless the latter solution seems, at best, 
highly improbable. 
The close proximity of Chronos' departure and arrival 
would be such that he would not seem to have left, although 
his physical location and mental condition may differ 
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considerably, indicating some change in his state. Yet if a 
person existed in one world who did not exist in another, or 
occupied a position occupied either by a person who differed 
either physically or mentally, or by an inanimate object, or 
by air molecules and photons in the other world, those two 
worlds would differ and therefore they could not coalesce. 
Furthermore, using this model the only method by which W2 
and W1 could merge after Chronos' initial departure would be 
if W2 somehow altered its path before a contradiction was 
generated, and there seems no simple explanation of such a 
convenient fission. In Chapter 1 it was argued that a galaxy 
or object would be invisible to people who were time 
reversed with respect to it. Martin Gardner (1967, p. 102) 
adds that there are some (he cites F. Russell Stannard's 
article, `Symmetry of the Time Axis', in Nature, August 13, 
1966) who would argue that two galaxies or objects that were 
time reversed with respect to one another could not interact 
in any way. Consequently there might not be any indication 
(arising from the existence of the backwards moving time 
traveller) of the contradiction about to be generated at the 
merging of the two worlds until after (per impossibile) the 
contradiction had occurred; and even if there were, to 
suggest that a world might alter its course in anticipation 
of events to come is to imbue possible worlds with 
sentience. While the traveller can play an active role in 
altering his path between worlds (although he cannot decide 
which particular world he will enter as a consequence of his 
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actions), a possible world cannot determine or alter its 
path. Nor should it be supposed from this claim that the 
introduction of a third possible world, into which the 
traveller moves as soon as he is in danger of generating a 
contradiction, will resolve the problems of this model. 
In order to enter another possible world from W2, 
Chronos would have to attempt an act with the potential to 
generate a contradiction, as was the case when he departed 
W1. But whereas in the latter instance Chronos' entry into 
W2 ensured the potential for contradiction was not 
fulfilled, in this model his mere existence (however brief) 
in the past of W2, which would be necessary to create the 
potential for contradiction necessary to ensure his 
relocation, could be sufficient to actually generate that 
contradiction, because there exists an earlier person-stage 
in the future of W2. This is due to the fact that if one 
assumes fission will not take place, it follows that W2 will 
only connect with W1 at the point of Chronos' initial 
departure. Under such circumstances an earlier person-stage 
would exist in the future of a world that contained an older 
person-stage in its past -- the same difficulty that makes 
time travel within one possible world highly improbable, if 
not impossible. Failure to recognise this potential arises 
from a tendency to imagine each world to be independent, 
forgetting that the intersection of worlds 3,2 and 1 is a 
world in itself (see Fig. 5.8). Thus this model is shown to 
be unsuitable to the needs of the time traveller. 
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To resolve the above difficulties, imagine that the 
traveller follows a curved path into an alternative past 
(see Fig. 5.9). Chronos moves into the alternative world as 
soon as he begins to travel by means of the time machine, 
branching off into a loop that takes him into the past, 
where he resumes normal temporal movement. At no point does 
Chronos exist in both the future and the past of one world 
at inappropriate person-stages (i. e. the older stage 
existing at the earlier moment relative to the external time 
frame), because his route is always future-directed from the 
local perspective -- despite its eventual success in re- 
locating him in the global past -- therefore there is no 
potential for the generation of closed causal chains. Nor 
does Chronos attempt to re-enter or merge with the world 
from which he initially departed, but problems do remain. 
The point labelled A in the diagram is the moment of 
his departure in, for example, 2000 AD. Point C is the 
moment at which he resumes normal temporal movement in W2 
(i. e. leaves his time machine). Point B is the date 1066 AD 
in W1. From this, two questions arise. The first concerns 
the ontological status of W2: is it a world at all? The 
second concerns the temporal agreement between W1 and W2: 
why should the time at which Chronos resumes normal temporal 
movement in W2 be equivalent to the date 1066 AD in W1? 
The nature of W2 is, at best, ambiguous. If its 
temporal indicator agrees with that of the external time 
frame (labelled Y), as illustrated in Fig 5.10, there will 
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come a point where it must be reversed, due to the looped 
construction of W2. Therefore a point must exist where the 
change-over between one temporal direction and the other 
takes place. The change-over point exists somewhere between 
1 and 2, and must be negotiated by the traveller. The 
concept expressed in this diagram provides a clue as to the 
real nature of W2, but before it is examined consideration 
must be given to the alternative. Suppose the temporal 
indicator did not agree with the Y axis, but instead flowed 
from point A in a positive progression such that his 
departure from W1 in 2000 AD is followed in due course by 
his passing through 2001 AD in W2 (see Fig. 5.11). This 
echoes the original description of the Gödelian space-time 
model in that Chronos himself would always move into the 
local future, but if the world in which Chronos exists is 
also moving into the future, at what point will it suddenly 
become the global past? Under this description, W2 becomes 
not the world closest to W1 at point B, but a world closer 
to W1 at point A. Since the temporal indicator of the world 
itself -- and not just the temporal indicator of Chronos 
when travelling through it -- is always future-directed, all 
that Chronos will achieve by means of a journey through W2 
would be entry into the future of an alternative to W1 -- a 
world that appears to lie in the past relative to the moment 
of his departure, according to an external time axis that is 
otherwise impotent. This is clearly contradictory, since it 
implies that at the external date 1066 AD (indicated by its 
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position relative to the Y axis), W2 is at time 2000+n AD, 
the sum of n depending on the time covered by the loop of 
W2. Once again, there is an analogy here that reveals the 
status of W2 as something other than a possible world. It is 
Chronos who is travelling backwards and then forwards 
through time in Fig. 5.10. It is with respect to Chronos 
alone that time continues to move in the positive direction 
while he travels backwards in time (relative to the Y axis) 
as in Fig. 5.11. Therefore W2 is not a world at all between 
points A and C, but the route taken by Chronos into the 
past. 
If these arguments show that Chronos cannot exist in an 
alternative possible world as he travels through time, where 
does Chronos exist during his backward movement? A yet 
higher dimension; a form of `super-' or `hyper-space' that 
is as yet undiscovered? While this solution may be applauded 
by science-fiction writers, who have for many years appealed 
to the use of higher dimensions by space-ships travelling at 
super-luminal velocities, it is not one that can be 
carefully analysed, and so leaves many questions unanswered. 
An attempt at answering the second problem raised above 
was provided when the nature of possible worlds accessible 
to the time traveller was examined in Chapter 4. There, I 
wrote that all such worlds must have an agreed temporal 
reference. In this way, the boundaries of the external time 
frame were extended such that it ceased to be 'time at rest 
with respect to the history of the planet', and instead 
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became `time at rest with respect to the history of the 
planet and every possible world accessible therefrom'. This 
common temporal reference implied the existence of an 
absolute time frame relative to every possible world, and 
this in turn had repercussions for another claim of Chapter 
4, where I argued that the traveller must first travel in 
time and then move to another world, and not merely jump 
from world to world and claim that such activity is time 
travel. A journey into the past within one possible world, 
to be followed by movement into another possible world has 
been shown to be either improbable or impossible, depending 
on the nature of causal relations. It is all the more 
important, therefore, that some agreed absolute time frame 
be determined according to which Chronos can claim to have 
moved into the past. However, as with so many of the 
arguments appealed to throughout this thesis in an effort to 
preserve logical sense in descriptions of backward temporal 
movement, the concept of an absolute external time frame 
existing outside all possible worlds is acceptable only so 
long as it is not subjected to close scrutiny, for at that 
point it becomes meaningless. It is a time frame existing 
outside all worlds of time and space, and because the time 
machine and its occupant also have spatial dimension, and 
consequently must exist in space as well as time when 
journeying into the past, this 'higher' time dimension must 
also contain a spatial dimension. From this it may be 
concluded that all possible worlds exist inside some larger 
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possible world; and if that is so, then why not still 
larger, all-encompassing possible worlds, and so on? It 
might be argued that the existence of time in our world is 
dependent on the existence of this higher dimension, and 
consequently an infinite regress need not be generated, but 
this claim is highly suspect and unsupportable. Thus, not 
only are there: an infinite number of possible worlds that 
branch from each alternative provided in this world, but all 
these worlds are contained within another world that may 
(there is no reason to think otherwise) be a part of yet 
another intricate branching, and so on. The theoretical 
advantages of this system of possible worlds for the time 
traveller do not seem to be sufficient to overcome their 
fantastic ontological requirements. 
Further problems remain. If the world existent at point 
C (Fig. 5.11) is to be considered the closest possible world 
to ours in 1066, this would seem to necessitate some form of 
connection between points B and C at that time. Without this 
link, since Chronos' route is indirect, the world he 
witnesses at 1066 AD may bear little or no relation to the 
world at that time as we know it. Merely by travelling 
backwards in time, Chronos cannot guarantee that a world 
causally unconnected with W1 until 2000 AD will resemble W1 
in 1066 AD. While it is possible to predict with varying 
degrees of accuracy the effects of a given action on future 
events, it is impossible to work the other way and, by 
examining present conditions, correctly identify the causes. 
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This is because the same result may be achieved in a number 
of different ways. 
In this model there does exist a relation between W1 
and W2, as expressed by the existence of Chronos in both. 
The relation is not of logical concern, though, because 
Chronos does not come from the future of W2 and so would be 
equivalent to a person from another, far more advanced, 
planet interfering in the affairs of 11th-century mankind. 
However, the lack of causal connection at point C is a 
matter that requires resolution, for the reasons mentioned 
above. In order that W2 may be the closest possible world to 
W1 at point B, there must be some causal connection between 
the two. This can be effected by the provision of a 
connecting line, as illustrated in Fig. 5.12. There are now 
two methods by which entry may be gained to W2: the first is 
the route created by the time traveller, beginning at A and 
ending at C; the second is achieved by means of an 
alternative possible outcome arising at point B, which marks 
the initial creation of W2 itself. 
Once Chronos has entered W2 at point C, he cannot re- 
enter W1 by means of the section of W2 existent between 
points C and B, and neither can he enter W1 at any point in 
the future relative to point B that is antecedent to the 
moment of his departure at A. In each case, the reason lies 
in the causal chains that would subsequently be generated. 
He would also be prevented, more by probability than by 
logic -- as previously mentioned in this section and in the 
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last chapter -- from re-entering the future of W1 after 
point A. Thus he may become lost in the infinity of possible 
worlds that he must use, and so even if a way was found by 
which the aforementioned conceptual and causal problems 
might be resolved, it appears highly improbable that there 
will ever appear any incontrovertible evidence that inter- 
world time travel has occurred. 
I have suggested a system of possible worlds to be used 
by a time traveller into the past who wishes to ensure the 
closest possible approximation to backward time travel into 
his own causal history, but the system is not satisfactory. 
In order that coherence may be preserved it has proved 
necessary to appeal to an accessible space between worlds, 
an absolute temporal reference for all possible worlds 
accessible from W1, and (although it has not been 
specifically stated) in order to preserve the energy 
conservation principle the total energy in the system must 
be the sum of that contained in every possible world, not 
merely that contained in any given one. If this were not the 
case, the sudden appearance of Chronos at C would be a 
violation of that principle which, while being a physical 
rather than a logical limitation, should be taken into 
consideration12. There also remain questions regarding the 
12. It should be explained that there is a difference between the traveller's sudden 
appearance in another possible world as a result of his time travelling activities, and 
the coalescence of two possible worlds of differing content that I rejected earlier. The 
traveller is active in determining his movements, and his sudden appearance can be 
explained by his time machine's' properties. There is no reason to suppose that the 
departure of Chronos from a world will result in anything more than his subtraction from 
the sun total of that world, and his addition to the sun total of the other. A sudden 
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ontological status of such a system of possible worlds, 
their accessibility, and their structure. Satisfactory 
solutions to all these problems must be found before 
possible worlds can be presented as a viable alternative to 
the highly improbable popular system of time travel. 
With so much left unresolved, the proposed examination 
of the nature of change across possible worlds that was 
mentioned in the previous chapter cannot be fully realised. 
Even though there may be evidence for the necessary 
existence of direct causal relations between any given 
moment in W1 and the moment in W2 visited by the traveller 
in an attempt to experience and `change' the past, the 
necessarily independent nature of the two moments to be 
compared, as well as difficulties with defining or 
explaining the existence of time frames relative to which 
inter-world time travel could take place, effectively 
prevent further analysis. 
From the above it is clear that any temporal movement 
that attempts even an approximation to travel into the 
causal past of the traveller demands either a highly 
improbable combination of factors together with an 
incomprehensible system that allows the mutual co-existence 
of past, present, and future, or the existence of a complex 
and ultimately unsatisfactory system of modal realism that 
influx of creatures from the world into which he has moved would be both unnecessary and 
absurd (another reason for questioning the possibility of time travel under these 
conditions). It is incompatible with the final model of inter-world time travel outlined 
above. 
also depends on some extra-world time frame. Yet I have not 
ruled out backward time travel altogether, as there remains 
one alternative yet to be examined. 
Section 7 
Relative Time Travel 
Time travel into the relative present is, at first 
glance, an acceptable consequence of high-velocity spatial 
movement. The traveller enters a space-ship and then moves 
off at high speed to a neighbouring star system. From there 
he sends a message back to Earth at near light speed as 
proof of his achievement. By comparing the distance the 
message has travelled with the time taken to complete the 
journey, it would be possible to determine how far into the 
past the traveller had journeyed. If the traveller were to 
send a message from the star system of Alpha Centauri -- 
which is approximately 4.3 light years from Earth -- the 
message might arrive only five years after the departure of 
the astronaut/time traveller, indicating his existence in 
that star system at a time more than three years before his 
message reaches Earth. Provided that the message cannot be 
sent on to reach Alpha Centauri before the traveller sends 
it, no logical contradiction would be generated13. However, 
even with this system problems may arise. 
13. were the traveller's machine and the message both to move at light speed (per 
i. possibile) the message would arrive, at the earliest, 8.6 years after the traveller's 
initial departure. This is not satisfactory. Consequently, the traveller must use a short- 
cut, e. g. a worm-hole, to shorten his journey time in order that the message may arrive 
after the interval suggested. 
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As the astronaut travels through space and time he must 
ensure that he never enters the backward light cone of one 
of his own past or present endeavours, because this would 
generate the same potential for logical contradiction 
arising from closed causal chains as a journey into his own 
past light cone here on Earth. The potential for such 
violations will depend on the velocities achieved and the 
area covered by such an astronaut. Yet because what is 
logically impossible cannot occur, there remains the 
argument that, as a matter of fact, the traveller simply 
does not place himself in a position where logical 
contradictions must arise. Thus, even were the physical 
potential realised, it would remain a matter of fact that he 
would never enter the backward light cone of his own past 
actions, or he would simply refrain from any action that 
might generate a contradiction. While it is necessary that 
one or other of these conditions be satisfied if the 
traveller is to continue with his activities, as with the 
conditions for time travel into the causal past of the 
traveller on his own planet, their fulfilment in this 
example seems either miraculous or highly suspect. The full 
impact of the last option is succinctly summarised by 
William Lane Craig, in his article Tachyons, Time Travel and 
Divine Omniscience where he considers a situation where it 
is possible to generate logical contradictions (in his case 
he appeals to the Tolman Paradox14, but the effect is the 
14. First suggested as early as 1917, the paradox envisions the following scenario: Person 
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same), but the young time travellers involved refrain from 
performing the required acts because they are ordered to do 
so. Craig writes 
does the very structure of space and time 
thus depend on the obedience of callow, young recruits 
to their commanding officer? 
Craig, 1988, p. 146. 
This might equally apply to Chronos. Is the entire structure 
of space and time to depend on his conveniently refraining 
from any act that might generate a logical contradiction? 
Clearly, the answer is `No'. If it is a fact that Chronos 
cannot perform a certain act -- not because he is 
constrained, but because it is akin to a mathematician 
attempting to square the circle -- then his travels must 
necessarily never place him in a position where it would be 
possible for him to perform that act. The simplest way to 
achieve this aim is by the denial of any system of backward 
time travel that might engender such consequences. Hence, 
not only is backward time travel into the immediate causal 
past of the time traveller shown to be highly improbable 
and, depending on the physical nature of causal relations, 
logically impossible, but so too is any system of backward 
temporal movement with the potential in due course to create 
A sends a message backwards in time to person B if and only if he does not receive a 
message from person B. Person B sends a message forwards in time to person A if and only 
it he receives a message from person A. Hence the message is sent if and only if it is not 
sent. 
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the same contradictions. Backward temporal movement across 
immense inter-stellar distances is therefore logically 
possible, provided that the amount of backward temporal 
movement is always balanced by the amount of time spent in 
achieving it. As a matter of logical, rather than physical, 
fact, no velocity can ever be achieved or short-cut be used 
that might generate a contradiction along the lines 
discussed in this thesis. 
In these chapters I have analysed every aspect of the 
time traveller's nature. It is now time to pull together all 
the strands of the arguments that have arisen from these 
studies, and consider the conclusions arising from them and 
the potential for further research that they indicate. 
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